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This thesis critically investigates how microfinance remains a development policy despite 
considerable evidence claiming it is neither pro-poor nor pro-women. The neoliberalisation 
of the development agenda to support structural adjustment required a solution to poverty 
that was market based. That solution was microfinance. Microfinance is high interest debt to 
the poor and, I argue, a tool not for poverty reduction but for the financialisation of poverty. 
Using the case of Egypt and Gramsci’s framework of hegemony, this thesis explores the way 
the microfinance industry has been able to present a convincing case for the ability of 
microfinance to address the issues of poverty, supported by narratives of individual 
empowerment. To facilitate the mainstream acceptance of debt for the poor, the 
microfinance industry promoted narratives which constructed the lives of those that borrow 
around ideas that later become popularly supported. The poor are cast as aspiring 
entrepreneurs by the industry, which works to shape the opinions of policy makers to embed 
those ideas into development policy. Through data provided by participants at all levels of the 
microfinance industry, this thesis sought to determine the role narratives play in maintaining 
the hegemony of microfinance. Evidence demonstrates that the industry relies on these 
narratives at a policy level to maintain the hegemony of microfinance while covering up the 
financialisation of poverty. On the ground, the narratives are shown as irrelevant and that 
loans to the poor are part of a coping strategy of last resort for those that are forced to live 
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Microfinance globally continues to be positioned as a critical development tool in the fight 
against poverty and exclusion. Its attractiveness is based largely on Mohammed Yunus’ (1999) 
30-year-old entrepreneurial narrative that providing loans to the poor allows them to unleash 
their commercial creativity, become entrepreneurs, improve their income, gain inclusion, and 
create a positive spiral out of poverty. Despite the attractiveness of Yunus’ narrative, there is 
a polemical debate regarding its actual effects on poverty reduction. Critics of microfinance, 
have contended that microfinance neither reduces poverty, promotes entrepreneurship, nor 
creates inclusivity (Bateman, 2010b; Bateman, 2014; Blowfield and Dolan 2014; Mader, 2015; 
Mader, 2016; Bateman and Maclean, 2017; Mader, 2017a;  Kar, 2018). Microfinance was sold 
to the world as a tool to banish poverty to the museums (Yunus, 1999: 282), however, it is 
evident that the reality of microfinance is at odds with those claims. It is now accepted that 
microfinance is not a miracle tool for bottom-up entrepreneurial development. Yet the 
development industry, led by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), remains certain 
that microfinance has a key role in assisting the lives of the poor.  
 
Whilst living and working in Cairo for an international corporate bank, I had the opportunity 
to work with the microfinance industry over a prolonged period. Over a number of years, I 
went from being a supporter of microfinance to someone who had serious doubts about the 
impact that the intervention claimed to have on borrowers. The disjuncture between the 
industry’s claims and my observations of the borrowers’ realities was the inspiration for my 
research. I sought to understand how debt, something I understood well as a banker, could 
become laden with expectation when introduced to the poor. The foundations of my work 
were based on a historical review of the stories told by the microfinance industry. In tracing 
the industry’s growth, I found consistent patterns of storytelling (which I understood as 
narratives) created and promoted by the industry to position microfinance as a critical 
development policy. It is these narratives which I viewed as assigning roles to debt far beyond 
anything debt could reasonably achieve. Building on the concept of narratives, I sought to 
observe the role narratives played for the microfinance industry to better understand if they 
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were associated with the favoured position of microfinance as a development policy that I 
understood to be ineffective.  
 
This thesis demonstrates how the microfinance industry relies on narratives that position 
microfinance as a key development policy. These narratives enable the industry to maintain 
its role in the lives of the poor. In observing microfinance, I determined that it is a hegemonic 
policy and concluded that the industry was supported by narratives which maintained that 
hegemony. I view microfinance as hegemonic largely due to its comprehensive inclusion in 
the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN, 2015). Hegemony, in 
simple terms, is the control of one group over another through means other than force 
(Gramsci, 1971), a position I understand to be reflective of the microfinance industry. The 
development sector remains certain microfinance has a positive role in the lives of the poor, 
yet the evidence suggests otherwise. I argue the industry’s continued dominance is supported 
by narratives that assign positive roles to debt and justify interventions that are not able to 
yield these positive outcomes. Microfinance is a tool used to expand the role of financial 
capital in the lives of the poor, extracting capital from those at the bottom of the pyramid and 
enriching those at the top. Using Egypt as a case study, I examine the role of narratives around 
microfinance through a range of interviews with industry participants. By reaching out to all 
levels, from policy makers to borrowers, I sought to better understand the role narratives play 
in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance and covering up the financialisation of poverty.  
 
Microfinance and Development  
 
Microfinance is a development intervention based on neoliberal ideas and was developed 
during a time where state-led development was rejected and individualistic self-help was the 
dominant ideological imperative. Neoliberalism, an agenda based on the deregulation of 
economies, the promotion of open markets to trade and capital, and the downsizing of the 
state through austerity or privatisation, is the structural underpinning of microfinance. 
Microfinance has been supported by narratives which have homogenised the poor, recast 
their relationship with the state, and integrated them into global financial networks by 
framing them as entrepreneurs seeking capital to participate in markets (Blowfield and Dolan, 
2014; Mader, 2015; Kar, 2018). Neoliberalism depoliticises poverty and narratives of 
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microfinance depoliticise poverty reduction. The industry casts the solution to poverty as an 
individualistic financial endeavour rather than something achieved through alternative 
redistributive methods.  
 
The narratives of microfinance are packaged within the imaginings of the American dream: 
that individual determination and hard work provide opportunities for individuals to realise 
their aspirations (Johnson, 2006). It is a dream where rich and poor alike pursue personal 
wealth as a means of fulfilment and freedom. I argue that the American dream is appropriated 
by narratives of microfinance and imposed upon the Global South. In observing the difference 
between microfinance narratives and reality, I questioned whether those people the 
narratives spoke about understood the terms that the industry placed upon them. I wanted 
to better understand whether the narratives of microfinance were reflected in the 
perceptions of participants and see if they had internalised the American dream. Using 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, I set out to observe whether the poor were convinced that 
entrepreneurial self-help through debt was a solution to their poverty in the same way that 
the development industry is.  
 
Research has shown that microfinance does not work for the poor (Bateman, 2010; 
Duvendack et al., 2011; Kar, 2018), yet its continued growth would indicate it does work for 
someone. Microfinance is not a small arm of niche finance. It is a large and profitable part of 
global capital with wholesale investments in microfinance yielding returns far greater than 
traditional markets (Ingrid, 2007). Therefore, microfinance appears to work for the global 
financial system. When presented without a narrative, microfinance simply consists of selling 
high interest debt to the world’s poorest with profits going to the world’s richest – not a 
convincing story for a development policy. I argue that through carefully crafted narratives 
about the entrepreneurial poor helping themselves out of poverty, or the excluded gaining 
inclusion, the concept of high interest debt to the poor becomes not only palatable but a 
development imperative. I seek not to prove or disprove the impact of microfinance, but to 
understand why despite considerable evidence against it (Bateman, 2010b; Bateman, 2014; 
Blowfield and Dolan 2014; Mader, 2015; Mader, 2016; Bateman and Maclean, 2017; Mader, 
2017a; Kar, 2018), microfinance is still considered a key development policy. 
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There are a number of terms that will be used throughout this thesis that will be defined in 
more detail in the subsequent chapters. However, for the purpose of the introduction I shall 
briefly establish the notions being discussed. Narratives are central to the argument of this 
thesis and in the most basic of senses are defined as:  
 
…… discourses with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way 
for a definite audience and thus offer insights about the world and/or people’s 
experiences of it. (Hinchman and Hinchman, 1997:16) 
 
For my research, this definition provides a clear framework because of its focus on two key 
features of narratives. The definition states that narratives are meaningful and are socially 
defined for a specific audience, things I view as being true of the narratives of microfinance. 
The study of narratives will be explored further in chapter three, but this definition provides 
an understanding of their role in my research for this opening chapter.  
 
Hegemony is the theoretical framework that I shall use to analyse and interpret my data. The 
theoretical framework chapter will outline in full detail Gramsci’s theory, but to aid the 
understanding of this introduction it is important to define what is to be understood by that 
term. Hegemony has been a critical concept in Marxism for explaining power relations 
between the ruling and subordinate classes. Hegemony is used to explain the control of one 
group over another through means other than force (Gramsci, 1971). I shall use Morton’s 
refinement of Gramsci’s definition of hegemony as the basis on which I shall develop my 
theoretical framework: “The articulation and justification of a particular set of interests as 
general interests” (Morton, 2007:113). Morton’s definition is appropriate for the discussion 
of narratives in my research because it outlines the process I view as taking place within the 
microfinance industry. The industry promotes a narrative that articulates a neoliberal solution 
to poverty as being ‘the’ solution to poverty.  
 
Throughout my work I state that microfinance is hegemonic at a policy level. I use the term 
policy level to refer to the inclusion of microfinance in the broad spectrum of development 
interventions that are being forwarded by the industry as part of the SDGs. For the purpose 
of this research, I conceptualise development policy as the “commitment to eradicate poverty 
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and achieve sustainable development by 2030 worldwide, ensuring that no one is left behind” 
(UN, 2015). If the achievement of the SDGs is contingent on poor individuals taking personal 
debt to pay for education (SDG 4), health (SDG 3), food (SDG 2), equality (SDG 5) and to 
eradicate poverty (SDG 1), then according on my research, that strategy is flawed. The 
literature has demonstrated that microfinance fails to sustainably improve any of those 
factors, which supports my claim that the industry relies on narratives to maintain its 
hegemony. 
 
The Narratives of Microfinance  
 
I argue that narratives within the microfinance industry are created stories that the industry 
promotes to ensure that the policy remains hegemonic. In order to understand the details of 
the narratives that are to be discussed, this section provides an overview of the two main 
narratives of microfinance. The aim is to demonstrate through the industry’s own literature 
how the IFIs and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) promoted those narratives. This overview 
sets the scene and demonstrates how the microfinance industry convinced policy makers that 
the poor were aspiring entrepreneurs in desperate need of debt.   
 
The Entrepreneur  
 
The primary protagonist of microfinance industry narratives is the entrepreneur. This figure 
is based on the classical economic theories of Adam Smith (1776) and J. S Mill (1836). The 
rational and utility seeking individual named ‘Homo-economicus’ pursues the goal of 
economic growth through investing in enterprise in a free market economy (Mill, 1836). The 
belief held by Smith, that the efficiency of the market will spread wealth across society, 
benefit millions, and move society as a whole out of poverty, is also held by Yunus (1999: 12). 
The construction of the narrowly focused, rationally self-interested individual was central to 
neoliberal ideas that in turn supported microfinance. Neoliberalism reduced the role of the 
state in development processes and strengthened the ideal of development as an 
individualistic task.  
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Yunus’ construction of a microentrepreneur was highly compatible with neoliberal ideas. 
Every poor individual is homogenised and cast as an entrepreneur. If they could borrow, they 
could succeed. Economic growth is considered the result of people’s capacity to innovate, 
grow a business, increase employment, and subsequently increase demand, creating a 
virtuous circle (Green, 2008). Microfinance promotes income-generating activities, the 
increase in income is accumulated not only to address the material issues of poverty but also 
to address the deeply rooted issues caused by poverty: ill health, poor education, unsuitable 
housing, lack of empowerment, and vulnerability. Microfinance was described as a way to 
end poverty, a world where individuals could meet their own basic life needs, a world where 
there would be no need for charity, for welfare, or for hand-outs. This appears to be a win-
win development methodology (Yunus, 1999: 25).  
 
A significant body of academic literature (Soto, 1989; Todd, 1996; Alexander, 2001; Dunn and 
Arbuckle, 2001; Snodgrass and Sebstad, 2002; Kaboski and Townsend, 2005; Kondo, 2007; 
McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008; McKenzie, 2015; Bruhn and Inessa, 2009; Syed, 2009) and MFI 
led impact assessments (BRAC, 1996; Grameen, 1997; ASA, 2003; CARD, 1997; Kashf, 2004) 
supported Yunus’ claims. Access to microfinance was shown to create employment by 
increasing jobs or the number of productive hours worked (Binswanger and Khandker, 1992; 
Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Yunus, 1999; Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001; Zohir and Matin, 2004; 
Christensen, Parsons and Fairbourne, 2010). Microfinance was shown to create employment 
for large unemployed populations who had little opportunity in the formal or government 
sectors (Akintoye, 2006; Akintoye, 2008).  
 
The original Yunus model of microfinance was targeted at women. Microfinance was designed 
to empower women in their communities and in their homes (Yunus, 1999; Kulkarni, 2011). 
Traditional, religious, or rural women are identified as people that have limited interactions 
with the world outside their house or family, and that lack of status includes having little or 
no access to financial services (Yunus, 1989). Microfinance empowers women. Empowerment 
is categorised by Sen (1990) as “universally valued functionings” that, regardless of context, 
are the basis of survival and wellbeing. Empowerment comprises change (Mayoux, 1998), 
choice (Kabeer, 2001), and power (Mayoux, 2001). Women who are able to access finance 
gain the power of controlling a loan and are better able to make or challenge decisions within 
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the household for themselves and their families  (Ackerley, 1995; Todd, 1996; Amin and 
Becker, 1998; Yunus, 1999; Montgomery, 2005; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2006; Osmani, 
2007; Hazarika, 2007; Roome, 2008; Li, Gan and Hu, 2011; Samad, 2014).  
 
The entrepreneurial narrative of microfinance constructs a silver bullet-like intervention that 
not only impacts employment and consumption but also health, education, and women’s 
empowerment. Using research to skilfully communicate the positives of microfinance, the 
industry created the perception that the poor are all potential entrepreneurs only held back 
by lack of capital.  
 
Financial Inclusion  
 
The positive impacts demonstrated by entrepreneurial microfinance have been challenged 
and rebutted not only by academics but also the development organisations that fund and 
support microfinance (Osmani, 1989; Quasem, 1991; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Morduch, 1998; 
Rahman, 1999; Hulme and Arun, 2009; Karlan and Zinman, 2009; Bateman, 2010b; Duvendack 
et al., 2011; van Rooyen, Stewart and de Wet, 2012; Bateman and Chang, 2012; Sinclair, 2012; 
Garikipati, 2013; Bateman, 2014; Duvendack, Palmer-Jones and Vaessen, 2014; Banerjee et 
al., 2015; Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman, 2015; Mader, 2015; Bateman and Maclean, 2017). All 
of these studies find counterevidence to the claims made by Yunus’ entrepreneurial school, 
proving that the poor were not credit-constrained entrepreneurs and that microfinance did 
not improve their wealth, their health, or empower women. What was perhaps unique about 
many of the challenges these studies brought to microfinance was the paradigm in which they 
were rooted. The challenges to microfinance remained supportive of microfinance, they just 
did not support the entrepreneurial narrative.  
 
The financial inclusion narrative, and the transition between it and the entrepreneurial 
narrative, is best illustrated by the academic exchanges between Khandker and Pitt and 
Morduch and Roodman. Khandker and Pitt’s (1998) seminal work found significant 
improvements in borrowers’ poverty statuses over non-borrowers. This was directly 
challenged by Morduch (1998) who cited concerns with their data and found no significant 
impacts on poverty using the same data set. Morduch however was not suggesting that 
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microfinance was wrong in principle, just that it achieved different but equally important 
things. Microfinance in the view of Morduch provides the poor with an important tool with 
which to manage their lives. The debate continued through a long journal article exchange 
(Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Pitt, 1999; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2006; Pitt, 2014b; Pitt, 
2014a; Morduch, 1998; Roodman and Morduch, 2009; Roodman and Morduch, 2014) and 
signified what became the debate of entrepreneurial microfinance versus financial inclusion. 
The impact was debated, the intervention was not.  
 
Microfinance was now the end, not the means. Creating jobs or alleviating poverty was no 
longer important. The aim was to provide sustainable financial services to the poor. The major 
supporters of microfinance changed the discourse and began stating that their aim was 
“providing poor households throughout the world with flexible and high-quality financial 
services on a sustainable basis” (CGAP, 2001: 1 cited in Mader 2015: 11), when years before 
they had claimed microfinance was “the single most effective way to reduce poverty and 
achieve broad-based economic growth” (CGAP, 1995a: 1 cited in Mader 2015: 11). The 
language used across the industry changed. The new narrative was the provision of 
sustainable financial services for all (WBG, 2014) with little mention of the impact on poverty 
or development (Mader, 2015; 2017a). The provision of financial services to those living in 
poverty helps them manage the complexities of their financial lives. This was particularly 
important when framed by the academics who support financial inclusion. Supporters of 
financial inclusion claim that for the poor, “not having enough money is bad enough. Not 
being able to manage whatever money you have is worse” (Collins et al., 2009:184).  
 
I acknowledge clearly that financial inclusion is a broad agenda which encompasses not only 
loans but savings, payment systems, bank accounts, and financial training for the poor. For 
the purposes of this thesis, however, financial inclusion shall be discussed in a narrower 
context, looking at only the loans offered under this narrative. The reason for this is twofold, 
firstly it makes the activities directly comparable to loans under the entrepreneurial narrative, 




The Structure of Neoliberalism  
 
Microfinance is a product of neoliberal ideas; the narratives clearly demonstrate their 
alignment. Neoliberalism is most commonly associated with the Thatcher and Reagan era of 
Western politics when market liberals were challenging post-war Keynesian economic 
thought, ending interventionism, and starting a wave of free market fundamentalism (Harvey, 
2007). The ideology of neo-liberalism is built on the idea personal welfare is maximised by the 
encouragement of private enterprise and the increase in individual responsibility. Free 
markets facilitate the actions of self-interested entrepreneurs who work to provide goods and 
services efficiently and effectively (Olssen and Peters, 2005). Under neoliberalism, a range of 
activities of government should be privatised, public holdings, and services should be sold off 
to the private sector for efficient delivery (Olssen and Peters, 2005; Harvey, 2007). The 
ideology claims the reduction of government intervention in the provision of social goods, the 
deregulation of financial markets, and the increase in private investment has generated an 
era of unparalleled social wellbeing for the world.    
 
Neoliberalism first appeared in development policy in the 1980s (Gore, 2000). The rise in 
developing world government debt, followed by the subsequent period of over indebtedness 
and default, allowed the IFIs to intervene and restructure the debt around neoliberal 
conditionalities (Harvey, 2007). The previous era of state-led development policy was called 
into question and policies of macroeconomic stability through fiscal discipline, public service 
retrenchment, state privatisation, trade liberalisation, tax reform, deregulation, and securing 
of property rights were promoted instead (Gore, 2000). Collectively, this became known as 
the Washington Consensus. Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were the 
implementation tool, debt refinancing was offered to governments on the condition of 
market reforms (Easterly, 2005). Neoliberal policies led to the growth of poverty, 
unemployment, and social inequalities in the countries that implemented them. The 
situations created by the SAPs led to political instability so that the IFIs needed a solution to 
address the threat of instability in current and future SAPs. Publicly, this is where the ideology 
of neoliberalism and the narratives of microfinance merged, allowing microfinance to be the 
tool to offer hope to those facing cuts under the SAPs. 
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Neoliberalism created a backdrop where the narratives of microfinance could become 
pervasive. Both the narratives of entrepreneurship and later that of financial inclusion are 
aligned with the politics of neoliberalism, a tool to spur entrepreneurial activity or a way for 
people to pay for privatised services. The IFIs encouraged and created MFIs across the 
developing world, to promote the informal sector and soak up the unemployed (Mader, 
2015). The narratives at a policy level claimed microfinance could address poverty. 
Policymakers were convinced and integrated microfinance into the SAPs as part of the 
emergency social fund, a measure designed to assist the informal sector and support the 
adjustment process (Glaessner, 1994; Weber, 2004). 
 
Neoliberalism and The Financialisation of Poverty  
 
Financialisation is an outcome of the neoliberal restructuring of an economic system, 
resulting in an expanded role for finance within those economies. Since the 1980s, 
neoliberalism has positioned finance as being of greater importance than the non-financial 
sector (Kotz, 2008: 2), creating an increased role for the financial sector in the lives of 
populations. Neoliberal economic systems undertake a process of financialisation, defined as:   
 
….... a process whereby financial markets, financial institutions and financial elites gain 
greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes. Financialisation 
transforms the functioning of economic system at both the macro and micro levels 
(Palley, 2007: 1).  
 
Kotz (2008:2) argues that financialisation as a process has been driven by neo-liberalism, not 
that financialisation facilitated the rise of neoliberalism as many previously thought. 
Neoliberal economies require financialisation for the process of accumulation to take place. 
Under the process of financialisation, the role of the financial sector is increased but the non-
financial sector shrinks in relative importance, leading to an increase in income inequality, 
wage stagnation, and a decrease in actual productivity. Financialised economies are at greater 
risk of debt deflation and cycles of recession. At an individual level, financialisation has led to 
a large increase in personal debt which has been made necessary by neoliberal economic 
reforms (Kotz, 2002).  
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The inspiration for this thesis is the work of what I term the financialisation of poverty school. 
It is the works of Milford Bateman (2010b; 2012; 2014; 2017) and Philip Mader (2013; 2014; 
2015; 2016; 2017a; 2017b) that have driven my research, and introduced me to the notion of 
the financialisation of poverty. The school views microfinance not as a tool for development 
but as a tool to financialise poverty. Neoliberalism across the developing world, as well as in 
the development agenda, has promoted the reduction of the role of the state and seen the 
increase in the privatisation of basic services. There has been a systematic increase in the role 
of the financial sector in the lives of the poor. Neoliberalism created markets and 
microfinance is the tool with which people participate. The narrative of financial inclusion has 
been created by the microfinance industry to assign a positive role for debt in the face of the 
financialisation of poverty. Microfinance runs counter to sustainable social and economic 
development, designed to cover capitalist accumulation in the lives of the poorest.  
 
The Research Question  
 
My research sought to better understand how the microfinance industry relies on narratives. 
This introduction has defined the process of the financialisaton of poverty taking place under 
the cover of narratives, a process I understand as the maintenance of hegemony. I argue that 
hegemony is what maintains microfinance as a development policy and explains its position 
in the policy space while it is unable to demonstrate effectiveness. The relationship between 
microfinance and hegemony is under-explored. Milford Bateman constructs a similar 
argument using the concept of agnotology (2014). Bateman states that agnotology, the study 
of ignorance, or what we don’t know and why we don’t know it, explains the actions of the 
microfinance industry in creating the narratives of microfinance. The industry hides and 
deflects from the negative outcomes generated by microfinance by actively promoting the 
positive, producing a designed ignorance. Whilst I find Bateman’s argument to be compelling, 
the argument fails to fully explain the depth of the views and beliefs held by supporters of 
microfinance. I maintain that to alter the sense-making of those who are concerned with the 
wellbeing of others (charities, NGOs), to be openly providing high interest debt to the world’s 
poorest for a profit goes beyond agnotology. The way the industry and its supporters hold the 
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narratives of microfinance to be true, even in the face of evidence to the contrary, I argue it 
is more than ignorance, it is the result of hegemony.  
 
The broad objective of this thesis is to explore the role of the narratives of microfinance in 
maintaining hegemony through the perceptions, understandings, and interpretations of 
those involved, using the case study of Egypt. The narratives of microfinance can be found 
throughout development policy and are foundational in the SDGs (UN, 2015). In Egypt, 
microfinance is a favoured tool of the Government and the IFIs. This position is maintained, 
despite the considerable evidence against microfinance. To focus the research, I will address 
one core question:  
 
• What role do narratives play in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance in Egypt?  
 
In order to answer the core research question and to formulate the research materials, I 
created two sub-questions.  
 
• Why do people engage with microfinance?  
• What do those people believe they are participating in?  
 
Microfinance seemingly has the ability to gain broad acceptance wherever it is introduced. To 
understand the role of narratives in that acceptance, the perceptions and experiences of 
those that are active in the industry were used to provide insight. Individuals from multiple 
levels within the industry were sought out to answer questions to determine what they 
perceived microfinance to achieve. The term ‘people’ is used within the sub-questions to 
indicate the broad range of those who engage with microfinance and who participated in this 
study. People could also be referred to as ‘the industry’, but those that borrow from MFIs 
would technically fall outside of that definition.  
 
To achieve the research objective and answer the research question, I used a qualitative 
methodology in the form of semi-structured interviews. To provide the depth and scope 
required to allow an investigation into hegemony and the role of narratives, the participants 
were made up of multiple tiers of the microfinance industry, from policy to practice. Senior 
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IFI representatives and the CEOs of large MFIs were interviewed alongside loan officers and 
microfinance borrowers. To address the question effectively, I grouped the participants into 
two levels defined as the mechanisms of hegemony - the IFIs and MFIs - and the consumers 
of hegemony - the loan officers and the borrowers. Each group provided insight into the 
promotion and the reception of narratives. Their perceptions and realities help uncover the 
role of narratives in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance. 
  
Semi-structured interviews were selected where questions were developed in direct 
connection with the literature discussed in the subsequent chapters. The semi-structured 
format allowed for the deep exploration of perceptions and experiences and maintained the 
flexibility to adjust the terminology to reflect the specific individual’s position. Flexibility in 
the questions was particularly important as participants ranged from Harvard educated 
directors of IFIs to female borrowers from the poorest areas of Cairo. Understanding that 
many of the participants of this study were vulnerable, ethical considerations were crucially 
important. Using guidance from the University of Bristol, I ensured that research participants 
were not subjected to harm as part of this process. Consent was gained, privacy was ensured, 
and each participant was aware that they could withdraw at any time. It was paramount for 
this research to make a meaningful contribution to the literature without jeopardising those 
that participated.  
 
Implications of this Thesis  
 
Microfinance is a global development intervention. Therefore, the fieldwork for this thesis 
could have taken place in any country that has exposure to microfinance. I have selected 
Egypt for two reasons. Firstly, my professional background is in financial services there and I 
speak the Egyptian Arabic dialect. Secondly, due to the recent transformation of the 
microfinance industry in the country, Egypt is a post-colonial state that had experienced 
socialism followed by development programmes driven by the Washington Consensus. 
Microfinance has been part of the Egyptian landscape since the late 1980s and the population 
have seemingly accepted the presence of MFIs as part of everyday life. Egypt provides a depth 
to the study of the narratives of microfinance that is perhaps not found elsewhere. In Egypt, 
the narrative of microfinance has gone full circle, from entrepreneurship to financial inclusion 
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and, since 2014 to the present, back to entrepreneurship. The switch back to the promotion 
of entrepreneurial microfinance is directly related to a new programme of structural 
adjustment, the 2016 Country Partnership Framework (CPF) (WBG, 2015). The CPF has been 
implemented by the IMF, World Bank and the Egyptian Government. It promoted market 
reforms and government retrenchment. I saw this as an opportunity to observe the narratives 
of microfinance in action as they were promoted to a population who were experiencing price 
rises and growing unemployment. The case of Egypt allowed me to explore whether the 
narratives of microfinance take people on a journey where beliefs are shaped, and their 
opinions moulded, as the theory of hegemony suggests. Observing how participants perceive 
narratives will help determine whether the narratives of microfinance are tools overlaid at a 
policy level to influence policy while perceptions on the ground are divergent.   
 
The implications of this research will allow for microfinance to be understood in a 
conceptually different way. It will allow those that engage with microfinance believing that 
they are helping people escape poverty to view the intervention through a different lens. My 
research presents the understanding that the prescribed ‘impact’ of microfinance is a 
narrative and a tool in a process of the financialisation of poverty. This thesis will demonstrate 
that microfinance is popular not because it is effective but because it is hegemonic, with 
narratives acting to conceal a reality divergent from the ideas presented in the narratives.  
 
The Structure of this Thesis  
 
The structure of this thesis emerged from my approach to understanding the role of 
narratives in Egypt. The four analytical chapters (chapters five to eight) give insight into the 
participants’ perceptions of microfinance across each level of the industry. The order flows 
from the IFIs through the MFIs to eventually reach the borrowers. This order appeared logical 
because it not only traced the flow of money in microfinance but it also traced the flow of 
narratives from the mechanisms to the recipients of hegemony. To set the scene for my 
research, chapters two, three, and four act as guides. Chapter two traces the history of 
microfinance through the terms of its narratives. Chapter three outlines my Gramscian 
approach to viewing the microfinance industry. The context of Egypt and the details of my 
case study are laid out in chapter four which leads into the four following analytical chapters. 
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Microfinance is a product of neoliberalism and understanding it situated within its political 
economy allows my research, through Gramsci’s lens, to separate the narrative from reality. 
In doing so I observe the industry’s reliance on narratives to maintain the hegemony of 




Chapter 2 - The Political Economy of Microfinance 
 
 
Introduction   
 
It is no secret that microfinance is financial capitalism’s response to poverty (Mader, 2015). 
Building banks and using capital markets to create a more equitable world where everyone 
can participate and no one lives in poverty. Of increasing size and global importance, the 
microfinance system is a paradigmatic stand for the faith in the modern-day financial order 
which its proponents and supporters truly believe (Bateman and Chang, 2012). Once a tiny 
sub-industry and now a global phenomenon, its claims of eradicating poverty and 
empowering women have caught the imagination of the world. Financial markets can take 
capital from the very richest and lend it directly to the very poorest. Contemporary capitalism 
can reach into the African villages and Asian slums and lift those living there out of poverty 
(Fisher & Sriram, 2002).  
 
Any development policy that holds such strong claims of poverty eradication and 
empowerment should expect scrutiny. However, as the literature presented in the 
introductory chapter illustrated, the majority of the research into microfinance comes from 
within its own capitalist paradigm. Challengers often support the underlying principle of 
microfinance and focus their critiques on the intricacies of institutional performance and the 
extent or type of beneficiary impact. The dominant arguments in the literature for the first 25 
years of microfinance was that it was an exciting possibility for reducing poverty. The question 
has simply been how effective it has been rather than whether it has been effective at all 
(Morduch, 2005). It was not until much more recently that challenges were mounted from a 
truly critical perspective, looking at the paradigm of microfinance as a structural poverty trap 
and nothing more than the extension of neoliberal capitalism to the poorest (Elyachar, 2005; 
Bateman, 2010b; Bateman and Chang, 2012; Mader, 2013; Mader, 2014; Bateman, 2014; 
Mader, 2015; Mader, 2016; Mader, 2017a; Bateman and Maclean, 2017; Kar, 2018).  
 
In 2011, faced with growing numbers of impact studies yielding inconclusive results and a new 
critical strand of literature, DfID undertook a comprehensive review of microfinance impact 
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studies (Duvendack et al., 2011). This review aimed to give clear indications of what was 
known globally about the impact of microfinance. Dr. Duvendack, who led the DfID-funded 
research ultimately concluded that those conducting the study “don’t know what it 
(microfinance) actually achieves” (Duvendack et al., 2011: 75).  So, after 30 plus years of 
microfinance practice and impact assessments, there was no definitive answer as to what 
microfinance does. Despite this report and countless others failing to provide tangible 
evidence of impact, the microfinance industry has been unaffected. The growth rate for 
microfinance has been steady at 15% per annum (ResponsAbility, 2018).  
 
I believe that microfinance has achieved a hegemonic position in global development policy 
supported by created narratives. The narratives of microfinance appear malleable and 
respond actively to global trends or critical research. The aim of this literature review is to 
move away from the “does it or doesn’t it” impact studies discussed in the introduction and 
explore it structurally within the wider political economy within which this intervention and 
its narratives have grown. The growth of modern microfinance was concurrent with the 
growth of a form of laissez-faire economic liberalism, known as neoliberalism (Mader, 2015). 
This signalled a profound change in economic thought in the developed world that inevitably 
found its way into the logic of development. IFI implemented macro-level structural 
adjustments paved the way for financial liberalisation and a market based micro-level 
approach to poverty reduction. Microfinance became the favoured policy choice of IFIs, 
development institutions and governments pursuing neoliberal reforms. Microfinance 
supported the macro-policy of structural adjustment alongside maintaining the micro-level 
market-driven ideology (Weber, 2000; 2002; 2004; Elyachar, 2005; Bateman, 2010b; Mader, 
2015; Kar, 2018).  
 
Microfinance supports government retrenchment and reconstructs people’s lives around 
new narratives of self-empowerment and freedom, all through the medium of finance 
(Mader, 2015; Kar, 2018). Microfinance urges people to unlearn their previous identities and 
cultural habits and accept one vision of a capitalist market, in which they are now 
‘entrepreneurs’ (Elyachar, 2005). The idea of precarious, informal labour is re-constructed as 
entrepreneurship and is admired by the world while the real structural issues of poverty are 
seemingly ignored (Kar, 2018). The individualistic idea of entrepreneurship as a ‘culture’ 
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created the idea that “every subject is rendered as entrepreneurial no matter how small, 
impoverished, or without resources and every aspect of human existence is produced as an 
entrepreneurial one” (Brown, 2015:65). The narrative of the poor as entrepreneurs promoted 
by the microfinance industry assisted the discourse of governments who were making macro-
level structural adjustments. It was said that the microenterprise sector, funded by 
microfinance, could soak up the growing amounts of surplus labour being created by the 
enactment of SAPs. Critical development theorist Eloise Weber explained that the popularity 
of the microfinance sector for governments was not only because it served to soak up 
unemployment but, more importantly, it was a tool which had the disciplinary potential to 
curtail collective political action through dividing labour into individual units (Weber, 2002).  
 
The promotion of the narratives of microfinance by the microfinance industry, including the 
IFIs, is part of an established process which allows the industry to assume and reinforce a 
controlling status in the development context. The IFIs have historically reduced complex 
multifaceted societal problems to singular technical or financial issues to which hold the 
solution. In a critique of IFI development policies, James Ferguson (1990) observes the case 
of Lesotho and specifically the cattle farming market. The IFIs construct the cattle market as 
uncompetitive and propose a market solution that would promote inward investment and 
revolutionise the cattle farming industry. Ferguson’s analysis demonstrates the 
misrepresentation of the realities on the ground by the IFIs through narratives. The IFIs used 
positive assertions of market-based solutions which allowed the IFIs to determine their 
intervention a success on its own terms. There are many similarities in the promotion of the 
narratives of microfinance, narratives which themselves define the success of microfinance. 
MFIs, through the IFIs, are gifted the power to define poverty and how it is best alleviated 
(Karim, 2008; Karim, 2011).  
 
Microfinance is conceptualised as poverty capital, a merger between development capital 
and finance capital working together to identify new geographies of investment that can be 
opened up. The concept shows microfinance narratives as tools with which the MFIs and IFIs 
promote “truths and knowledge about poverty and poverty as a resource” which is responsive 
to global capital (Roy, 2010; Mader, 2015:4). The world’s poorest have been integrated into 
global financial networks as part of the neoliberal development discourse, depoliticising 
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poverty by financialising it. The narratives of microfinance position poverty alleviation as an 
individualist task undertaken by the ‘entrepreneur’ rather than a redistributive process 
managed by the state (Brigg, 2001). The narratives fail to account for the often hostile political 
economy within which the poor operate (Wood, Maitrot and Devine, 2016: 7) and the realities 
of being a microentrepreneur.  
 
The narratives of microfinance position it as a tool of bottom-up development and social 
inclusion. However, the financialisation of poverty school sees it as the expansion of the 
frontiers of capitalism to the world’s poorest people. The two conflicting positions require 
deeper exploration to understand the intervention of microfinance in greater detail. Through 
this literature review, I investigate how the expansion of the microfinance industry and its 
surrounding narratives have grown, progressed, and changed over time to achieve broad 
global support, which is a position microfinance occupies without tangible evidence for its 
effectiveness (Duvendack et al., 2011). The review of literature traces the wider political 
economy in which microfinance has grown. The aim is to identify where the narratives have 
been significantly strengthened because the underlying principles are compatible with wider 
global trends.  
 
The Origins of Microfinance  
 
It would be difficult to talk about microfinance in any context without talking about Dr. 
Mohammed Yunus. As understood from the introductory chapter of this thesis, the USAID-
sponsored economist’s experiments with microloans in the village of Jobra, Bangladesh, was 
the beginning of what we know as the modern microfinance movement. It was his conception 
of poverty and solutions to it that form the underlying premise of today’s dominant narrative 
of microfinance. Whilst the term has never been explicitly used, what I term the Yunus School 
of Microfinance is built around the concept of entrepreneurship. Yunus’ book, Banker to the 
Poor (1999), constructs the poorest of the poor as entrepreneurs, all able to pull themselves 
out of poverty through enterprise. It was the narrative of entrepreneurship that made this 
approach so appealing, changing the discourse from poverty as a ‘problem’ to the poor being 
the ‘largest untapped market’.  
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Many of us see the millions of impoverished people in the world as a seemingly 
unsolvable 'problem'. However, we should see them as the world's largest untapped 
source of entrepreneurs and consumers (Yunus, 1999:1).  
 
Dr. Yunus’ economic ‘experiments’ took place throughout the 1970s and 80s but it was not 
until 1999 that Dr. Yunus published his book. By that time the Grameen Bank and its 
operations were globally renowned, and it was more a book of validation than the 
introduction of a new narrative. In the book, Dr. Yunus cleverly constructs microfinance 
against the traditional banking sector which he describes as “not being people worthy”. The 
Yunus School was not traditional banking. It was not about making money and it was not 
supposed to be exploitative. It was this strong differentiation from the mainstream finance 
sector that made microfinance attractive to those who would ordinarily oppose connecting 
banking, or debt, and poverty alleviation.               
 
The Yunus School’s legacy of differentiation from mainstream finance and the narrative of 
entrepreneurship is still dominant today. The dominance is shown in the fact that ‘everyone 
supports microfinance’. What is meant by this statement is not that microfinance is without 
its critics but it is an intervention that those on both the left and the right of the political 
spectrum actively support. Large global capitalist corporations work with NGOs, charities, and 
left-wing think tanks to actively promote microfinance. Organisations like Oxfam, ActionAid 
(Johnson and Rogaly, 1999) and Save the Children (StC, 2019) share a podium with hedge 
funds (Matthaus-Maier and Von Pischke, 2006) and global capital (Visa, 2019). The narrative 
of individualistic self-help became so dominant that it was the only way governments, 
organisations, and charities envisioned poverty alleviation. The structure within which it 
operated was unquestionable, the hegemonic narrative of neoliberal capitalism, fitting 
perfectly with the Western idiom of “teaching a man to fish”.  
 
The proliferation of the Yunus School entrepreneurial narrative cannot solely be attributed to 
Dr. Yunus as his book was not published until 1999. By that time, the microfinance industry 
and the Grameen Bank was already incredibly well known and well replicated (Syed, 2009). 
There had been earlier studies on the Grameen Bank, before Yunus’ work was published. The 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and Mahabub Hossain (Hossain and Salimullah, 
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1984) published one of the first. Mahabub Hossain had investigated the effectiveness of 
microcredit in rural Bangladesh using Grameen’s programme as the case study. Funded by 
the Washington-based International Food Policy Research Institute, part of a network of 
research institutes funded by the US Government and the World Bank, Hossain and Salimullah 
(1984) published their first report into the Grameen Bank. Their work was followed almost 
immediately by the work of Dharam Ghai (1984) who went on to be the Director of the UN 
Research Institute for Social Development in 1987. Both studies illustrated credit as an 
important entry point for economic and social advancement. Coincidentally, both studies 
were published by the Grameen Bank itself and funded by Washington-backed IFIs.  
 
The 1984 works of Hossain and Ghai were important at the time. However, they were more 
about experiences of starting an MFI than an impact assessment. The earliest comprehensive 
impact assessment was published in 1988, again by Mahabub Hossain (1988). Still under the 
instruction of the International Food Policy Research Institute, he published what for a long 
time was considered the most important document in microfinance. Hossain’s study was the 
first truly academic review of impact. The work can be considered pivotal in the history of 
microfinance as it formalised and “proved” what Grameen had been saying. The 
entrepreneurial self-help solution to poverty worked and now there was evidence. The work 
of Hossain, championed by the financially supportive IFIs, dominated and drove microfinance 
discourse for over a decade. It was the basis for much of the work done in the 1990s and was 
paramount when it came to the building of the structures of microfinance within the 
development industry.  
 
Hossain’s work led organisations who had been experimenting with microcredit, such as the 
ACCION network, to grow their lending programmes. In 1989, buoyed by the positive findings 
of Hossain, ACCION stated their public aims with a confidence not seen previously in the 
industry:      
  
The programs’ raison d’etre is: impact on the lives of the beneficiaries. This impact can 
be economic, social and human, and occurs through continued assistance to each 
beneficiary’s source of livelihood. This process leads to stabilisation and growth 
among the firms that are assisted, as witnessed by growing amounts of working capital 
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loans that firms can absorb. The programs, then, attempt to reach small firms that can 
grow. Through the provision of credit and assistance on credit management and other 
areas, the programs seek to make the firms more financially viable and larger 
(Olivares, 1989:14 cited in Mader, 2015).  
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were dominated by the Yunus School of Microfinance which 
forwarded the entrepreneurial narrative. Entrepreneurship amongst the poor had caught the 
imagination of the developing world and the microfinance industry grew at an accelerated 
pace (Robinson, 2001). Across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, microfinance accompanied 
SAPs as the poverty reduction tool of choice. CGAP, a non-profit financial inclusion think tank 
based at the World Bank offices in Washington, claimed in 1995 that:  
 
Financial services to low income entrepreneurs may be the single most effective way 
to reduce poverty and achieve broad based economic growth (CGAP, 1995b:1 cited in 
Mader 2015).  
 
Yunus, Hossain, the Grameen Bank and the wider development community had cemented 
the narrative of the entrepreneur into development mainstream and advanced the structures 
of capitalism to the poorest of the poor.      
 
Global Political Developments  
 
Whilst Yunus’ entrepreneurial microfinance was being trialled in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, there were great changes occurring in the global political economy. Post-WW2 
economics, which had been heavily influenced by John Maynard Keynes, were being strongly 
challenged by those of a freer market persuasion. The moderate interventionism as a way of 
producing superior outcomes in terms of prosperity and employment promoted by Keynesian 
economic thought was deemed too interfering by a growing band of market liberals. The 
election of Margret Thatcher in the UK in 1979 and the subsequent election of Ronald Reagan 
as President of the United States two years later saw the end of interventionism and the 
beginning of a period of free market fundamentalism (Harvey, 2007). 
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The rise of neoliberalism was contingent on the Keynesian economic crisis of the 1970s. A 
number of external factors contributing to a global period of stagflation and large government 
deficits were seized upon by the neoliberals. Milton Friedman, a Chicago School economist, 
argued that inflation was high due to the large increase in money supply by governments in 
the early 1970s. His assessment perhaps ignored external factors such as the oil crisis and the 
cost of certain wars (Mader, 2015). The ideas of the Chicago School gained ground rapidly, 
finding support within mainstream economics due to the seemingly empirical nature of their 
work. Keynesian economics was displaced and the neoliberal ideas of the Chicago school 
replaced them (Harvey, 2007).   
 
Neoliberalism hit the developing world with full force in the early 1980s (Gore, 2000). The 
1970s saw the major internationalisation of the US financial sector and a lending boom across 
the developing world. In Latin America, government debt rose at an annual compounded rate 
of 24% between 1970 and 1978. In the late 1970s, it became apparent that the ability for 
developing nations to continue servicing their debt was diminishing. Another oil crisis in 1979 
further exacerbated the problem. However, the problems did not stop the further 
accumulation of national debt and developing countries’ debts doubled between 1979 and 
1982 (Harvey, 2007). The early 1980s saw interest rates grow as the US Federal Reserve tried 
to combat high inflation in the US. This compounded the precarious debt service coverage of 
developing nation governments. In August 1982, Mexico was the first nation to disclose it 
could not meet its interest obligations on government debt. This triggered a chain of defaults 
across the developing world and by the end of 1982, 40 countries were in arrears on their 
debt. One year later 27 of those 40 nations were in negotiations with the Washington-based 
IFIs to restructure their debt (Harvey, 2007). 
 
This was the neoliberals’ opportunity to demonstrate their brand of economic development 
policy. In response to the debt-led state development policies of the past, a new breed of 
liberal economic reform was promoted. In what became known as the Washington 
Consensus, the IFIs, and the US Treasury Department prescribed policies of macroeconomic 
stability through fiscal discipline, public service retrenchment, state privatisation, trade 
liberalisation, tax reform, deregulation, and securing of property rights (Gore, 2000). These 
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changes were implemented through SAPs as conditions of debt refinancing and the provision 
of further loans to defaulting governments (Easterly, 2005). Structural adjustment loans were 
not to be used for infrastructure or industry but for implementing the austerity policies of the 
Washington Consensus. Third World governments went about cutting social spending, 
removing subsidies and price controls, reducing the size of the public sector, and privatising 
state industries. These changes had a profound negative impact on the populations of those 
countries, disproportionality the poorer. SAPs produced mass unemployment, general unrest 
and created a political threat within those nations. The IFIs needed policies to address the 
threats arising from the SAPs. It was important, however, that the policies were within the 
structure of the Washington framework (Denters, 1996).  
 
It was at this juncture that the IFIs saw the potential of microfinance. With growing 
unemployment from the shrinking government and formal sectors, there was a realisation (or 
a hope) that the informal sector could soak up some of the unemployed (Mader, 2015). The 
informal sector could be encouraged by the far-reaching provision of credit to the new 
unemployed, or entrepreneurs, as they then became known. Microfinance was formally 
included for the first time in 1985 as part of the SAP for Bolivia in a programme called the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) (Glaessner, 1994). Microfinance was part of the emergency social 
fund, a temporary measure designed to assist the informal sector and support the adjustment 
process until formal employment was re-created by the private sector (Glaessner, 1994; 
Weber, 2004). The formal inclusion of microfinance was being influenced by the World Bank-
funded impact study by Hossain and Salimullah (1984). The study, which validated the 
usefulness of microfinance within the context of high unemployment in Bangladesh, was used 
as a comparative case for Bolivia. Subsequently, microfinance was rolled out as part of the 
NEP. Under the NEP, microfinance was to be provided by the NGO sector who delivered 
subsidised pro-poor targeted poverty reduction microfinance. The aim of this was said to be 
twofold: first, to act as a social safety net and second, perhaps more controversially, to reduce 
political opposition to the NEP by providing a lifeline to those that opposed it (Jenkins, 1994; 
Jorgensen, 1992). Whilst the NEP’s macro-economic overall results were questionable 
(Jenkins, 1995), in the eyes of the World Bank, microfinance in Bolivia was a success 
(Robinson, 2001).  
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Buoyed by the Bolivian case, the World Bank sought to increase microfinance provision within 
the blueprint of all future SAPs (Mader, 2015). The combination of SAPs with microfinance 
was rolled out across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The IFIs used the NGO sector to provide 
microfinance, actively encouraging the formation of microfinance NGOs. The role each party 
played were mutually beneficial. As the IFIs implement the SAPs, they knew that 
unemployment and poverty would grow; creating a role for newly formed NGOs (Bateman 
and Chang, 2012). At this time, NGO microfinance was subsidised, often by the IFIs. NGOs 
were provided operational allowances to support their formation as well as cheap funds 
which meant they could offer low rates of interest to their clients.  
 
SAPs, backstopped by the social safety net of microfinance, were introduced across the 
developing world throughout the 1980s. During this time seminal works of the likes of Hossain 
(1988) and De Soto (1989) were published and promoted which validated the role of 
microfinance through the narrative of the entrepreneurial poor. It was constructed as a 
methodology that could be universally applied across the world to solve the problems of 
poverty. The microfinance industry worked tirelessly to further validate the claims of 
microfinance with assessments of their own programmes, conducted by themselves. 
Examples of these are the likes of Grameen’s annual report (1984 onwards), BRAC in 
Bangladesh (1996; 1998), ASA in Bangladesh (1997) and CARD in the Philippines (1997). All of 
which found overwhelming evidence in support of their own programmes. The narrative of 
the Yunus School of microfinance, the bottom of the pyramid entrepreneur, dominated the 
industry, development discourse and even permeated the opinion of the wider public who 
were growing in support of microfinance.       
 
The deterioration of human welfare under the SAPs led to a change in focus by the IFIs 
(Sadasivam, 1997). From the outset it was clear that SAPs were failing in their aims to shift 
employment from the public to the private sector and the policies were facing increased 
criticism (Jenkins, 1994). Forced government austerity had impacted employment and 
retrenchments in government spending had affected poverty levels. Healthcare and 
education were privatised and utility costs had been increasing rapidly (Easterly, 2005). The 
IFIs were aware of the poverty and discontent SAPs caused and needed to expand their own 
role in poverty alleviation (Kapur, Webb and Lewis, 1997). Poverty alleviation needed to 
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become a fundamental part of economic structural adjustment but also needed to maintain 
the neoliberal ideology. The IFIs attempted to stop quantifying humans in terms of factors of 
production and acknowledged that economic decline threatens human wellbeing, especially 
those in vulnerable positions and the poor (Weber, 2004). In 1987 UNICEF and other IFIs 
published “Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting 
Growth” (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987), which was described as “alternative adjustment” 
where poverty alleviation was to be “properly integrated” into SAPs, not just an NGO “bolt 
on”.  
 
The IFIs took this opportunity and expanded their programmes of microfinance. Microfinance 
was fully and formally integrated into the World Bank’s 1991 operational directive, providing 
that integrated poverty alleviation tool called for by UNICEF (Weber, 2004). This gave the 
macro-level adjustments a formal micro level counterpart that would “ensure positive human 
outcomes” from the SAPs. The micro-level interventions added complementary programmes 
to microfinance. They had a focus on health and nutrition as well as sectoral policies that 
promoted the growth of small-scale agriculture and local service industries. This 
complimentary role was undertaken by the microfinance industry themselves alongside their 
loan books. This worked to support the idea that “reducing poverty is an ethical and pragmatic 
good, which properly negotiated, can be cost-effective” (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987:12).  
 
This became known as the Post-Washington Consensus and was considered a step forward in 
countering the failings of the Washington Consensus. It was the realisation that markets alone 
do not produce an equitable distribution of wealth and there is a need for greater social safety 
nets (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2004). The Washington Consensus targeted a limited set of 
objectives using a too narrow range of policies whilst the Post-Washington Consensus 
refocused policy on poverty reduction (Weber, 2000). Whilst the rhetoric of the Post-
Washington Consensus was focused on solving the micro-level issues of poverty, the macro 
level was still based on neoliberal reforms, the underlying causes of the poverty (Weber, 
2002).  
 
Microfinance and the complementary social programmes under the Post-Washington 
Consensus were used to address the poverty and unemployment created by the structural 
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adjustment reforms. The relationship became a reinforcing cycle. As more neoliberal reforms 
were implemented, more poverty was created, and there was a greater need for microfinance 
(Stiglitz, 2004). Heloise Weber, a sceptic of the Post-Washington Consensus, positioned it as 
no more than rhetoric to soften the blow of the Washington Consensus (2000; 2002; 2004). 
The Post-Washington Consensus was no more than a tool to dampen resistance to SAPs at a 
community level and to expand the frontiers of neoliberalism. The World Bank itself noted 
microfinance as a tool was only chosen because its entrepreneurial self-help philosophy was 
consistent with the economic framework of neoliberal reforms (Jorgensen, 1992). 
 
Throughout the 1990s, entrepreneurial microfinance was a key poverty alleviation tool built 
into the framework of the SAPs. To support the implementation of microfinance a body of 
literature was produced supporting the narrative of the entrepreneurial poor. The narrative 
supported the notion that the poor, through microfinance, had the ability to help themselves 
out of poverty, complementing the actions of the SAPs. The most well publicised work was 
that of Mark Pitt and Shahidur Khandker (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). The authors, based at 
Brown University and funded by the World Bank, gave an updated analysis of the Bangladeshi 
microfinance industry. Studying three programmes, including the Grameen Bank their study 
reaffirmed the positive claims microfinance had on both beneficiaries and on development. 
The study claimed, which was also a claim that was backed by Dr. Yunus, that “5% of Grameen 
borrowers escape poverty each year” (Pitt and Khandker, 1998: 266). The findings validated 
the narrative and further reinforced the position of microfinance as development orthodoxy. 
IFIs and NGOs were proven to be able to alleviate poverty through well designed, subsidised 
credit programmes promoting enterprise development amongst the poor.  
 
The Model Changes but the Narrative Remains the Same – Financial Systems  
 
Originally under the Washington Consensus, microfinance and the informal sector were 
designed as temporary interventions to provide relief from the immediate rise in 
unemployment under the SAPs (Weber, 2000). However, the formal private sector was either 
shrinking in those countries due to pressure from cheaper imports allowed under the newly 
liberalised trade regimes or from industrialising with new capital-intensive, not labour 
intensive, methods. Whatever the reason, the private sector was not producing the rise in 
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formal employment expected (Young, 2010). The gravity and scope of the poverty created 
under the SAPs and the lack of solution presented by the formal private sector meant that 
microenterprise and microfinance ‘had to’ become the permanent solution to poverty 
alleviation (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987; Weber, 2002).  
 
Once microfinance was established as permanent development architecture, access on such 
a scale could no longer be subsidised. If microfinance was the ‘proven’ answer, then the 
commercial market was the only feasible model for its expansion (CGAP, 1995b; Bateman, 
2010b; CGAP, 2012). This was the beginning of the new model of microfinance, the ‘Financial 
Systems’ model (Robinson, 2001). The narrative of the entrepreneur remained the same and 
it was the method by which they were served that changed.  
 
The conventional view has held that microenterprise finance helps poor people and 
therefore is a desirable development activity but that it cannot be financially viable. 
Small loans, it is said, are simply too costly to administer, and the profits from such 
lending too meagre to permit profitability. However, a study examining some of the 
best microfinance institutions concludes that this conventional wisdom is quite wrong. 
Microfinance institutions can and indeed need to be self-sustaining if they are to 
achieve their outreach potential providing rapid growth in access to financial services 
by poor people to help them run their business (CGAP, 1995b: 1).  
 
A critical part of the Yunus School of Microfinance was based on a methodology called 
‘poverty lending’, with the primary goal to help the poor. Credit was provided to the poor on 
a heavily subsidised basis and donor funds were lent to beneficiaries alongside a host of other 
social programmes (Yunus, 1999). It was this model that was first championed by the IFIs as 
part of the SAP response to poverty and mass unemployment. It was the positive associations 
of heavy subsidies and low interest rates that originally gained acceptance for the narrative.  
 
However, even at the earliest stages of microfinance development, it was clear that 
microfinance and social programmes had a significant cost which might impact its expansion. 
Hossain’s seminal study (1988) notes that to balance equity and developmental 
considerations with cost there is a continuing need to subsidise microfinance and the 
 43 
associated social programmes. In clear language, the cost of operating an MFI is too high for 
the borrowers alone to bear. Yet, if microfinance was to be expanded in line with World Bank 
demands, then the limitations associated with operating as NGOs with donor funds and 
subsidies needed to change. Institutional self-sufficiency through cost recovery was the shift 
that would enable microfinance to offer its ‘full potential’ to poor clients across the world 
(Robinson, 2001; Hulme and Arun, 2009).  
 
The move away from subsidies and towards the ‘financial systems’ model of microfinance was 
helped along in the 1990s by the downfall of state-sponsored rural credit programmes across 
the developing world. Rural credit programmes administered and subsidised by governments 
throughout the 1970s and 80s were being widely discredited and cast as failures (Yaron, 
1992). Rural programmes offered below market interest rates on agricultural loans, 
subsidised by governments. The programmes had poor repayment rates and the intervention 
was explained as being ‘undervalued’ by borrowers. It was constructed that the poor did not 
value what they did not have to pay for, used it carelessly, and felt no obligation to repay 
(Robinson, 2001). Furthermore, it was common for state-sponsored rural credit programmes 
to have funds siphoned off by local elites or be lent according to local status favouring 
wealthier beneficiaries with higher social status. Rural credit programmes became 
synonymous with being pro-elite anti-poor and of high cost to the state due to inefficiencies 
and corruption (Robinson, 2001; Braverman and Guasch, 1990).  
 
At the same time, new studies demonstrated that NGOs could run successful pro-poor 
interventions based on unsubsidised credit. These programmes reported high repayment 
rates, over 98%, and had interest rates far higher than the rural credit programmes at profit 
making levels (Hossain and Salimullah, 1984; Hossain, 1988; CGAP, 1995b; Pitt and Khandker, 
1998; Khandker, 2003). MFIs constructed the repayment of their loans as the poor valuing 
credit that they paid for (Khandker, 2003). The construction of the studies around the 
downfall of government rural credit programmes not only demonstrated that subsidised 
credit was ‘negative’ but that they also spun credit demand as price inelastic, meaning that 
higher interest rates charged by MFIs were not a deterrent to credit demand (Kochar, 1997).  
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The poor, it was said, could use the credit to produce higher returns on capital than the 
interest charged, therefore, price was unimportant compared to supply (Kochar, 1997; Bell, 
Srinivasan and Udrry, 1997; Karlan and Zinman, 2009). MFIs could lend at central bank rates 
or higher and the poor would borrow. This enabled MFIs to become sustainable financial 
institutions that covered their own costs. MFIs could expand, make a profit, and assist the 
poor simultaneously (Christen, 1997), exactly as the IFIs had hoped. MFIs own studies 
constructed the borrowing and repayment of high interest loans by the poor, as a rational 
choice made by microentrepreneurs who knew they could make marginal returns above the 
interest rate by running their businesses (Woodruff, McKenzie and de Mel, 2007). What these 
studies failed to acknowledge was the fact that the poor are highly constrained in their 
consumption and might borrow whatever the cost due to immediate demands (Bateman, 
2010b; Duvendack et al., 2011; Mader, 2014; 2015).   
 
The financial systems approach to microfinance is built on a double bottom line, a win-win 
approach to lending (Montgomery, 2005; Hulme, 2008). The organisational sustainability of 
an MFI will determine over time how many people it can reach and how much poverty it will 
alleviate (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). As subsidised credit came to an end, subsidies for 
MFIs did not (Cull, Demirg-Kunt and Morduch, 2009). MFIs switched the use of subsidies from 
subsidising the borrowers directly through cheap interest to subsidising themselves. The 
subsidies were used to discount wholesale funds for the MFI while charging the poor market 
or above market interest rates which significantly increased profits of MFIs (Mader, 2015). 
Subsidies for ‘financial systems’ microfinance were seen as a short-term solution while MFIs 
became sustainable, justifying the short-term use of subsidy for MFIs over directly subsidising 
the poor (Mader, 2013). However, in 2010, as many as 95% of MFIs were still receiving 
subsidies whilst making a profit (El-Zoghbi, 2011; Bateman and Chang, 2012).  
 
The financial systems model of microfinance, as well as creating profit making entities, also 
diminished the direct intervention of governments in the microfinance process (Bateman, 
2010b). It became a normal model of operation for organisations like CARE International, KIVA 
and others to use external for-profit MFIs to undertake their microfinance activity (Bateman 
and Maclean, 2017). This removed the direct line of sight between the NGOs and the 
borrowers, yet the NGOs still claimed a positive impact. The creation of the sustainable 
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financial systems approach was about expanding microfinance access to all those that 
‘needed it’. Commercial MFIs described an ‘absurd gap’ between supply and demand for 
financial services, a gap that they were able to fill (Robinson, 2001; Robinson, 2009). The gap, 
however, was actually created by constructing financial services as a ‘basic human right’, and 
therefore, something that ‘everyone needs’ (Bateman and Chang, 2012). According to the 
World Bank, there are 2.5 billion people ‘excluded’ from financial services (WBG, 2014), 80% 
of those living on less than $2 per day. The premise of the gap and the expansion of financial 
systems microfinance is that there are those who are ‘without’ and therefore should be 
provided for (Mader, 2013). The construction of the concept of financial services as a ‘right’ 
has avoided the scrutiny it might deserve, allowing the new narrative of ‘financial inclusion’ 
to appear (Bayulgen, 2013).  
 
The growth of microfinance was facilitated by the strength of the entrepreneurial narrative 
and the increasing demand for loans was interpreted as a demand for productive 
microfinance for business purposes. The entrepreneurial narrative had allowed the 
microfinance industry to construct its own profitable operational model within the structure 
of neoliberal capitalism. The poor were worthy borrowers because they were entrepreneurs 
and working hard and they needed the credit to be productive. The hardworking 
microentrepreneurs valued credit as it allowed them to be productive. They could and would 
therefore pay market, or higher, interest rates. The narrative of entrepreneurship and the 
tool of sustainable microfinance meant that the process of bottom-up development was 
reinforced as win-win (Robinson, 2009; Robinson, 2001; Bateman and Chang, 2012). The 
World Bank, through its microfinance best practice guidance (Ledgerwood, 1999), promoted 
the move from poverty lending (subsidised interested rates) to financial systems (for-profit 
market interest rates) holding those constructed ideas and assumptions as objective facts 
(Hulme and Arun, 2009).   
 
In tracing the literature through the foundational years of the entrepreneurial narrative I 
argue it demonstrates the formation of hegemony. The concept of the poor as entrepreneurs 
was promoted and replicated by governments, IFIs, MFIs, and NGOs to the point it seemingly 
became common sense within the development industry. It was the hegemony of the 
entrepreneurial narrative and the acceptance of assumptions that went with it that allowed 
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the industry to refocus impact assessments away from beneficiaries onto institutions. 
Previously beneficiaries were the sole focus (Hossain and Salimullah, 1984; Hossain, 1988; 
Yunus, 1999) of impact assessments. However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s onwards, 
the health of the MFIs was the dominant focus of the impact studies. The entrepreneurial 
narrative made it implicit that borrowers benefitted from the action of lending, high 
repayment rates and returning clients indicated a causal positive effect on borrowers of 
borrowing (Simanowitz, 2001). Ledgerwood’s 1999 publication for the World Bank was one 
of the earliest indications that the financial sustainability of the MFI was to become a more 
important focus of study than the intended beneficiary.  
 
A significant body of literature (Ledgerwood, 1999; Robinson, 2001; Ledgerwood, 2006; 
Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Hulme and Arun, 2009; Cull, Demirg-Kunt and Morduch, 
2009; Robinson, 2009; Ledgerwood, 2013) focused on the institutional methods for MFIs to 
achieve financial sustainability. The change in impact assessments were accompanied by a 
fundamental change in the language of microfinance. Donors became “funders” (Bateman, 
2010b), beneficiaries became “clients” (ACCION, 2008a), and impact became “market 
penetration” (Ledgerwood, 2006). The industry had fundamentally changed in structure while 
the underlying entrepreneurial narrative maintained the historic positive perceptions. A 
result of what I argue to be the hegemony of microfinance. The entrepreneurial narrative of 
the Yunus School remained but the rationale was now of sustainable financial systems.  
 
Financial Systems to Financial Inclusion – A New Narrative and a New School   
 
Harvard economist Jonathan Morduch (1998) published a paper in direct response to Pitt and 
Khandker’s research on the Bangladeshi microfinance industry (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
Morduch challenged Pitt and Khandker’s findings of positive impacts on the borrowers of 
microfinance. The challenge, rooted firmly in the paradigm set by microfinance, stated not 
that microfinance did not achieve anything, but it achieved something different to that stated 
by Pitt and Khandker’s research. The point of Morduch’s challenge was not that microfinance 
did not impact the lives of the poor, just that the impact was different to the narrative of the 
Yunus School. Microfinance was impactful to the poor, not as entrepreneurs but as a tool to 
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reduce vulnerability in their everyday lives (Morduch, 1998). Morduch, who is pro-
microfinance, states that microfinance is important for the poor but will not necessarily lift 
them out of poverty as entrepreneurs. In perhaps one of the most widely known academic 
debates in the field, Morduch along with David Roodman (Morduch, 1998; Roodman and 
Morduch, 2009; Roodman and Morduch, 2014) debated with Pitt and Khandker (Pitt and 
Khandker, 1998; Pitt, 1999; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2006; Pitt, 2014b; Pitt, 2014a), 
pitting microfinance against microfinance. There was no challenge to microfinance itself, only 
the outcome was debated. Was it a tool to promote entrepreneurship or was it a tool to 
reduce vulnerability? This was the beginning of the ‘financial inclusion’ narrative.  
 
The narrative of financial inclusion worked to maintain the position of microfinance as a key 
development tool but changed the purpose of that tool. Mader (2015) observed the discourse 
of some of the major organisations involved in microfinance over a 10-year period to illustrate 
the change. When the narrative of the Yunus School was dominant in the 1990s, microfinance 
was touted as “the single most effective way to reduce poverty and achieve broad-based 
economic growth” (CGAP, 1995a:1 cited in Mader 2015). By 1998, the same organisation 
claimed microfinance “creates opportunities for the poor to create, own and accumulate 
assets and to smooth consumption” (CGAP, 1998:1 cited in Mader 2015) and moved the 
narrative away from poverty alleviation and entrepreneurship as the driver of economic 
growth but still indicating the productive nature of microfinance. In 2000, CGAP (CGAP, 2000) 
claimed it was the “Microfinance Services Era”, removing the aims of enterprise and the 
accumulation of assets entirely. By 2001, the ideas of the Yunus School were totally removed 
from the discourse, microfinance was now about “providing poor households throughout the 
world with flexible and high-quality financial services on a sustainable basis” (CGAP, 2001:1 
cited in Mader 2015). The same change was present at ACCION, moving from “Impact can be 
economic, social and human, and occurs through continued assistance to each beneficiary’s 
source of livelihood.” (Olivares, 1989:14 cited in Mader 2015) to:  
 
Full financial inclusion is a state which all people who can use them have access to a 
full suite of quality financial services, provided at affordable prices, in a convenient 
manner, and with dignity for the clients. Financial services are delivered by a range of 
providers, most of them private, and reach everyone who can use them, including 
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disabled, poor, rural, and other excluded populations (ACCION, 2008b cited in Mader 
2015).       
 
The new narrative constructed microfinance as an end rather than the means. There was no 
longer any mention of alleviating poverty or economic development, just the provision of 
financial services as the goal (WBG, 2014). The Yunus School narrative of poverty alleviation 
through entrepreneurship had been removed from the discourse and a careful positioning of 
language presented financial inclusion as its replacement despite no explicit claims of impact 
on poverty or development (Mader, 2015; Mader, 2017a). Financial inclusion became the 
purpose of MFIs with the large-scale provision of a full suite of financial services, loans, 
savings, insurance for the poor by sustainable, and profitable institutions (Robinson, 2009). 
By slow metamorphosis, the new narrative replaced the old.   
 
The full replacement of the entrepreneurial narrative is demonstrated by CGAP in their 
report, Advancing Financial Access for the World’s Poor (2012). The report is a 15-year review 
of their activities, from inception until the time of publication. The notion of the 
microentrepreneur or microenterprises is notably missing from the whole document. Instead, 
their activities in the 1990s “enabled MFIs to serve low-income families that previously had 
been considered ‘un-bankable’”, and that CGAP proved that poor families “could be served 
in a sustainable fashion”.  According to the 2012 report, CGAP from the outset focused on 
“supporting early experimentation, collecting and disseminating information about sound 
practices, and broadly advocating for a sustainable approach to the provision of financial 
services for the poor” (:7). This runs contrary to the early reports produced by CGAP which 
stated microfinance was “the single most effective way to reduce poverty and achieve broad-
based economic growth” and that "Microentrepreneurs have shown that they repay market-
based loans, and use the proceeds of business to increase their assets, their living standards, 
and their roles in shaping societies” (CGAP, 1995a: 3 cited in Mader, 2015). It appears that 
CGAP has re-written its own institutional memory to remove the entrepreneurial narrative 
now that it has been disproven.   
 
The formative work of a team of US-based economists legitimised the narrative of financial 
inclusion in their book, Portfolios of the Poor (Collins et al., 2009). A collection of US 
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universities and MFIs collected ‘financial diaries’ of the poor over the period of a year. The 
book tracked how poor households organised and managed their finances. The aim was to 
obtain a deeper understanding of financial tools used by the poor and sought a detailed view 
of the potential for financial inclusion. The financial lives of hundreds of poor illustrate the 
complexities of living in poverty when it comes to money management. Participants were 
shown to use multiple formal, semi-formal, and informal financial intermediaries. Loans from 
formal MFIs were recorded in the portfolios, although few were used for entrepreneurial 
activities. MFI loans were shown to be used for various types of consumption and household 
expense. Moneylenders, whose microfinance was originally designed to eradicate from the 
lives of the poor (Yunus, 1999: 12), were often used in the portfolios, especially due to their 
flexibility. Informal money lending, family, and money lenders were all often used to repay 
loan instalments to MFIs (Collins et al., 2009). One of the overlooked conclusions of the book 
was that regular predictable income, such as a salary, pension or social security, provided 
overall greater positive outcomes in terms of wellbeing than any financial intervention or an 
income from a microenterprise.  
 
However, what Collins et al (2009:184) did conclude was a reconstruction of poverty from 
meaning the lack of money to meaning the lack of financial services: “Not having enough 
money is bad enough. Not being able to manage whatever money you have is worse.” 
Indicating that the pursuit of full financial inclusion on the grounds of it being more important 
than money to the poor was now of critical importance. There was no discussion of the logic 
of financial inclusion as a development imperative or why it should be pursued over other 
forms of inclusion, for example, health or educational inclusion. This premise was simply 
assumed throughout.  
 
The new narrative of financial inclusion successfully removed the entrepreneurial narrative 
of the Yunus School of Microfinance, of increasing the incomes of the poor, and replaced it 
with the aim of improving the efficiency with which they move their limited finances (Mader, 
2015; Mader, 2017a). Collins et al’s (2009) work, along with the works of Pitt and Khandker 
(Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Pitt, 1999; Pitt et al., 2003; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2006; 
Khandker, 2012; Pitt, 2014b; Pitt, 2014a), Roodman and Morduch (Morduch, 1998; Roodman 
and Morduch, 2009; Roodman and Morduch, 2014) and others (Christen, 1997; Robinson, 
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2001; Ledgerwood, 2006; ACCION, 2008b; Robinson, 2009; Ledgerwood, 2013; Yousefi, 2015; 
Visa, 2019) have been crucial in forwarding the financial inclusion narrative which is now 
deeply imbedded in development policy and instrumental in achieving the SDGs.  
 
From entrepreneurship to financial inclusion, this section of the literature review has 
demonstrated how the microfinance industry has changed and promoted narratives to 
support the continuation of microfinance in development policy. Despite the fact that 
evidence has disproved the entrepreneurial narrative and microfinance policy has been 
diverted away from it, as will become evident from the case study of this thesis, Yunus’ ideas 
are still pervasive in parts of the microfinance industry. I maintain that it is hegemony that 
supports the position of the entrepreneurial narrative in the industry and it is the positive 
associations of entrepreneurship that have allowed the narrative of financial inclusion to go 
largely unchallenged (Bayulgen, 2013). I argue that financial inclusion has piggybacked on the 
hegemony of the entrepreneurial narrative which has allowed its core assumptions to be 
implemented without scrutiny or contestation (Mader, 2017a). Financial inclusion is said to 
support wider development goals, assist the poor in their daily lives, relieve the effects of 
poverty. However, studies (Mader, 2016; 2017a) demonstrate that many of those claims are 
without foundation or evidence. Through the promotion of narratives to maintain hegemony, 
the microfinance industry has positioned financial inclusion in the same way they positioned 
entrepreneurship, a compelling narrative that has become common sense among the 
development community.  
 
Entrepreneurship to Consumption Smoothing  
 
The narrative of the Yunus School made entrepreneurship, poverty alleviation, and 
development central to the intervention of microfinance (Yunus, 1999). Financial inclusion 
moved the imperative to provide financial services to all, no matter what the end use of the 
product or service (Robinson, 2009). Microfinance loans were, therefore, open to be used for 
whatever the borrower liked, even basic food consumption. Consumption as a use for 
microfinance is actually not new.  In the early literature, the fundamentals of microfinance 
for microenterprises were challenged, although not explicitly highlighted (Hossain, 1988:49). 
Consumption had appeared as a use for loans in a number of well noted studies but had been 
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simply unacknowledged by MFIs and IFIs. Studies actually showed that loans were seldom 
used for the purpose of enterprise (Rahman, 1999; Ledgerwood, 1999; Matthaus-Maier and 
Von Pischke, 2006; Bateman, 2010b; Bateman and Chang, 2012; Sinclair, 2012; KPMG, 2013; 
Mader, 2013; Mader, 2014). FINCA’s (one of the world’s largest MFIs) founder John Hatch 
said that “90% of loans were always used for current consumption rather than to fuel 
enterprise” (HBR, 2007).  
 
The construction of the poor as willing entrepreneurs is challenged by the findings of 
consumption debt. The construction of poor entrepreneurs was seemingly not considered 
problematic throughout the history of microfinance and was broadly accepted as the 
narrative told an appropriate story. Observationally, the entrepreneurial behaviour of 
individuals in the developing world that perhaps encouraged the narrative construction is 
more likely born of necessity than true entrepreneurship spirit (Bateman, 2010b). Alongside 
claims that enterprise loans are spent on consumption, other microfinance studies showed 
that MFIs themselves found it impossible to monitor and enforce loan use. The significant 
cost of monitoring where loans were spent meant that MFIs could not know if loans were 
used for enterprise or consumption (Arunachalam, 2011). Quotes from microfinance clients 
identified that throughout their long relationship with MFIs (lender-borrower), “They [the 
MFI] didn’t seem to care what I would do with the money” (Mohan, 2010; Mader, 2015:174). 
The narrative of entrepreneurship and the emerging reality was very different.  
 
As the narrative changed to financial inclusion, the acceptance of loans for consumption 
became publicised and widespread. The microfinance industry no longer hid behind false 
ideas of entrepreneurship and adopted the phrase ‘Consumption Smoothing’ as a way of 
justifying the importance of the loan. Consumption smoothing meant there was a reduced 
variance in income over time allowing more stable year-round consumption of microfinance 
clients (Zeller and Sharma, 2000). Consumption smoothing justifies the continuation of 
microfinance programmes as an alleviator of the symptoms of poverty especially the 
symptom of income constraints (Dunford, 2013). Microfinance allows borrowers to smooth 
the inconsistent supply of money that is associated with living in poverty, enabling the 
immediate consumption of food in tough times, the paying of school fees when they are 
demanded or emergency health care when needed (Zeller and Sharma, 2000).  
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Under the basic principles of banking, lending for consumption is high risk, especially at lower 
income levels. Debt service is likely to be limited due to the low level of income and therefore 
financial institutions charge high rates of interest to manage the risk carefully. Lending for 
business expansion, the idea behind the Yunus narrative, is different whilst not necessarily 
less risky. If an investment is made in an income generating activity, theoretically the ability 
to service the debt should increase as the income from the activity is generated. Under the 
Yunus School, a beneficiary’s income was expected to increase due to the new business 
activity, giving them the ability to service the debt even though they were poor (Yunus, 1999). 
Whatever the reality, the theory of the narrative was plausible.  
 
From a technical perspective, Financial Inclusion’s approach to lending for consumption relies 
on repayment from existing income streams, something that amongst the poor are already 
known to be constrained. Therefore, comparisons have been drawn between the payday 
lenders of the West and this new narrative of microfinance. However, payday lending is 
debated academically from a negative standpoint (Stegman, 2007). It is also enforced and 
regulated tightly by governments (FCA, 2016) and subject to significant negative coverage, 
particularly from charities (Oxfam, 2016). Despite this, MFIs are championed as providers of 
social improvement and supported by everyone from governments to charities, the same 
charities that campaign against payday lending (Oxfam, 2008). For example, Oxfam states pay 
day loans are a significant negative factor in the state of UK poverty today (2016), while 
explaining that microfinance is critically important for the lives of the poor (2008). Whilst 
globally, reasons for borrowing money are diverse, in the microfinance sector and for the 
poor, that reason is more likely to be a lack of money for basic goods and services (Mader, 
2015). As early as 1973, Amit Bhaduri (1973) observed the borrowers of moneylenders in 
India. His observations indicated that borrowing for consumption was a sign of desperation 
and done as a last resort due to abject poverty. Under the narrative of Financial Inclusion, the 
same conditions now are presented as a free rational choice made by individuals who are now 
‘included’ (WBG, 2014; Visa, 2019). 
 
A number of studies (Mohan, 2010; Stoll, 2012; Hummel, 2014; Salazar, 2014) explain that it 
should be no surprise that people who are financially constrained borrow for food, education 
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or medical expenses, as those items are desperately needed and now often commercially 
provided. Thomas Dichter, who had a 40-year career in international development, explains 
that consumption borrowing should not be seen as individuals naively borrowing for 
consumption's sake. His book shows that the borrowers understand the choice and 
consequences of microfinance. For them, borrowing is a choice, but a choice that is often 
between eating and starvation (Ditchter, 2007). 
 
Is Consumption Smoothing a Development Imperative? – Microfinance Impact  
 
The microfinance impact assessments that focused on borrowers sought to identify impacts 
in terms of changes in indicators of poverty. These indicators were primarily an increase in 
income and business investment or an increase in consumption in anything from durable 
goods and property to food, health care and education. The consumption increase was always 
explained as having been paid for by increased business income under the entrepreneurial 
narrative of the Yunus School. However, modern randomised control trials, that measured 
income increase over time repeatedly found no significant results (Banerjee, Karlan and 
Zinman, 2015). There was no evidence that microfinance borrowers increased their income 
or started a business. A small proportion indicated that they made business investments and 
there was certainly no evidence that linked income generation to escaping poverty 
(Chowdhury, 2009). For an intervention that is supposed to generate income through 
enterprise, these were disappointing results.  
 
However, the results are not unexpected. Hossain’s (1984; 1988) and Ghai’s (1984) works, 
both used to promote microfinance in the early phases, both indicated significant impact 
limitations. The authors note that if microfinance were to expand as a tool for 
entrepreneurship, given the limited capacity of the borrowers and inelastic markets, there 
would likely be a surplus of specific basic goods and services in each location. People targeted 
by microfinance were not skilled innovators but likely to perform basic services (shoeshine) 
or sell basic goods (fruit and veg). These enterprises were not expansive by nature. In the 
short- to medium-term, microenterprises would lead to a decline in prices and limit overall 
developmental impact. The economic situation presented in the literature is the demand side, 
however, entrepreneurial microfinance is a supply side solution (Hossain and Salimullah, 
 54 
1984; Dharam, 1984; Hossain, 1988). Whether the microfinance industry and the IFIs missed 
or ignored Hossain’s statements, they were not accounted for in the role out of microfinance 
under the SAPs. The narrative was strongly presented as one of enterprise to escape poverty. 
MFI proliferation in certain areas was associated with increasing levels of enterprise and 
presented as the success of microfinance in creating enterprise and growth. However, the 
findings of Banerjee and Duflo and others indicate that MFI proliferation is from the re-
financing or recycling of existing consumption debt (2015).  
 
Consumption indicators have always been more definitive when it comes to demonstrating 
impact in microfinance studies. Consistently, studies that observe consumption as a measure 
of impact find that access to microfinance produces a successful outcome, quantified as an 
increase in consumption (Todd, 1996; Alexander, 2001; Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001; Snodgrass 
and Sebstad, 2002; Kaboski and Townsend, 2005; Kondo, 2007; McKenzie and Woodruff, 
2008; Bruhn and Inessa, 2009; Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman, 2015). Access to microfinance, 
therefore, increases consumption, however, under the narrative of entrepreneurship, 
consumption is shown as being increased by profit from a microenterprise, not from merely 
spending the loan. The narrative of entrepreneurship determined that an increase in 
consumption fuelled by business income would be sustainable over time. However, research 
showed that microfinance is not used for microenterprise (Chowdhury, 2009) and that 
consumption increases are short-term one-off increases associated with the expenditure of 
loan capital (Banerjee et al., 2015). Portfolios of the Poor (Collins et al., 2009) further 
illustrates through qualitative data that borrowers borrow to consume or to pay back other 
loans also used for consumption.  
 
Under the financial inclusion narrative, lending for consumption is now presented as the 
development imperative, not to generate an income. Whilst it could be conceived using 
definitions of development such as those given by Sen (2001) that access to credit represents 
freedom of opportunity, the research found debt is used primarily on the emergency 
consumption of medical supplies or basic services like paying for previously publicly provided 
education (Pitt et al., 2003; Amin, Rai and Topa, 2003; Gertler, Levine and Moretti, 2009; Islam 
and Maitra, 2011). Therefore, claiming that microfinance is freedom when all it allows is for 
the poor to pay for services that the governments of the borrowers have commercialised 
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appears disingenuous. The argument for financial inclusion has two broad failings; first that 
debt for the income constrained is unlikely to improve their situation and, second, it fails to 
problematise the fact that the poor now have to pay for emergency health care, basic 
education, or drinking water. Access to credit is a fundamental human right but access to 
health or water is not. 
 
The narrative of financial inclusion has never been as widely acknowledged as the 
entrepreneurial narrative, the latter being still largely associated with the microfinance 
industry (Olugbenga, 2017). This is demonstrated by the seminal randomised control trial 
(RCT) “The Miracle of Microfinance”  (Banerjee et al., 2015). The study found that 
“entrepreneurial activity was not cited as a frequent use for loans amongst their sample 
population” yet the opening statement and the executive summary stated, “Small business 
investment and profits from pre-existing business increased” (: 1). The representation of the 
data puts microentrepreneurial activity at the forefront of impact yet the data from the study 
and the MFIs who participated explain the largest use of loans by far was basic consumption. 
The narrative of financial inclusion is yet to be appealing enough to lead the headlines. 
Financial inclusion fails to demonstrate any developmental outcome and therefore the Yunus 
School narrative is used to present a more development focused outcome that people relate 
to.  
 
In the same study, Banerjee et al (2015: 3) explain that net consumption did not actually rise. 
The study observed that “Durable goods expenditure increased, while ‘temptation goods’ 
expenditure declined (equally)”. The study constructs the purchase of durable goods as 
rational investment decisions by the borrowers, replacing ‘temptation goods’ with ‘durable 
goods’, borrowers are “making better decisions”. However, other readings of the study 
explain the change in purchasing behaviour as borrowers buying what their constrained 
income would not ordinarily allow. The cutting back on temptation goods like “drinking tea 
outside of the home” is to facilitate the loan and interest repayment, not necessarily “making 
better decisions”. Microfinance when explained in this form appears to be about behavioural 
change to facilitate the growth of capitalism amongst the poorest (Bateman, 2010b; Bateman, 
2014; Bateman and Maclean, 2017). Banerjee et al’s study concluded that “enhanced 
microcredit access does not appear to be associated with any meaningful increase in 
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consumption after 15 to 18 months” (2015:11). Illustrating that once the loan capital is spent, 
borrowers are considered to be in the same position as before their loan.  
 
To say Financial Inclusion microfinance has demonstrated no impact is not necessarily correct. 
As expected in situations where income is constrained and public goods such as health and 
education are no longer provided by the state, many households borrow to cover those costs 
(Mader, 2017a). Accessing a loan for medical care or school fees may be the only option 
borrowers have if they want treatment or their children to be educated (Islam and Maitra, 
2011). Financial inclusion microfinance may not be used to generate income and reduce 
poverty but it does give individuals the tools to negotiate a market economy. The 
neoliberalisation of development has positioned debt as the only way people living in poverty 
can access essentials such as health and education. It is the positive associations that are 
assigned to that condition by the narrative of financial inclusion that I believe enable that 
position to be popularly maintained.  
 
The narrative of financial inclusion has negotiated its position in international development 
policy and refocused MFIs towards sustainable profitable operation. While the realities of 
microfinance have changed significantly, the old narrative of entrepreneurial self-help 
remains dominant. The presence and strength of the Yunus School entrepreneurial narrative 
seemingly hides the fact that microfinance operates in a development grey area. The industry 
capitalises on the positives of the old narrative while allowing microfinance to grow as a tool 
for fuelling consumption. The body of literature that accompanies the financial inclusion 
narrative, especially its long-term impacts, is under-researched and inadequate for an 
intervention that is as prolific as microfinance (Mader, 2016; 2017a). The industry promotes 
narratives to grow within the structures of the development industry without answering vital 
questions of impact.   
 
The Financialisation of Poverty  
 
This literature review has traced the narratives of microfinance throughout their history and 
has found it difficult to draw concrete conclusions as to what the impact of microfinance is 
now supposed to be. The narrative of entrepreneurial microfinance from the Yunus School is 
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still present in the development discourse but this narrative now appears to be neither the 
aim nor the outcome of microfinance. The narrative of financial inclusion constructs 
microfinance to be of value to everyone but there is little evidence to show just what that 
value really is. Microfinance, at least at a policy level, has avoided a truly hard critique. 
Throughout its history, critics have played with the nuts and bolts to refine microfinance or 
have debated whether its outcome has been increased entrepreneurship or consumption 
smoothing but all within the paradigm of neoliberalism. 
 
Starting slowly in the mid-2000s, but growing significantly since 2010, a more structural 
critique of microfinance has developed. The critique is based on the concept of the 
financialisation of poverty. The financialisation of poverty school views the expansion of 
microfinance as the expansion of the frontiers of capital accumulation to the poor by 
financialising poverty to fit into the global neoliberal system (Weber, 2004; Harvey, 2007; 
Aitken, 2010; Young, 2010; Bateman, 2010b; Bateman and Chang, 2012; Sinclair, 2012; 
Mader, 2013; Bateman, 2014; Mader, 2014; 2015; 2017a; Bateman and Maclean, 2017). It is 
the first truly conceptual critique of microfinance that challenges the entire intervention and 
the structure within which it operates.  
 
As described in the introduction, financialisation is a process that requires structural change 
in an economy and is driven by neoliberalism. Through the expansion of the role of the 
financial sector, neoliberalism enacts its agenda by encouraging capital accumulation and 
building markets in which the population are forced to participate. With its roots in the British 
school of IPE, the financialisation of poverty school’s work describes the same condition 
where the poor are positioned according to the opportunities they represent to the flow of 
global capital (Young, 2010). Neoliberalism within the development agenda has normalised 
microfinance within wider development discourse, framing finance as a social good. It is no 
longer a contestable idea but a tool of necessity in the modern life of the poor (Goede, 2005).  
As observed by Kotz (2008), neoliberalism changes the structure of an economy, supporting 
a minimal state agenda and building financial markets. Within that structure the 
normalisation of debt finance takes place and finance becomes the only tool to manage life 
in a market economy. Financialisation transfers the provision of services, health, education, 
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and others from the state to the individual, redrawing the relationship between the two 
(Bateman, 2010b; Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Mader, 2015).   
 
One of the seminal works that falls under my definition of the financialisation of poverty 
school was written by Milford Bateman, an economist with a background in development in 
Eastern Europe. Bateman’s book, Why Doesn’t Microfinance Work? The Destructive Rise of 
Local Neoliberalism (2010b) moves outside the paradigm of neoliberalism and away from 
impact-based critiques. Bateman contends that the neoliberal model of development, and 
microfinance as part of it, is flawed. Building on his experience in Bosnia, he constructs a new 
narrative of financialisation as a malign effort to extract wealth from the poor and transfer it 
to the global elite through finance. Bateman observes market creation through consumption-
based microfinance and restructuring bottom of the pyramid economies around 
consumerism for the very poorest, paid for by money lent by the very richest.  
 
The research within the financialisation of poverty school observes the intervention of 
microfinance in a conceptually different way, responding not to the narratives of 
microfinance but to the realities that they bought to the borrowers. The neoliberal 
development agenda is shown as being responsible for ignoring the large limitations 
presented in the early works of Hossain, Salimullah, and Ghai, instead focusing on the 
presentation of the small and limited upsides that those works presented. Bateman 
demonstrates that changes in microfinance, from pro-poor subsidies to profit making 
sustainability, was not about expanding access to the poor who would use it for enterprise 
but a way of removing oversight and any notion of subsidy in order to maximise profit from 
lending to the poor. Bateman’s work introduced the thought that narratives and intended 
outcomes are divergent.  
 
One of the most influential works from the perspective of my research was by Philip Mader, 
The Political Economy of Microfinance (2015). This work and his later work on financial 
inclusion (2016; 2017a), deconstruct the narratives of microfinance and proposes that 
financial inclusion and microfinance have always been ends in themselves. Mader explains 
microfinance not as an attempt to end poverty but an attempt to financialise it through 
narratives of empowerment. In short, microfinance made poverty a site of value extraction. 
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Mader draws on the work of Karl Polanyi and makes direct comparison between parts of the 
Poor Law Reform of 1834 in the UK and the political motivations of the modern microfinance 
movement. The promotion of self-employment through microenterprise is described as the 
programmed disempowerment of those that fail to make it in the new capitalist wage 
economy. The poor are supported in setting up informal survival-type activities that keep 
them “wrapped up in the act of merely surviving” (Bateman, 2010b:30). Mader observes the 
systemic flaws in the microfinance system culminating in the Indian crisis, noting that despite 
these, the industry continues to persistently grow (Mader, 2015). It was Mader’s work that 
influenced my research that seeks to understand how, in spite of the evidence, microfinance 
continued as a pro-poor development policy.  
 
The financialisation of poverty literature explores other angles of microfinance missed by the 
traditional impact-based critiques. Understanding the role of microfinance on the collective 
actions of the poor is central to this critical approach. The narrative of entrepreneurship is 
based on individualistic self-help, individuals are cast as entrepreneurs acting alone, not 
employees of others collectively participating in the labour market. Borrowers of 
microfinance bear a resemblance to the lumpenproletariat observed by Karl Marx, a group of 
people so subjugated and passive that they could not be relied upon to play a role in the 
revolution (Bourdin, 2013). Bateman (2010a) draws on this idea, describing microfinance as 
containment of the poor. Engaging the poor in their own immediate survival and distracting 
them from participating in forces that are counter to the neoliberal project. The containment 
of the poor is seen as both an act of disempowerment and dispossession, removing their 
capacity to act against wider neo-liberal changes taking place in the economy.  
 
The physical act of dispossession visible in the control and containment of the poor is seen by 
others as something deeper than a weakening of collective belonging and action. Julia 
Elyachar (2005) argues that neo-liberal development programmes in Cairo have attempted to 
dispossess individuals of their culture and replace it with dreams of the rewards of 
globalisation. Elyachar observes how the narrative of entrepreneurship worked to position 
the poor alongside skilled craftsmen, using the positive associations of skilled labour to shape 
perspectives of what the poor could achieve as entrepreneurs. The basic proponents of the 
narrative are challenged by simple observations of the poor being no more entrepreneurial 
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than anyone else. What the narrative constructed as ‘enterprise’ was just an act of necessity 
in the face of no other options (Bateman, 2010b).  
 
The foundational works of Hossain and Salimullah (1984; 1988) and Ghai (1984) are revisited 
by the Financialisation of Poverty School (Bateman and Maclean, 2017) which takes a 
different approach to previous interpretations. It focuses on the limitations of the 
entrepreneurship observed by Hossain and Ghai in the early phases, where their work pointed 
out the lack of scope for market creation, skill shortages, demand issues, and limited overall 
ability to impact development. The microfinance industry and IFIs promoted the very minor 
positive attributes from those studies to highlight the potential of microfinance, the 
financialisation of poverty school now reads those early works more critically. The authors of 
those early works identified that the capacity of the poor as entrepreneurs and the limits set 
by their environment could only ever yield limited impact in terms of development. I argue 
that if development policy had not been based on neoliberalism at that time, the ideas and 
scope of microfinance may have been promoted very differently.  
 
At its core, the financialisation of poverty school’s challenge to the microfinance industry is 
that debt for consumption can do nothing more than keep people poor (Bateman, 2010b; 
Mader, 2015; 2017a). That challenge is addressed in a series of exchanges between Milford 
Bateman, David Roodman, and James Morduch of the Financial Inclusion School. Roodman 
and Morduch contend that financial inclusion has value and a place in development policy 
and challenge directly Bateman’s 2010 book (Roodman, 2010). Roodman claims that Bateman 
talks of microfinance as a grand conspiracy theory coherently working to keep people poor, 
something that “of course that no one would ever do”. Roodman is firmly a neoliberal, his 
challenges are rooted in that paradigm and therefore his view of non-market alternatives to 
development are unsuitable and unsustainable. Bateman responds from a different 
paradigm, illustrating neoliberalism not as a conspiracy theory but as a market system that 
dispossesses the masses in favour of the few. In 2012, ACCION and USAID hosted a live debate 
between Roodman and Bateman (ACCION, 2012), symbolising two conflicting ideologies that 
exist in opposition to each other. One participant sat within the existing paradigm of 
neoliberal capitalism while the other looked critically from the outside to challenge 
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neoliberalism in development. Whilst the debate had no one winner, the chair concluded 
that:  
 
The debate had an unhappy outcome for those who believe in the efficacy of 
microfinance. Roodman struggled to counter Bateman’s insistence that microfinance 
is an abject failure and that development dollars could be better spent elsewhere. The 
most he offered is that randomized trials of microfinance have not found either a clear 
negative or positive effect, a half-hearted endorsement. So, when Bateman says that 
Roodman’s support of microfinance depends on an act of faith not evidence, it is hard 
to argue the point (ACCION, 2012). 
 
The debate continued through journal article exchanges in which Bateman states that the 
microfinance industry has been engaged in agnotology as a way of keeping the intervention 
dominant (Bateman, 2014). Agnotology is explained as the act “whereby the powerful are 
engaged in the intentional production and promotion of ignorance”. Bateman uses 
Roodman’s 2012 (Roodman, 2012) book ‘Due Diligence, an impertinent enquiry into 
microfinance’ as the explanation for his observation. Roodman’s book, considered a seminal 
work of the financial inclusion narrative, is reflected on as an act of agnotology. The book, 
supported by the MasterCard Foundation and the World Bank’s CGAP, starts by strongly 
critiquing entrepreneurial microfinance and confirms that the overall impact on poverty has 
been nil. Bateman states, this creates the impression of it being written from a truly critical 
perspective, willing to challenge microfinance. The theme of the book then turns strongly to 
financial inclusion, the importance of sustainable financial services for the poor to manage 
their lives, with little mention of impact. There is no evidence provided as to the reasons why 
financial inclusion is imperative. Within Roodman’s argument, there is no question that 
financial capitalism is the only way in which the world can be structured and it is as true for 
the poor as it is for the rich. Roodman states that “no one is suggesting that the for-profit 
mortgage sector in the US should be ended”, overlooking the difference in the status of clients 
and their reasons for borrowing. Roodman’s book is a justification of the position of 
microfinance in the future of development, something that benefits the MasterCard 
Foundation, CGAP, and others.  
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The financialisation of poverty is the result of the neoliberal restructuring of poverty to suit 
the needs of financial capitalism. Microfinance is the tool through which that restructuring 
takes place, re-casting relationships between individuals and the state. The financialisation of 
poverty school has approached microfinance under those terms, viewing it as a tool of 
neoliberalism and not as a well-meaning development policy. It is the conceptually different 
challenge to microfinance that has influenced my research and the foundation of this thesis. 
After working for many years in the industry, viewing failure of impact as a problem of design, 
the perspectives of the financialisation of poverty school changed the way I researched 
microfinance and understood its intentions. Building on the work of the school, I sought to 
understand how, given the conceptual challenges that exist, microfinance remains placed in 
the development agenda.  
 
Microfinance, A Greater Destruction  
 
Through neoliberal financialisation, economies experience a range of changes which include 
a reduction in the size and importance of the productive sectors, deindustrialisation, the 
stagnation of wages, and a decrease in productivity. States, companies and individuals take 
on increased quantities of debt, boosting the financial sector but over indebting themselves 
and increasing their dependency on credit (Kotz, 2008: 2). The process Kotz observed at the 
macro-level is replicated at the micro-level, something also observed by Pupavac (2005), who 
set out to study the empowerment of women by microfinance in post-war Bosnia. Her 
findings were unexpected. She observed not only the disempowerment of previously 
empowered women but also the deindustrialisation of a previously semi-industrial nation.  
 
Pupavac noted that under state stewardship, the former Yugoslavia made great progress in 
educating and upskilling their population, especially women. The post-WW2 economy was 
rapidly industrialising, standards of living were rising, and women and men contributed 
equally due to the highly skilled female population (Seibel and Damachi, 1982; Pupavac, 2005; 
Bateman, 2010b). Bosnia, having experienced industrial success as part of the post-WWII 
development programme, was forced to accept a different development methodology after 
the Balkan conflict. Implemented by the IFIs, the redevelopment of Bosnia was constructed 
around microenterprises, microfinance, and the creation of an informal sector. The 
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development programme was built on a neoliberal ideology of limited state participation, not 
the post-WWII ideology of state-driven development. The IFIs used the ‘successes’ of 
microfinance elsewhere to justify its implementation. The methodology, the narrative of 
entrepreneurship, was presented as proven, sound, and cost effective (Bateman, 2010b). 
Entrepreneurial microfinance was positioned as a key part of the development package 
offered to the post-Balkan war Bosnian Government.  
 
What was observed in the medium term was vastly different to the outcomes presented by 
the IFIs. Highly skilled Bosnians, both men and women, were given options to borrow money 
to start embryonic microenterprises. Their only option was a financialised future as state 
developed industrial work was no longer supported. Alongside microfinance, the process of 
trade liberalisation (also part of the neoliberal package) allowed for cheap imports of 
previously locally manufactured goods. This led to the further industrial decline of domestic 
industry and the prolific rise of microfinance borrowing (Pupavac, 2005; Bateman, 2010b). 
The entrepreneurial narrative had dictated that the Bosnians would start microenterprises 
and build the economy from the ground up. However, as industrial jobs continued to decline, 
microfinance borrowing was shown predominantly to be propping up basic consumption in 
an economy of high unemployment (Pupavac, 2005).  
 
Bosnia has now taken a backwards step in terms of both sustainable development and 
women’s empowerment. Negative outcomes for women and employment have emerged 
since the introduction of microfinance. The case of Bosnia highlights the vulnerability of 
economies to financialisation and the greater danger of microfinance-led development 
(Bateman, 2010b; Bateman and Maclean, 2017). The case of Bosnia is not undisputed, 
however. The financial inclusion school views Bosnia as a success and champion of the 
sustainable microfinance industry (Bateman, 2010b). Forbes magazine champions Bosnian 
microfinance stating that five of the world’s 50 largest MFIs are based there, second only to 
Bangladesh with seven (Forbes, 2008). The dichotomy exemplifies the debate between 
financial inclusion and financialisation standpoints. The former sees microfinance as good, 
arguing that MFIs are needed by the borrowers and are both sustainable and profitable. 
Financialisation adherents see the reality of microfinance as funding basic consumption 
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amongst the poorest and creating over indebtedness in a disempowered unemployed 
population. 
 
The observation of Pupavac is not the only example of deindustrialisation through 
microfinance and neoliberal development practices. The Inter-American Development Bank, 
a bank with a historic neoliberal agenda, concluded in 2010 that in Latin America, persisting 
levels of poverty and a lack of development was partly produced by channelling funds to the 
microfinance sector over the previous three decades (IDB, 2010). The bank states that funds 
directed towards profitable microfinance banks created nothing but unproductive informal 
microenterprises and consumption spending at the expense of investing in productive 
employment generating industry (Bateman, 2014). Microfinance had “directly given rise to 
high levels of poverty, deprivation and rising inequalities” because it facilitated “the 
pulverisation of economic activity into millions of tiny enterprises with low productivity and 




The literature in the introductory chapter explored the narratives of microfinance and looked 
at the intervention through the impact debate. It identified differences in perspectives around 
microfinance operations, outputs, and outcomes. This critical literature review has explored 
those narratives from a wider perspective, positioning them as part of a greater more 
complex political debate. The literature has traced the early Yunus School entrepreneurial 
narrative, which promoted development and poverty alleviation through constructed ideas 
of entrepreneurial activity, to the latest narrative, that of financial inclusion. Whilst the 
narrative of entrepreneurial self-help has now all but been removed by the industry, the 
positive associations born in the early stages remain pervasive. The microfinance industry, 
with the narrative of financial inclusion, has taken the positive associations of 
entrepreneurship and built a position for microfinance, irrespective of impact.    
 
I argue through this thesis that microfinance is hegemonic as a development policy and the 
industry maintains that position through the promotion of narratives. The literature review 
has shown not only how microfinance and neoliberalism are compatible but that 
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microfinance is a product of neoliberalism in development policy (Bateman and Maclean, 
2017). Throughout the history of microfinance, the majority of research has failed to show 
positive developmental impact and merely uncovered high levels of consumption spending 
among borrowers. As shown by this chapter, regardless of these findings the global 
microfinance industry has been able to continue promoting narratives with positive 
associations, creating a hegemonic position for microfinance.  
 
Narratives have provided the microfinance industry a tool to allow it to offer little more than 
pay day loans for the ultra-poor and to pass it off as a development imperative (Mader, 2017a; 
Mader, 2015). Neoliberal development policies created a fertile environment for 
microfinance. As the IFIs liberalised markets and opened them to international capital they 
shifted poverty assistance from the state to the individual. The privatisation of basic services 
such as health and education created a market in which the poor could participate, paid for 
by debt. Governments, IFIs, and development agencies, through the narratives of 
microfinance, were able to promise win-win development, poverty alleviation and profit, only 
if no one looked too closely. Microfinance could continue with its favoured status in 
development policy despite no longer actually even claiming to alleviate poverty.  
 
To challenge the dominance of microfinance at a conceptual level, a new critical school 
fundamentally questioned the design and rationale of microfinance. The school critiques 
microfinance from outside the neoliberal paradigm, viewing debt to the poor as the 
financialisation of poverty. The school’s critique of microfinance runs parallel with broader 
critiques of neoliberalism, where the very basis of Dr. Yunus’ experiment in the 1970s is 
questioned. The school argues that by overlooking critical limitations identified in Hossain’s 
(1988) earliest impact assessment, the industry was able to hide the financialisation of the 
lives of the world’s poorest by the world’s richest under the guise of enterprise and inclusion. 
It is the work and critiques of the financialisation school which led to the conception of my 
thesis.  
 
Through my experience in the industry, I view the reality of microfinance to be divergent from 
the narratives. Through engaging with the financialisation of poverty school’s work, I argue 
that the intention of the industry is to financialise poverty. Financialising poverty aims to 
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restructure the economy of the poor around debt capital and to extract wealth from the 
world’s poorest. These are not the outcomes presented in the narratives of microfinance. In 
observing the divergent reality, I sought to explore the perceptions of industry insiders, both 
lenders and borrowers, to understand what they saw as the realities and impacts of 
microfinance.  
 
Throughout this literature review, I have demonstrated that the microfinance industry 
promotes narratives which, I shall argue in the next chapter, is how the industry maintains 
hegemony. Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is conceptualised by Cox as a “form in 
which dominance is obscured by achieving an appearance of acquiescence” (1994: 366). It is 
the harmonious presentation of debt to the poor within the narratives of microfinance which 
aligned with my views on the industry and influenced my research. This chapter 
demonstrated how the IFIs, MFIs, NGOs, and other institutions have promoted narratives of 
entrepreneurship and empowerment while providing loans to the poor. Viewing narratives 
as a tool to maintain hegemony enabled my research to better explore how microfinance 
remains a hegemonic development policy whilst not demonstrating significant impact. 
 
The following chapter will discuss Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and demonstrate how as a 
tool I will use it to explain the position of microfinance within development policy. As a 
theoretical framework, hegemony provides a lens to observe the achievements of 






















Chapter two explored the political economy within which the narratives of microfinance are 
produced and replicated. The chapter traces the origins of both the entrepreneurial and the 
financial inclusion narratives back to the neoliberalisation of development policy. The 
literature demonstrated that previous research into microfinance both from entrepreneurial 
and financial inclusion perspectives is understood by the industry itself as inconclusive in 
terms of impact (Duvendack et al., 2011). I argue the inconclusive nature of the research into 
microfinance is constructed by supporters of microfinance as a positive to hide the failure of 
microfinance, perform against its narratives, and cover more malign outcomes. Echoing the 
tobacco industry in the 1980s, “doubt is our product” (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008), the 
industry does not concede failure. Despite overwhelming evidence, it changes its narratives 
to enable the continuation of the promotion of neoliberal interventions for the poor.  
 
Chapter two demonstrated that the narratives of microfinance are produced and promoted 
in a significant body of pro-microfinance research. Due to scale and financing, IFI-supported 
research output is produced in greater quantities and promoted more effectively than 
research that challenges the premise of the narratives. As this chapter will argue, the 
reproduction of the narratives of microfinance is designed to maintain its hegemony in 
development policy. The IFI funded research is designed to convince at a policy level that debt 
to the poor in the name of development is common sense. Introduced in chapter one, 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony illustrated how deeper ideological control could be exerted 
over populations without the need for coercion. With neoliberalism being dominant within 
the development agenda, hegemony of microfinance at a policy level means it is more likely 
to be perceived as having a positive effect on the poor regardless of the evidence. A growing 
critical approach to microfinance, what I term the financialisation of poverty school, 
challenges the neoliberal logic of development within microfinance. The school moves the 
critique away from impact, and views microfinance as a tool to financialise poverty. 
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It is the dominance of the narratives of microfinance highlighted in chapter two that defined 
the ideas of this thesis. I argue that narratives of microfinance are hegemonic and hegemony 
was the reason for the continuation of microfinance in development policy. Hegemony is “the 
articulation and justification of a particular set of interests as general interests” (Morton, 
2007:113) to exercise power and control. Using Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, I seek to 
explore the role the narratives of microfinance have in the maintaining of the hegemony of 
microfinance in Egypt. The microfinance industry constructs poor borrowers as entrepreneurs 
and then measures their lives by small statistical changes in strictly defined metrics. MFIs are 
defined as providers of a human right and represented as the supporters of a bottom up 
business revolution designed to address the issues of poverty and unemployment (Yunus, 
1999: 11). The narratives of microfinance are pervasive yet the results are inconclusive. The 
ideology seemingly dominates the reality, something I argue is the outcome of hegemony.   
 
I set about this research not because there was a gap in qualitative assessments of the impact 
of microfinance. Examples of those already exist (Elyachar, 2005; Copestake, Johnson and 
Wright, 2002; Copestake et al., 2005; Collins et al., 2009). It motivated by a gap in the 
literature of personal stories, perceptions, and experiences of people who interact with 
microfinance daily, those that are often talked about, but rarely talked to. I saw the gap as an 
opportunity to understand more about the role the narratives of microfinance play in the lives 
of those that borrow, told directly by those people. I wanted to understand if high interest 
loans to the poor meant more to them than the sum of their parts, were the loans perceived 
to be more than just debt, but a ticket out of poverty. It is from that understanding that I 
formulated my research question:  
 
• What role do narratives play in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance in Egypt?  
 
To answer this question, I will use the perceptions and experiences of those involved in 
microfinance to explore what they believe they are participating in. Hegemony is achieved 
when ideas have broad consent and acceptance from a population. I argue that this position 
is reflective of the microfinance industry. Through the promotion of narratives by institutions 
of state and civil society, the microfinance industry has maintained consensus that debt can 
address poverty. Gramsci’s insights will be used as a way of understanding the success and 
 69 
dominance of microfinance despite the lack of developmental impact. At a policy level I 
believe that microfinance is hegemonic and that narratives play a key role in maintaining that 
hegemony. This research will determine at a more observable level, the individual participant, 
how narratives justify microfinance as a reasonable or ‘common sense’ intervention. The aim 
of this thesis is not to determine whether Gramsci’s concepts are true, rather it is a step 
towards understanding the continuation of microfinance as a development policy. 
 
This chapter elaborates the theoretical framework through which this research will be 
undertaken. The chapter reviews the key terms to be discussed as well as the work of Antonio 
Gramsci and his theory of hegemony. The narratives of microfinance are then discussed in 
the context of their formation and promotion, contextualising them as tools of hegemony. 
Finally, this chapter sets out the framework by which the data collected from the participants 
will be analysed and presented in order to answer the research question.  
 
The Value of Narratives  
 
The research question that I set out to answer with this work is focused on narratives, a term 
which is used in this context to describe the storytelling that can impact understandings and 
shape realities (Mishler, 1995: 117). Before moving to discuss how I consider the work of 
Antonio Gramsci helps in understanding the modern microfinance industry, it is necessary to 
define the term ‘narrative’. The study of narratives is embedded in the achievement of a 
greater understanding of human thought (Chafe, 1990). Part of the field of psychology, 
scholars like Elliot Mishler (1995) have identified how narratives allow humans to make 
meaning from abstract things or acts. Within the context of collective behaviour, narratives 
assist in the shaping of identities and creating ideologies. They are the stories humans rely on 
to make sense and effectively create reality.  
 
Narrative scholarship describes storytelling as a foundational and fundamental concept in 
human psychology (Polkinghorne, 1988), offering not rules and rational arguments but the 
reliving of actions through stories and beliefs. Narratives are sequences of statements 
connected by both a temporal and a moral order (Ricoeur, 1984) bridging the gap between 
daily social interaction and large-scale social structures (Ewick & Silbey, 1995: 198). Narratives 
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both form and sustain culture, as people interpret their lives through the stories they hear 
and tell about themselves. Narratives are also more than a constituent of social life, they have 
the potential to shape and create beliefs, not only reflecting a populations’ lived reality but 
also defining it for them (Gray, 2014: 5).  
  
The study of political narratives stems from broader narrative theory and focuses on stories 
constructed by figures with ‘power’ through the course of action, in this case, political action 
(Gray, 2014: 6). Political narratives define the creation of “political realities”, widely 
acknowledged understandings that are not considered “objective realities” (Shenhav, 2006: 
247). Edward Bernays 1928 work, ‘Propaganda’, claims that: 
 
We are governed, our minds moulded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely 
by men we have never heard of (37).  
 
Bernays’ observation of the formation of “ideas” explains how, through narratives, the “public 
mind” is controlled by those that hold power. Bernays was writing on the positive power of 
propaganda for those that had power and wanted to shape opinions or sell ideas. He attached 
narratives to unpalatable ideas to influence public opinion and create positive opinions, 
something that was determined as necessary for a “smoothly functioning society” (1928: 37).  
 
As a researcher, the creation of the political realities through narrative, described by Bernays, 
mirrored my understanding of the relative strength of the microfinance industry. The 
narratives of microfinance, constructed often by public figures such as Mohammed Yunus, 
promoted the efficacy of microfinance, creating a belief that it was an effective poverty 
alleviation tool when in reality a multitude of feasible outcomes of debt are possible. The 
microfinance industry engaged in systematic storytelling, supported by global institutions, to 
sell high interest debt to the poor and to create what I define as the narratives of 
microfinance. The narratives of microfinance as explained in the opening chapter of this thesis 
demonstrate how the industry created political realities for the poor that became dominant 
in development policy.   
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Common Sense, Narratives and Gramsci  
 
Narratives are shown to have hegemonic potential. They are used to reproduce structures of 
meaning and power which are used as a means of social control (Gray, 2014: 5). Narratives 
are continually told to reinforce and perpetuate structures of meaning which become ever 
stronger and ever more integrated into cultures and belief systems affecting a population’s 
sense making (Gray, 2014: 6). Drawing on Crehan’s (2016) reading of Gramsci’s concept of 
“Common Sense” or “Senso Comune”, the link between narrative scholarship and Gramsci’s 
conceptions enabled my work to connect narratives and hegemony in seeking to explain the 
microfinance industry. Gramsci’s concept of senso comune is different to the English 
understanding of common sense, which is positively associated with practicality and being 
reasonable. Senso Comune describes contrasting beliefs and ideas that are widely held within 
a certain community but the reasons why are unclear due to the lack of obvious evidence. 
Gramsci saw those beliefs and ideas as created visions of the world disseminated by 
institutions and hierarchies promoting particular views or behaviours (Gramsci, 1971: 34). 
Gramsci’s examination of the working-class notion of senso comune was situated within his 
conceptions of hegemony.  
 
Gramsci’s described his observations of the inconsistencies in the behaviour of the working 
class. The mix between protests one day and subservience the following day and the 
expectation of assistance from the state combined with the resentment of its officials were 
described as a 'contradictory consciousness'. The contradictions within their actions were 
interpreted as a battle between two theoretical consciousnesses. Conscience is formed of two 
theoretical consciousnesses, one inherent in a person’s daily reality and one superimposed 
and unconsciously absorbed (Patnaik, 1988: 4). It is the second of those consciousnesses 
which Gramsci understood to be a product of hegemony. Building on the Marxist tradition, 
Gramsci stated that the consciousness that was superimposed and unconsciously absorbed 
was how hegemony is manufactured, propagated, and reproduced in populations. 
Hegemony, created using narratives of the ruling classes, is absorbed through the 
contradictory consciousness (Gramsci, 1971: 324).   
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Gramsci further expands on the traditional Marxist conception of hegemony, acknowledging 
the existence of original thought in the dominated classes. Gramsci’s studies of subaltern 
consciousness explain the contradictory nature of behaviours among those classes. Gramsci’s 
observed contradiction, where one’s consciousness was directly opposed to one’s activity, 
explained why workers aligned with capital and not collectively as fellow workers. Whilst the 
workers did maintain their original thought, it was Gramsci’s understanding that the 
absorption of the created reality that dominated senso comune in the subaltern classes 
(Gramsci 1971: 419). The narratives of the ruling classes, therefore, are critical in 
development of the subaltern’s senso comune.  
 
I argue that narratives and Gramsci’s understanding of senso comune form part of the process 
of hegemony. The institutions associated with the dominant power structures produce visions 
of the world that are incorporated into consciousness (Gramsci 1971: 199). Gramsci, when 
describing the ruling classes and the institutions that promote and disseminate hegemony, is 
talking of political and civil society. Agencies of state, political parties, churches, educational 
institutions, and other agencies of civil society combine to form the superstructure, a term 
that will be discussed later in this chapter. Gramsci sees civil society as structures that are 
able to expound common sense through a structured and coherent system (1971: 330). The 
framework for this study has been built around this Gramscian theory of hegemony that I 
believe has allowed microfinance to maintain its position in development policy. The 
microfinance industry, as part of civil society has promoted narratives which appear to have 
become senso comune, apparently placing the worldview of the powerful into the 
consciousness of the powerless.  
 
A Gramscian Approach  
 
Understanding the concept of narratives through Gramsci’s concept of senso comune 
illustrates their roles in the supporting and enabling of hegemony. To position hegemony as 
the theoretical framework of this thesis, it is necessary to understand the details of that 
theory as well as how it is positioned amongst other Gramscian concepts. Gramsci’s theories, 
formulated in early 20th century Italy, many of them written whilst imprisoned by Mussolini’s 
Fascist Party, are significant theories in the neo-Marxist field. Concentrated on the approach 
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to uneven development and born of the industrial social conflicts taking place in newly 
industrialising Northern Italy, Antonio Gramsci added layers of understanding to the 
traditional conceptualisation of power relations. Hegemony, a term previously used by Lenin 
to describe the leadership of the working class in revolution, was developed by Gramsci, who 
focused more on how hegemony was formed and maintained.  
 
Interpretations of hegemony from Gramsci as well as other neo-Marxists such as Robert Cox 
(Cox, 1983) and Adam Morton (Morton, 2007) give scope to the understanding of how 
hegemony is formed. Traditionally, in IR theory, hegemony was unidimensional. Power and 
dominance was believed to be founded on the military and economic means of a nation state. 
This traditional conception of power to dominate and control was viewed by Gramsci as 
incomplete. Gramsci and others, conceived of power as having more layers, layers of 
consensus and permission complemented by coercion created hegemonic power (Femia, 
1979). Morton explains Hegemony as:  
 
The articulation and justification of a particular set of interests as general interests 
(emphasis added) (Morton, 2007:113). 
 
Hegemonic ideas are presented as ideas that have broad consent and acceptance because 
they are shown to be supported by the institutions of state (Morton, 2007). Gramsci’s 
conception of state institutions explained his ideas of how consensus in hegemony worked. 
The state not only included the apparatus of government but also the apparatus of civil 
society. Civil society is seen as tool through which the elite construct consensus through 
propagation of narratives promoting certain world views (Morton, 2007). Cox’s earlier work 
states that within a world order hegemony exists:  
 
Based on a coherent fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent 
collective image of world order (including norms) and a set of institutions which 
administer the order with a certain semblance of universality (Cox, 1981: 139). 
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Hegemony is not only dominance by power but an exercise in opinion moulding. Cox later 
elaborates on the process of shifting from dominance by power to dominance by collective 
image through acquiescence:  
 
…as if it were the natural order of things….[it] is an internalised coherence which has 
most probably arisen from an externally imposed order but has been transformed into 
an intersubjectively constituted reality (Cox, 1994: 366).  
 
Hegemony is dominance through the creation of a consensual order. The political apparatus 
of the public sphere directs narratives, the private sphere promotes them, they are consumed 
and digested, and this enables hegemony. The conception of political and civil societies is 
subject to much debate but for the purpose of understanding it in the context of my work, 
the definition is taken directly from Gramsci:  
 
The state should be understood, then, not just as the apparatus of government 
operating within the ‘public’ sphere (government, political parties, military) but also 
as part of the ‘private’ sphere of civil society (church, media, education) through which 
hegemony functions (Gramsci and Buttigieg, 1992: 12).  
 
The state, in both public and private spheres, organises and legitimises narratives for the 
expansion of a world view and creation of hegemony (Gramsci and Buttigieg, 1992). The 
narratives which the public sphere produces are consumed and contested in the private 
sphere of civil society. Civil society is the space where the narratives are shaped into beliefs 
and where hegemonic ideas become the lived realities. It is through the two spheres, state 
and civil society, that the hegemonic political narrative is promoted. Creating consent within 
the population allows those in power to dominate without the use of force. It is the focus on 
the moral and intellectual functions by the state that create hegemony through social 
relations (Cox, 1981). Trusted institutions such as church and academia are the key tools in 
shaping opinions.  
 
Hegemony is a world view so strongly rooted in a society’s lived reality that it dominates all 
other ways of viewing the world. It is an opinion moulding activity for ideological domination 
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(Morton, 2007). Hegemony is both artificially constructed through imposed narratives and 
organically derived from peoples real lived experience, creating a self-reinforcing circle. 
Hegemony is continuously constructed, negotiated, and contested in a process of 
development. It is the contestation and counternarratives that Gramsci expressed as the 
inconsistencies in the consciousness of the working class - the inherent lived reality clashing 
with the narratives superimposed and unconsciously absorbed. Hegemony, in the battle 
ground of civil society, is seemingly flexible, yet in reality, it works to consume challenges and 
incorporate them into the hegemon (Gramsci and Buttigieg, 1992). Hegemony is a constant 
process of construction, artificial but reinforced by the natural, which privileges certain 
worldviews and builds dialectical relations between social forces to universalise and 
naturalise those views. The process of domination creates cultural values and a belief system 
around which societies grow. The values and beliefs work to legitimise the institutions that 
propagate those ideas, which through societal interaction endorse particular cultures, values, 
beliefs and language. The process continues until the views of the hegemon are incorporated 
into reality and there is an acceptance of ideas (Morton, 2007: 113).  
 
When researching Gramsci for the theoretical framework of this thesis, I wanted to both use 
his work on hegemony as the lens to view microfinance but wanted to ensure I looked more 
widely at Gramsci’s contribution to neo-Marxism. Gramsci’s work is rooted in a certain period 
yet it still provides great explanatory insight. Gramsci’s ideas have been well applied to the 
proliferation of the neo-liberal development model and the observation of uneven 
development between states. In ‘Unravelling Gramsci’ (2007), Morton applies Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony to illustrate the acceptance of the population of the transition between 
import substitution industrialisation and neo-liberal capitalist accumulation in contemporary 
developing states. The transition from one economic model to another is authored and 
promoted by dominant social forces within the form of state, and through the tools of civil 
society integrated into social life to gain the acceptance of the population.  
 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is based on the Marxist theory of society consisting of two 
parts, the base and the superstructure. Building on Marx’s conceptions, Gramsci determined 
that the superstructure was made up of two constituent parts, political society (government, 
political parties, military) and civil society (church, media, education), with civil society being 
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the consensus-creating element driving cultural hegemony (Simpson and Wilkinson, 2002: 
33). Whilst I concentrate on narratives and hegemony for the analysis of the microfinance 
industry, placing those within a wider framework assists in the understanding of the broader 
theoretical landscape within which this research took place. Marx’s work theorises that the 
base, the relationships of production, is where people enter to produce the necessities of life.  
 
The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation. (Marx, 1859: 1)  
 
The activities of the base create and reinforce the superstructure which reflects the dominant 
ideology of the ruling classes. Marx’s original conception of the superstructure was one 
dimensional in terms of its composition and political power and culture were categorised as 
one. The relationship between base and superstructure in Marx’s conception was not 
unidirectional. The base shaped the superstructure and superstructure maintained the base. 
The reciprocal nature of the relationship between base and superstructure allowed for the 
superstructure to influence perceptions which over time are reflected in the political and 
economic realities, which again reinforce the superstructure.  
 
Gramsci’s reconceptualisation of the superstructure, the split into two levels, demonstrated 
how he believed the ruling class exercised the function of hegemony. Through civil society, 
institutions not directly associated with the political state - schools and universities, religious 
institutions, media, and NGOs - integrate the narratives of the dominant classes into the senso 
comune of the subordinate classes. It is the separation of political and civil society which 
allowed for a deeper understanding of how hegemony was maintained without the more 
traditional notions of coercion associated with the infrastructure of state (Simpson and 
Wilkinson, 2002:34).   
 
The sum of the base and the superstructure is described by Gramsci’s notion of a ‘historical 
bloc’. The historic bloc was where the base and the superstructure became a concrete reality, 
an amalgamation of ideology and praxis at an individual and a societal level. Gramsci’s 
conception of the historical bloc looks at humanity and specifically human nature as a:  
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…historical bloc of purely individual and subjective elements and of mass and objective 
or material elements (Gramsci and Buttigieg, 1992: 360).  
 
The historical bloc therefore is a concept that Gramsci defines as a political, economic and 
social condition where hegemony has been attained. The process of forming hegemony is the 
battle for the foundation of a new historical bloc. The very existence of a historical bloc is 
impossible without hegemony and a dominant social class (Sotiris, 2018: 95). The concept of 
the historical bloc outlines the context within which the opinion moulding takes place. Where 
one’s lived reality is reflective of the narratives that one consumes, the formation of senso 
comune is inevitable (Sotiris, 2018: 114).  
 
The historical situating of Gramsci’s theories is frequently part of academic debate. Gramsci’ 
observations were of a certain time and it is critical to acknowledge those roots. I chose to 
take a more immanent sociological reading of Gramsci and engage with the interpretations 
and their multifaceted nature, not an essentialist view of his work. This work carefully takes 
the concept of hegemony outside of its original conception and works to relate it to the 
contemporary microfinance industry. Applying theory in a new context has been debated but 
as Stuart Hall wrote:  
 
We shouldn’t use Gramsci like an Old Testament prophet who, at the correct moment, 
will offer us the consoling and appropriate quotation. We can’t pluck up this 
‘Sardinian’ from his specific and unique political formation, beam him down at the end 
of the 20th century, and ask him to solve our problems for us: especially since the 
whole thrust of his thinking was to refuse this easy transfer of generalisations from 
one conjuncture, nation or epoch to another (1987:16).  
 
Transferring Gramsci’s concepts and taking them away from a binary dialectic based on class 
can be considered a misuse of Gramsci’s work (Filippini and Barr, 2017).  Historicists demand 
that his concepts are analysed relative to the circumstances and context from which they 
were derived before they are applied to any contemporary issues (Morton, 2003). This thesis 
further acknowledges those challenges and accepts the limitations of applying a historically 
rooted concept to a modern condition. Gramsci’s own method of approaching the history of 
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ideas addresses the challenge of his ideas being as useful today as they were then by 
discussing ideas within and beyond their context. Morton argues that:  
 
Any reading of Gramsci based on a self-reflexive purpose, rather than a representative 
interpretation, cannot objectively reveal a ‘true’ or ‘real’ Gramsci; thus no ‘correct’ 
reading can be produced (2003: 119).  
 
This meant that Gramsci did not relegate ideas and the social conditions that created them 
as having no relevance to the present. Whist this study is taking a particular conception of 
Gramsci’s idea and sidestepping a deeply historicised approach, it is working to expose a 
dominant narrative that through popular consent, has subjugated the poor, and integrated 
them into a global capitalist system.  
 
Hegemony and the Narratives of Microfinance  
 
Using the wider work of Gramsci, I seek to understand how the concept of hegemony, 
discussed above, relates to the contemporary microfinance industry. I argued in the opening 
chapter that the narratives of microfinance are constructions of the superstructure within 
Gramsci’s conceptualisation of the historical bloc. The narratives of microfinance are 
promoted not only by the state, but by institutions of development, the media, education and 
even the church (Bateman, 2010b), the components of Gramsci’s civil society. The narratives 
are well integrated into development discourse and appear as the dominant thought in regard 
to poverty alleviation, illustrating the reinforcing relationship between the superstructure 
and the base.  
 
I argue that microfinance is hegemonic and that the narratives of microfinance have 
supported the industry in maintaining its hegemony. My research is designed to determine 
the extent that the narratives affect hegemony by exploring their reach amongst those that 
engage with microfinance. The narratives form part of the hegemonic neo-liberal agenda and 
have been integrated into the public and private spheres to become widely accepted among 
development professionals. To observe the impact of the narratives and the extent to which 
microfinance is hegemonic, I question participants in the microfinance industry across all 
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levels. I define the levels of participation in the microfinance industry between what 
Gramsci’s theory would conceive of as civil society and those the theory would determine as 
subaltern. Observing the interplay between civil society and subaltern participants will allow 
this research to explore whether the seemingly hegemonic microfinance narratives have 
actually affected a process of opinion moulding and if so, to what extent.  
 
As described in the introductory chapter, the two levels of microfinance participation are split 
over four tiers that are represented by the participant groups. Their understanding and 
perceptions of their interactions with microfinance are explored through primary research to 
answer the research question. The first two levels are made up of IFI and MFI representatives. 
These groups are both part of the Gramscian conception of civil society. Placing them within 
the framework of civil society positions them as responsible for the promotion and 
dissemination of the narratives of microfinance. Robert Cox defines these institutions as 
“mechanisms of hegemony” through which macro-hegemonic narratives are translated to the 
population, expressed as universal norms (1983: 170).  
  
To assert that notion, I use Cox’s definition of key functions of the mechanisms of Hegemony. 
Cox states that mechanisms of hegemony fulfil the following criteria: “(1) they embody the 
rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the 
product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the 
world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter-
hegemonic ideas” (1983: 170). Through the creation and maintenance of the narratives of 
microfinance and through Cox’s criteria it is possible to identify the IFIs and MFIs as 
mechanisms of hegemony.  
 
Responsible for the implementation of the policies of the Washington consensus, the SAPs, 
and many other neoliberal policies, the IFIs and MFIs are identifiable in the first two of Cox’s 
functions. Globally and locally, the IFIs and MFIs have pursued policies which are considered 
products of neoliberal hegemony, specifically a free market ideology and government 
retrenchments (Wade, 2002). Collectively the IFIs and MFIs have promoted narratives that 
have sought to ideologically legitimise the norms of the neoliberal world order. IFI and MFI 
research has shown that the poor are restrained entrepreneurs just in need of capital to 
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succeed (Yunus, 1999: 11) and have worked to create a consensus on debt for the poor being 
pro-poor (Bateman, 2010b; Mader, 2015).  
 
Cox’s fourth definition states that the elites of peripheral countries are co-opted. In the case 
of Egypt, this is most recently observed through the IMF CPF with the Egyptian Government 
(IMF, 2016a). The CPF has seen the Government of Egypt cut public services, reduce the size 
of public sector, cut subsidies and tariffs, and open up the economy to global capital all with 
the aim of improving the lives of the poor (Momani, 2018). Cox’s final criteria, being able to 
absorb counter hegemonic ideas, is demonstrated by the microfinance industries transition 
from the entrepreneurial to the financial inclusion narrative. The IFI and MFIs acknowledged 
counter hegemonic idea that microfinance does not work and promoted a change in the 
industry, not rejecting microfinance but stating a new aim for it. The new narrative absorbed 
the challenge to microfinance and allowed its continuation. 
 
The second level of study is focused on those determined as the subaltern. I look at those that 
civil society seek to control with the support of narratives, the field staff of MFIs and their 
clients. Whether or not the narratives of microfinance are hegemonic is perhaps better 
observed through the perceptions of these two groups since they are the subaltern over 
which hegemony is sought. It is ultimately the perceptions of these groups that shall be 
observed to determine whether civil society has really shaped opinion and sold neoliberalism 
to the bottom of the pyramid. The aim of this research was to understand whether the 
microfinance industry had created hegemony through narratives through observing whether 
those participating, especially in the second level, believe the narratives and held a local 
neoliberal ideology.  
 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony explains how the hegemon creates a seemingly harmonious 
nature of the relationship between the dominant power groups and the subaltern (Gramsci, 
1995: 344). In microfinance literature, I observe the same seemingly harmonious relationship 
presented across the microfinance industry, from donors to MFI to borrowers, all working for 
each other. I seek to determine whether that harmony itself is just a narrative or whether the 
narrative has actually created hegemony and the subaltern consent to neoliberal ideals. 
Through my primary research, I aim to observe the dissemination and receipt of the narratives 
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of microfinance to try and determine whether those narratives support the maintenance of 
hegemony. I wanted to understand the success of microfinance not as a development tool 
but as a shaper of senso comune. I sought to understand whether the narratives weaken the 
social power of people to legitimately question and challenge what they are being offered. To 
facilitate those observations, the two narratives of microfinance that I highlighted in the 
introduction are positioned not by the development industry but as I see them, as tools of 
hegemony.  
 
The Entrepreneur  
 
Arguably the most important narrative of microfinance, the construction of the 
‘entrepreneur’, the underpinning of the original Yunus school (Yunus, 1989; Yunus, 1999; 
Dharam, 1984; Hossain and Salimullah, 1984; Hossain, 1988). The narrative casts the poor as 
entrepreneurs and was critical for the early acceptance and proliferation of microfinance. 
Casting the poor as entrepreneurs worked to change the vocabulary that can be associated 
with them. The word debt is removed to become an ‘opportunity’ and consumption became 
an ‘investment’. The removal of the word ‘debt’ from microfinance literature worked to 
remove the perception of risk associated with borrowing from the narrative. Putting the poor 
into debt is unpalatable, giving an entrepreneur an opportunity is commendable (Bateman, 
2010b).  
 
Once the microfinance industry changed the language, narratives were built that changed the 
perceptions that surrounded poverty and debt. The narrative of the entrepreneur presented 
the offering of debt to the unskilled poor so they can try and employ themselves in whatever 
meagre task they can perform or even just feed themselves. This was constructed as “a 
chance for those held back to unleash their creative energy in the market for their own 
benefit” (Yunus, 2006). The tools of civil society promoted the narratives, universities, the 
Church and the media. Jeffrey Sachs of Colombia University said:  
 
The key to ending extreme poverty is to enable the poorest of the poor to get their 
foot on the ladder of development . . . the poorest of the poor are stuck beneath it. 
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They lack the minimum amount of capital necessary to get a foothold, and therefore 
need a boost up to the first rung (2005: 244)   
 
The media promoted microfinance, a New York Times article called "The Women's Crusade," 
(Kristof, 2009), showed a destitute woman who borrowed $65 from a microfinance bank who 
started a successful business, educated her daughters, built a house, and became an 
employer of others - a true success story of the effects of microfinance. The Church was no 
different. As early as the 1980s, religious groups were active participants in microfinance 
lending and supporters of the entrepreneurial narrative (Boucher, 2012). Microfinance was 
claimed as:   
 
Valued by most Christian development organizations as an effective marketplace 
ministry that proclaims the power of the gospel, builds the local church, and 
empowers laity to demonstrate the love of Christ to the poor (Bussau, 2000: 68)   
 
Outside the traditional Gramscian conception of Civil Society, but fulfilling many of the same 
criteria, celebrities also participated in the promotion of the entrepreneurial narrative. 
Celebrities mainstreamed the idea that the uneducated illiterate poor, especially poor 
women, were actually budding entrepreneurs in need of capital. Famously, through the New 
York Times, Bono of the band U2 stated:  
 
Give a man a fish, [and] he’ll eat for a day. Give a woman microcredit, [and] she, her 
husband, her children, and her extended family will eat for a lifetime (NYT, 2005). 
 
The narrative of the entrepreneur, and its introduction and promotion through the tools of 
civil society, reflects the process of the formation of hegemony. Gramsci’s concept, refined 
by Morton as “the articulation and justification of a particular set of interests as general 
interests” (2007: 113) is seen in civil societies support of that narrative. The narrative is 
compelling enough for charities, NGOs, politicians on the left, and well-meaning 




Financial Inclusion  
 
In the mid-2000s, the narrative of the entrepreneur was starting to lose its dominance. 
Innovations in impact assessment meant that for the first time the efficacy promoted by the 
narrative was challenged. As per Cox’s (1983: 170) definition of mechanisms of hegemony, 
the microfinance industry acted to absorb the counter-hegemonic idea that microfinance did 
not help the poor. The narrative of financial inclusion was created, normalising high interest 
consumption lending to the poor as a development imperative. The financial inclusion 
narrative made microfinance about providing financial services to the poor at a profit for 
them to consume.  
 
I am not challenging the notion of consumer lending to the poor for financial gain but 
challenging the notion that consumer lending can be logically considered a development 
policy. The narrative accepted that the old microfinance ideas of entrepreneurship were 
flawed, absorbed the challenge, and restated its aim as a tool to support the poor to pay for 
the basic public services that the state has taken away from them. The narrative of financial 
inclusion, like that of entrepreneurship and financial systems, alters the language surrounding 
microfinance. The mechanisms of hegemony insert words like Consumption Smoothing into 
the discourse, presented as the positive reason why financial inclusion is a development 
policy (Zeller and Sharma, 2000).  
 
The narrative of microfinance was once about giving the ability to the poor to become 
entrepreneurs and alleviate their poverty. Through a process of challenge and absorption, the 
narrative of microfinance became about being an alleviator of the symptoms of poverty 
(Dunford, 2013). The narrative promotes the fact that borrowers can send the children to 
school or seek urgent medical treatment, using emotive justification for the continuation of 
microfinance programmes as development. The narrative detracts from the alternative 
viewpoint, taking the focus away from why the poor should have to pay for basic education 
or medical treatment in the first place.  
 
The two core narratives of microfinance detailed in this section are what I believe 
demonstrate the promotion of hegemony. The narratives, promoted through a range of 
 84 
mechanisms of civil society, have shaped the opinions of practitioners and policy makers as 
well as encourage those with a casual interest. Across the narratives, microfinance enjoys 
broad political and public support from the university to the church, charities to 
philanthropists. There is a senso comune understanding of the efficacy of microfinance. These 
narratives have enabled microfinance to become a development imperative deeply 
integrated into the SDGs (Mader, 2017a) despite evidence that demonstrates microfinance 
fails to meet its stated aims. I view Gramsci’s description of the process and maintenance of 
hegemony as being present in the development and continuation of the microfinance 
industry and this research seeks to determine the extent that narratives can explain that 
hegemony.  
 
Microfinance and Counter Hegemonic Narratives  
 
In the formation of hegemony, the consumption of counter hegemonic narratives is part of 
the process itself. When researching microfinance for this thesis, I observed the way the 
narratives of microfinance were able to overcome crises and continue unscathed. 
Microfinance has faced a significant number of crises and on each occasion, as this section 
demonstrates, the industry has moved past it incorporating the counter narrative and 
strengthening its position.  
 
In Bolivia in 2001, the SAP created rapid inflation which led to increased prices across the 
economy, with the basic utilities market faced the highest price rises. As part of the SAP, the 
IFIs encouraged the growth of MFIs, due to the rapidly increasing demand for loans. The 
demand for loans was not however for entrepreneurship, which at the time was the narrative 
in use. The demand came from people needing to pay basic utility bills from one month to the 
next (Gill, 2000; Rhyne, 2001; Oliviera, 2004). The pay-day style lending for utility bills led to 
client over-indebtedness which eventually led to street protests. The government stepped in 
and requested repayment moratoriums for borrowers to calm the protests. The street riots, 
followed by the governments call for moratoriums, ultimately led to the collapse of the 
microfinance industry in Bolivia with multiple MFIs going out of business. The government 
stepped in to manage the crisis, the central bank agreed concessions for borrowers, the loans 
were written off. A year after the crisis took hold, the microfinance sector was significantly 
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reduced and faced negative perception (Rhyne, 2001; Marconi and Mosley, 2005; Mader, 
2015). After the crisis, the industry has slowly rebuilt itself, disassociating itself from its past 
and reaching pre-crisis levels of borrowing. The negative perceptions were forgotten and the 
narrative of financial inclusion became embedded (Mader, 2015). The IFIs and MFIs managed 
this crisis by criticising their own approach, finding fault with the methodology and not with 
microfinance itself, and improving regulation overseen by the IFIs allowed MFIs to restart 
their business of lending to the poor (ACCION, 2010). The microfinance industry reacted to 
the crisis, consumed the counter narrative, and continued. As defined by Cox, this is the 
mechanism of hegemony at work.  
 
There have been multiple other significant crises of microfinance over the years. There have 
been repayment crises in Pakistan, Nicaragua, Bosnia, Morocco, India, and others (ACCION, 
2010). Interest rates of 100% or higher to the world’s poorest were uncovered in critical 
research projects (Bateman, 2010b). Multiple instances of mass suicides amongst 
overindebted borrowers were attributed to microfinance (Shenton, 2011; Bastiaensen et al., 
2013; Mader, 2015). The microfinance industry navigated the crises by always finding a reason 
other than the debt itself as the cause of the problem. Regulation, organisational design, a 
wider global crisis, or bad practice have been cited as causes. The industry actively responds 
by making ‘changes’ so the crisis would not happen again. The narrative consumes the 
challenge and avoids the focus on the issue of debt itself being a problem (Rhyne, 2001; 
Marconi and Mosley, 2006; Shylendra, 2006; Sriram, 2014).  
 
A Gramscian Framework for this Study  
 
I have chosen specifically Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as the framework for this thesis 
because it provides deeper insights into what I observed in working within and researching 
the microfinance industry. The framework will be used to analyse the perceptions of 
participants in the microfinance industry to determine the role narratives play in maintaining 
the hegemony of microfinance in Egypt. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Gramsci’s theory 
of hegemony is situated within his wider conceptions of the world and power. Hegemony for 
Gramsci determined how the dominant power structures remain in place without the use of 
considerable force. It is the result of the ideological struggle to form a historical bloc. The 
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historical bloc represents the social reality of the base as well as the dominant power of the 
superstructure, forming a lived reality in the vision of that historic bloc. Whilst hegemony 
secured through the narratives of microfinance is the interest of my work, situating the 
narratives and interventions of microfinance is critical in understanding microfinance as an 
industry.  
 
As the introductory chapter explained, microfinance is a development intervention born of 
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism under Gramsci’s theory is a new historical bloc, displacing liberal 
capitalism with a new form logic and senso comune in the fields of economics and governance 
(Torres, 2013: 83). Traditional conceptions of a historical bloc, like those of Cox (1983: 170), 
are based on the maintenance of power by a superstructure and is inherently a ‘national’ 
theory. Defining senso comune as culturally shared understandings and observing that ‘what 
is common sense for one group is not common sense for another’, the nationally rooted 
nature of a historic bloc is clear. However, Morton (2007: 121) builds on that conception and 
states that the expansion of a national social order can move towards a global order once it 
has consolidated the historical bloc at the national level. As globalisation crosses borders, it 
creates a comparable framework across cultures, allowing for the implementation of similar 
notions of senso comune globally. The national therefore, is a departure point for the 
international and what becomes a hegemonic world order and a global historical bloc.  
 
The international nature of the neoliberal historic bloc explains why neoliberalism is often 
supported by governments in the developing world where the majority of their population 
live on less than US$2 per day and rely heavily on social security infrastructure (Norman, 2014: 
3). The historic bloc has changed both the underlying economic base and the senso comune 
of the population. This explains the background against which microfinance has been so 
prolific and it is from that understanding that I build the parameters of my research. 
Narratives play a part in hegemony and the foundation of a historical bloc. However, they are 
part of a greater system that impacts the economic realities of people. Neoliberalism, along 
with promoting narratives, has built logic and economic structures which act to bind people 
within a limited range of choices, regardless or not whether they engage with the narratives. 
The formation of the historic bloc means they have little choice but to engage with the 
economic realities.  
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In Egypt, the case study I selected for my research, economic reforms have been underway 
since shortly after independence. Chapter 4 explores fully the political and economic changes 
that have been undertaken in the move from a newly socialist state in 1950s to a landscape 
which is both neoliberal as well as heavily state controlled. I observed the narratives of 
microfinance while I was working in Egypt in the late 2000s. It was those narratives presented 
against the realities of my observations that prompted my research question. I wanted to 
understand the role of narratives in what I argue is the hegemony of microfinance in Egypt, 
as well as to determine the extent to which those narratives had shaped the senso comune of 
those that engage with microfinance. Placing Gramsci’s theory of hegemony in the wider 
context of Gramsci’s work allowed me to understand in greater detail how the conception of 
the historical bloc works with the economic base changing to reflect the control of the 
superstructure.  
 
This contextualised understanding demonstrates that narratives are not the only tool of 
control confronted by those who engage with microfinance. The circumstances created by 
the economic base present other reasons why they might engage with microfinance. The way 
the industry has changed and promoted narratives in Egypt gave me the opportunity to 
observe how those narratives affect the perceptions of those that engage with microfinance. 
I was interested in observing whether those that engage with microfinance perceive 
themselves as entrepreneurs building their way out of poverty or whether they are trapped 




From afar, the various imaginaries around microfinance appear harmonious. The literature 
makes the assumption that those that participate do so because they understand the value 
of the opportunity that they have been given (Yunus, 1999: 11). Those participants, mostly 
women, are constructed as wanting to be part of the new frontier of capitalism and ready to 
lift themselves up by the bootstraps (Smith and Thurman, 2007: 10). That narrative is 
compelling and resonates with many across the world. This idea of the poor as entrepreneurs 
has been an accepted part of development discourse for over 30 years.  
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Hegemony, in the view of Antonio Gramsci, is the ideological dominance of others by power 
and through the exercise of opinion moulding. Narratives are tools in the formation and 
maintenance of hegemony (Bates, 1975: 351). They are promoted by civil society and 
assimilated into the daily lives of people, becoming a senso comune that is reinforced through 
daily lived reality. The objective of my research is to better understand why microfinance, 
despite its documented failings, remained a core development policy. In observing the growth 
of the microfinance industry and the promotion of its narratives, I drew similarities with 
elements of Gramsci’s description of the foundation of a historical bloc, especially the idea of 
dominance through consent. The narrative constructed participants in the industry as 
entrepreneurs yet my experience of the reality was different. I wanted to understand whether 
the narratives of microfinance had shaped the senso comune of borrowers in the same way I 
argue it has of policy makers.   
 
Using the framework outlined in this chapter, I conducted interviews with multiple levels of 
participants within the microfinance industry. I sought to understand whether the narratives 
had shaped the senso comune of policy makers to the extent they would argue that debt is a 
solution to poverty. At a deeper level, I sought to observe whether the narratives of 
microfinance extended down to the slums of Cairo and made people believe they can start 
their own business to remove themselves from poverty. Through observing both the 
mechanisms and recipients of hegemony, I wanted to better understand whether 
microfinance and its narratives were hegemonic or whether engagement with microfinance 
was driven by the neoliberal restructuring of the economic base. The following chapter will 
explain the context within which the fieldwork took place, as well as describe the 













The 30 plus years of microfinance impact studies discussed in chapters one and two have 
overwhelmingly taken place in Asia (Hossain and Salimullah, 1984; Dharam, 1984; Hossain, 
1988; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Yunus, 1999; Khandker, 2012; Roodman and Morduch, 2014; 
Banerjee et al., 2015). Whilst research has taken place across most countries with a 
microfinance presence, studies outside of Asia are rarely comprehensive. The focus of studies 
on Asia created the idea that the Asian model was successful and therefore could be 
replicated across the world with limited regard for local context (Syed, 2009: 51). 
Predominantly, although not exclusively, these roll outs have followed instances where SAPs 
have been implemented. Microfinance is integrated by the IFIs into post SAP economies with 
the task of alleviating poverty and creating employment. Given this global approach to 
microfinance, the research for this thesis could have ultimately taken place in any post SAP 
economy. I chose Egypt as the location to conduct its primary research, predominantly due 




Egypt is a country of c. 90 million people situated at the crossroads of North Africa and the 
Middle East. Egypt is ranked as middle income by the World Bank (2018b) with medium levels 
of human development according to the UN (2018). However, 30% of its population still live 
on less than $2 per day and in 2015 the unemployment rate was at around 15%, growing 
steadily over the preceding 20 years. The informal economy is responsible for c. 40% of all 
employment (CAPMAS, 2015). The Government of Egypt is the largest formal sector employer 
through both the civil service and the Army (Sims, 2012). Whilst the government, in terms of 
the number of people it employs, has grown consistently over the past 20 years, its role in 
people’s lives in terms of health, education, and other public services has been considerably 
reduced (Sulayman, 2011). Public service retrenchment began in 1990 with the 
implementation of the first IMF and World Bank SAP. The second SAP, newly named as a CPF, 
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was agreed in 2016 (WBG, 2015) and has since been fully executed (REUTERS, 2019), has 
further diminished the role of the state in public life. 
 
The 2016 CPF is a $12 billion, three-year financing package provided by the IMF. Its 
implementation is supported by Egyptian officials who acknowledge publicly that there is a 
requirement for the “quick implementation of economic reforms for Egypt to restore 
macroeconomic stability” (IMF, 2016a). There was an agenda of reforms attached to the CPF 
which included: 
!
liberalization of the exchange rate regime, fiscal consolidation to lower budget 
expenditures, tax increases, deep structural reforms, and lifting business regulations 
to spur economic growth (IMF, 2016a). 
 
The proposals included a host of monetary and fiscal reforms which were designed to reduce 
public spending. Large reforms to the civil service were required, as was the reduction in the 
state’s role in providing subsidised social services (El-Badrawi, 2017). Leading up to the first 
$2.75 billion tranche disbursement, the Egyptian Government removed the dollar currency 
peg, thus devaluing the national currency by half (Guardian, 2016). They also removed and 
reduced food and fuel subsidies (Saba, 2019) and announced measures to shrink the public 
sector (Abed, 2019). These reforms were made even in the face of potential political 
instability in post revolution Egypt. The outcome of these reforms was to further swell the 
size of the informal sector and increase unemployment levels, two identified causes of the 
revolution in 2011. Throughout the world, and Egypt is no exception, the same conditions 
have been the preconditions for the entry and expansion of microfinance programmes. 
During post-SAP implementation, using the narrative of entrepreneurship and self-
employment, microfinance has been used to help contain the newly unemployed (Bateman 
and Chang, 2012). Since the early 1990s, various forms of microfinance have expanded in 
Egypt, from NGOs to the for-profit financial sector. They often replicate the intervention 
styles of the programmes so coveted in Asia and elsewhere.  
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I developed the ideas for this thesis over a number of years whilst I was living and working for 
a global bank in Cairo. From my experience there, I understood that Egypt would be a suitable 
example for the fieldwork of my thesis based on both the microfinance sector and the wider 
economic conditions. Egypt has experienced an economic path similar to that of many of the 
other countries where microfinance is pervasive. Post-colonial socialism challenged by global 
neoliberal ideals and imposed structural adjustment provide the ideal backdrop for 
microfinance. Reductions in public services along with the shrinking civil service and a lack of 
formal employment options for a large unemployed youth population. These are the 
conditions where microfinance thrives. The following section provides a brief explanation of 
how and why microfinance has embedded itself into the everyday lives of Egyptians.   
 
An Economic History of Egypt   
 
The adaption of neoliberal market-based reforms in Egypt came in the early 1990s and the 
events that led up to that change are comparable to lots of newly independent states post-
WWII. In the 1950s, Egypt began its post-colonial independence with a socialist government. 
The presidency of Gamel Abdel Nasser had put the controls of the Egyptian economy firmly 
in the government’s hands. He removed both foreign and domestic private capital from the 
majority of industries and began a series of social changes (Cooper, 1982; Tignor, 1998; Bush, 
1999). As a result, the population of Egypt experienced unprecedented access to education, 
health care, housing, jobs, and social welfare for the first time (Ikram, 2006). 
 
State backed socialism largely remained in place throughout the following 30 years under 
presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. Whilst the latter created an environment more 
conducive to private investment capital, state provision was still very much dominant (Ayubi, 
1991). Any privatisation that did occur under Sadat and Mubarak could be best described as 
crony capitalism. A small group of liberal bourgeoisie and regime supporters who had been 
side-lined by Nasser were reinstated as the corporate class. They mainly operated and 
managed state owned assets in return for a fee (Sadowski, 1991; Bush, 1999). Until the late 
1980s, the Egyptian state was by far the largest actor within the Egyptian economy with only 
ten percent of total capital held privately (Ayubi, 1991).  
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Throughout the early 1980s, the Egyptian economy enjoyed growth of around eight percent 
per annum. Disappointingly for the Egyptian people, the GDP growth was essentially jobless 
growth based predominantly on increasing rents (Radwan, 1998). The state had a growing 
budget and acted as an employer of last resort, making up for the lack of formal employment 
growth elsewhere in the economy. As a result, the public sector swelled. For all those that 
could not find public sector work, the informal sector also expanded significantly to contain 
the unemployed (Oweiss, 1990; Rizk, 1991). The informal economy grew and people took to 
income generating activities such as petty trading and cash paid home-based work. Whilst 
from the outside the overall economic picture of Egypt seemed bright, Mubarak began to 
erode certain liberties and take a more authoritarian approach to rule. Any public outcry 
against the erosion of liberties was dampened by large state-based actions designed to stop 
the objections. The state created jobs within the civil service and expanded the large existing 
welfare programmes along with food and transport subsidies. The programmes of state 
employment and increased welfare were used as a form of regime legitimisation to suppress 
the dissatisfaction among the population (Waterbury, 1983). 
 
Whilst these changes were going on inside Egypt, the 1980s saw an increase in oil production 
and a large oil glut. Oil prices crashed from $35 a barrel in 1980 to less than $10 in 1986 which 
caused problems for the Egyptian economy. This made the rapidly growing but 
underemployed civil service and a large welfare budget unsustainable for the government. 
Public debt increased rapidly. With oil and other revenues diminishing, Egypt was struggling 
to meet its large public sector commitments. This situation was true for much of the 
developing world at the time. This inability to service high levels of public debt led to the need 
for international assistance that came in the form of the SAPs. In 1991 the Economic and 
Structural Adjustment Programme between Egypt, the IMF, and the World Bank was signed 
(Abdel-Khalek, 2001), alleviating Egypt’s financial issues but fundamentally changing the 
relationship between the state and the population (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014).  
 
The Egyptian SAP was no different to any others at the time and guided by the Post 
Washington Consensus. It focused on reducing budget deficits, fiscal discipline, and the 
opening of markets (El-Khouri, 1997). The Egyptian Government cut public expenditure, 
ended food and fuel subsidies, and began to sell off the vast collection of publicly owned 
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companies. This acted to significantly reduce the budget deficit and boost state income. 
Further changes were made in monetary policy which liberalised both the interest and 
exchange rates. This saw the Egyptian pound devalue considerably, increasing Egypt’s 
international competitiveness (Abdel-Khalek, 2001). In the short term, the SAP was shown as 
a huge success. The budget deficit decreased from 15% to 1% over a 5-year period (El-Khouri, 
1997) and due to a devalued currency, exports drove a growth in real GDP of around 5% per 
year (Abdel-Khalek, 2001). The success created a strong argument for further reforms 
because early reforms had ‘proven’ that state intervention was holding Egypt back.    
 
The long-term impacts of the SAP were somewhat less impressive. Whilst the removal of 
tariffs and subsidies had benefits on the budget deficit, it damaged the longer term growth 
prospects of domestic industry and increased costs to unaffordable levels for the poorer social 
classes (Abdel-Khalek, 2001). The poor suffered from the gradual replacement of state 
provided health and education services with new neoliberal ‘cost recovery’ alternatives 
(Mitchell, 2002; Tadros, 2006). Land reforms meant that land lost through ‘President Nasser’s 
gift to the peasants’, the 1952 reform act, was purchased back by the original wealthy 
landlords. Along with the ownership change the new act meant landlords could evict tenant 
farmers after 12 month contracts in favour of larger agribusinesses (Bush, 1999; Saad, 2002). 
It is estimated that over a million tenant farmers were evicted and over 700 thousand more 
jobs were lost under this act alone (Mitchell, 2002).  
 
Banking sector reforms as part of the SAP made banking very profitable and attracted 
significant amounts of global capital. However, the contribution of the banking sector to 
growth in the real economy was minimal. The East Asian crisis was the first indication of the 
weakness of finance-driven growth. In Egypt as in other developing nations, international 
capital fled, slowing the headline growth of the economy. Banking reforms continued and by 
2006 all but six percent of the governments banking shares were in private hands (Abdel-
Khalek, 2001).     
 
Open markets and promoting foreign investment are founding principles of the World Bank 
(Harrison, 2004). In Egypt, as part of the SAP, import bans and trade tariffs were removed for 
both agriculture and manufacturing, opening up Egyptian companies to foreign competition 
 94 
and foreign capital. Newly privatised industries, which were already in the hands of 
supporters of the incumbent regime, were sold again to foreign investors. This created a 
super-rich business elite. The removal of import bans and tariffs had a significant effect on 
agribusiness and manufacturing in Egypt. The sectors began to suffer a period of rapid de-
industrialisation as a domestic industry was replaced with foreign producers and cheaper 
imports (Abdel-Khalek, 2001).  
 
Much of the new and existing industry moved to tariff free areas, which encouraged inward 
investment but derived no income for the state. The 10-year tax break system was abused as 
companies reaching their 10th year dissolved and reincorporated to receive further tax breaks 
(Sulayman, 2011). At the same time, corporations were enjoying tax breaks while employees 
were experiencing rising taxes and rising prices. Employees were also incurring additional 
costs for services, education, and health that had previously been provided by the state under 
Nasser and Sadat. These reforms created a deteriorating long-term economic situation for 
Egypt which led to increasing inequality and growing dissatisfaction in the population. These 
conditions are said to have in part led to the 2011 revolution which saw the overthrow of 
President Mubarak (Sims, 2012).  
 
The 1991 SAP oversaw the privatisation and downsizing of the Egyptian state at the cost of 
the Egyptian people (Bush, 1999). The re-distribution of industry, land, money, and rights fell 
in favour of large international capital and the landed elite to the detriment of the majority 
of Egyptians. This not only caused higher instances of poverty in the population, it ultimately 
contributed to the political instability over the years running up to the 2011 revolution (Sims, 
2012). De-industrialisation and land reforms also led to an increase in urban migration and a 
swelling mass of unemployment in Cairo and other larger metropolitan areas (Saad, 2002; 
Mitchell, 2002; Sims, 2012). In 1990 Cairo was estimated to have a population of around 12 
million, which grew to 22 million by 2011. The official unemployment rate in 1988 stood at 
around five percent but by 1993 it had increased to over 10% and today stands at around 
15%. Estimates of the size of the informal economy in 1993 ran at around 40%, meaning actual 
unemployment (people not in formal employment) was much higher than the headline 10%, 
informal employment is included as ‘employed’ in the Egyptian employment statistics (Sims, 
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2012). The combination of these events created pressure and dissatisfaction among an 
increasingly poor Egyptian society.  
 
In 2011, to chants of “bread, freedom and social justice” President Mubarak was overthrown 
after 30 years of rule. The revolution, whilst political in many ways, had economic causes. It 
reflected how the population felt that the social contract between people and state was 
broken (ElDahshan, 2015). The subsidised food, power, and transport had diminished to a 
point where working people could no longer live on what they earned. The revolution bought 
about regime change and a period of volatility, both politically and economically, with 
multiple elections and a further revolution. A Muslim Brotherhood president, Mohammed 
Morsi, was elected and held office for a year before a popular revolution backed by the army 
and a military general, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, overthrew him. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi became the 
interim president and then in 2014 formally became president in a landslide election.  
 
During this political upheaval, whoever had been in power at any time between 2011 and 
2014 gave the people what they wanted. The public sector increased in size, 450,000 
temporary contracts were made permanent, and salaries and pensions were increased by 
15%. Alongside this, the government approved increases in subsidies for food and fuel from 
$15 Billion to $26 Billion per year (Momani, 2018). Whilst these moves addressed some of the 
population’s immediate demands, they did the opposite for the state of the economy. The 
underlying economic fundamentals were poor, public sector debt was increasing, foreign 
exchange balances were reducing, and the instability was keeping away investors and tourists 
alike (Brown, 2016).  
 
In 2016, the economy stalled and the IMF stepped in to provide a $12 billion funding package, 
the CPF. The CPF was designed to “address macroeconomic vulnerabilities and promote 
inclusive growth and job creation” (IMF, 2016b). The CPF was provided on the conditions of 
monetary, fiscal, and structural reforms. The monetary agenda focused mainly on the floating 
of the Egyptian currency and a containment of inflation. Fiscal reforms meant reducing public 
debt through cutting the civil service and subsidies on food, fuel, and transport (Momani, 
2018; Aboudi, 2018), as well as the introduction of VAT.  Structural reforms focused on 
industrial competitiveness, the opening of markets, and the increased provision of finance to 
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SMEs. Whilst the CPF did have some measures to ease the burden on certain groups, such as 
support for women, increased spending on day care centres and the provision of free school 
meals for the poorest, the overall result appears to have made life more difficult for those 
living on and near the poverty line (El-Badrawi, 2017).   
 
Headline figures used to demonstrate the CPFs success show increases in financial inflows to 
Egypt. These inflows were expected to be in the form of FDI, but data indicates they are 
increased remittances from migrant workers buying assets at a reduced post devaluation 
price (Mohammed, 2019). On the ground inflation rose to above 30% which created 
significant hardships among the larger parts of Egypt’s population. The devaluation increased 
the prices of many basic foods and goods, cooking oil, rice, sugar, and other everyday staples. 
These have been subject to hoarding with profiteering, pushing the prices higher still 
(Momani, 2018). The anticipated improvement in domestic production capabilities has yet to 
be realised, Egypt still largely relies on imported goods and inputs, all purchased in foreign 
currencies, meaning a near doubling in prices (Momani, 2018). In 2018 unemployment was 
still increasing and across Egypt there was the emergence of new protests and riots termed 
the ‘new bread riots’ in reference to the riots of the 1970s (Eye, 2018).  
 
The brief overview of Egyptian economic history is not a detailed analysis but rather an insight 
into the political economy that created certain conditions on the ground. It demonstrates the 
impact and outcome of the SAP and CPF on the people of Egypt and provides an 
understanding of the environment to which microfinance was introduced. The economic 
history of Egypt created ideal growth conditions for the microfinance sector where 
microfinance is positioned as a tool to reduce unemployment and address poverty (Bateman, 
2010b; Bateman and Chang, 2012; Mader, 2015). The CPF not only created the right 
conditions, it also dictated the flows of finance to ensure microfinance was supported. The 
CPF stated that new bank funding would be channelled towards SMEs (IMF, 2016a) to support 
growth and jobs. This boosted the entrepreneurial narrative of microfinance in Egypt. 
According to data, funding set aside for SMEs, the dynamic job creating sector, was allocated 
to microfinance, the MSE sector - a far larger and more profitable sector for banks that is 
significantly less impactful in terms of job creation, innovation and poverty reduction 
(Bateman, 2010b).  
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Microfinance in Egypt  
 
The 1990s SAP left a fertile landscape for the microfinance industry in Egypt. The large and 
growing population combined with the oversized informal economy meant that from the 
early 1990s the aid agencies, predominantly USAID, and INGOs promoted microfinance 
services to fight poverty and generate employment (EFSA, 2008; EFSA, 2014). It is estimated 
that as of 2008, USAID funded 50% of the microfinance activities in Egypt (UNAGIFS, 2008). 
The MFI sector started as small scale NGOs promoting credit and training for Egyptian 
entrepreneurs, by the mid-2000s there were 280 microfinance programmes with over 1 
million active clients (EFSA, 2008). Egypt has become the largest microfinance market in the 
Arab world, measured by both the number of borrowers and by the loan portfolio (CGAP, 
2005). The expanding informal sector led the Egyptian Government to launch a national 
strategy to encourage the formalisation of rapidly forming microenterprises (CGAP, 2005). 
The state acted to reduce bureaucracy to enable microenterprises to formalise and hoped for 
increased tax revenue, with little success. To support the government’s strategy, USAID, KfW, 
and the UNDP jointly launched their own national strategy for microfinance in Egypt. The 
strategy targeted:  
 
The economically active poor, meaning those who are not destitute. The economically 
active poor include the micro enterprise sector, and the vulnerable poor who are 
employed in low-salary jobs, both of whom are excluded, or underserved by the 
formal financial system (CGAP, 2005:11)  
 
The strategy identified target groups in both the entrepreneurial and the financial inclusion 
narratives. At the time, MFIs were free to pursue any form of lending they chose. MFIs could 
lend for both enterprise and consumption.  
 
After the introduction of the microfinance strategies, the industry grew. Yet by 2008, the 
penetration rates in Egypt were measured at around only 6%, well below average for similar 
countries (EFSA, 2008). Egypt was identified as a key growth market by the IFIs due to unmet 
microfinance demand (Prior, 2010). The IFIs and MFIs ascribed the slow growth to over-
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regulation within the sector so they lobbied the government to liberalise the market. In two 
sets of laws, 2008 and 2014 the Egyptian Government approved new pro-growth 
microfinance laws, opening the market to for-profit MFIs and foreign investment. MFIs could 
make a profit from lending and expand their lending activities to cover a broader range of 
clients (EFSA, 2014). According to the Microfinance Forum (2016), this new law has allowed 
the issuance of 700 institutional licenses since 2014, an increase of 420 institutions since 
2008. The 2014 Law contained a regulation that the existing MFIs had not expected. NGO 
MFIs, 100% of the non-bank market prior to 2008 and still over 90% of it by 2014, were only 
allowed to lend for enterprise purposes, which meant large parts of their portfolios being lent 
for consumption were no longer legal.  
 
The structural and legal adjustments facilitated growth in the commercial microfinance 
market of Egypt, just as the IFIs had desired. In 2018, there were 897 active licenses for 
microfinance provision and many more awaiting approval. NGOs were legally mandated to 
only offer enterprise loans and therefore switched their public communications to the 
entrepreneurial narrative. Private and foreign-owned MFIs could offer any type of loan, 
enterprise or consumption. Egypt has c. 3.1 million active borrowers and a loan portfolio of 
over US$1 billion (El Tawil, 2018). Women make up c. 70% of all clients and the average loan 
size across the country is 1000 L.E (US$62) (Salem and Malak, 2017).  
 
The study of microfinance in Egypt is limited compared to most other African or Asian 
countries. What studies there are, are focused primarily on financial systems and sustainable 
financial models for NGO MFIs (NBD, 2000; UNAGIFS, 2008; EFSA, 2014; Razek, 2017) or on a 
welfarist approach looking at an improvement in poverty indicators whilst not commenting 
on the way they were achieved (Nader, 2008; Drolet, 2010; El Hadidi, 2016; El Hadidi, 2018). 
Much of the literature would be considered pro-microfinance, finding positive correlations 
between income, assets, children’s education levels (Nader, 2008), positive impact on 
women’s empowerment (El Hadidi, 2016; El Hadidi, 2018), and concluding that microfinance 
should do more to enhance women’s empowerment (Drolet, 2010).  
 
The studies use predominantly qualitative data, without the sophistication of the RCT 
methodology, to observe changes in behaviours. The correlations in income, assets, and 
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children’s education levels (Nader, 2008) are consistent with an injection of capital into a 
household. There is no deeper exploration as to what causes the increase in income, loan 
capital or microenterprise, so there is little scope for further conclusions. Other work (Drolet, 
2010; El Hadidi, 2016; El Hadidi, 2018) use qualitative analysis through a perception of change 
survey, taken only post borrowing, not before and after. Whilst the studies show women 
slightly perceive themselves to be more empowered after borrowing, the method means the 
data would not be considered valid under the terms of Duvendack’s criteria for assessing 
impact for DfID (Duvendack et al., 2011).   
 
There is one critical and influential work on microfinance in Cairo, a piece written by Julia 
Elyachar (2005). The work focuses on microfinance delivered by the Social Fund for 
Development (SFD) through NGOs and the dispossessive nature it has on the craftsmen of 
Cairo. The SFD was a government and UNDP backed microfinance mechanism designed as a 
social safety net during the economic and structural reforms. It was introduced at a time when 
the IFIs were pushing the entrepreneurial narrative to conceal issues created by their 
neoliberal agenda. Elyachar’s ethnography, Markets of Dispossession, presents a critique of 
the notions of the market in the craftsmen’s world in Cairo. The market she is referring to is 
the expansion of neo-liberal ideology that was driving poverty alleviation programmes 
implemented by the IFIs and International Governments.  
 
The work observed the forced movement of ‘craftsmen’, a term in Egypt that signifies a skilled 
person with a workshop, from the centre of Cairo to a new city. Madinet El Hirafiyeen, or 
Craftsman City, was built by the government on the outskirts of Cairo. The city, like a 
neoliberal experiment for the free market, was poorly located, poorly constructed, and poorly 
connected. The move, designed to clean up the city centre for a property boom, broke old 
networks and ruined the livelihoods of thousands of craftsmen across Cairo. Elyachar’s use of 
the word dispossession was not an accident. People were dispossessed not only of their 
livelihood but of their ability to decide. The result was total disempowerment and the tools 
for this disempowerment were the empowerment programmes of IFIs, government, and 
NGOs. The craftsmen were forced to move to the new city at the same time as the SFD and 
MFI NGOs were encouraging the unemployed and graduates as well as unskilled 
microentrepreneurs to move there and set up businesses. Craftsmen and the unskilled poor 
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were categorised together, working to legitimise the idea of the poor as entrepreneurs, and 
to de-legitimise another, the craftsmen as skilled technicians.  Microfinance was the tool that 
facilitated the move, creating a mass of ‘entrepreneurs’ to whom NGO MFIs could provide 
loans.  
 
The work observed the construction of the ‘entrepreneurial’ narrative in Cairo, where 
graduates, unemployed, and subsistence salespeople were all classified as entrepreneurs 
along with the skilled craftsmen. The title craftsman in Egypt was meaningful. It symbolised 
skilled, trusted workmen who belonged to old networks and the fabric of Cairene life. They 
were now ‘entrepreneurs’ like everyone else, and their title, their old networks, and their 
livelihoods were now meaningless. Elyachar demonstrated how the individuals were 
incomparable in terms of their skills and ability to run a business but were grouped together 
for the convenience of the narrative and for microfinance policy. The blurred lines made the 
questioning of the narrative of the entrepreneurs more difficult to challenge. The narrative 
dispossessed the craftsmen of their title, their status, their culture, and their network and 
gave it to everyone else. Today, Madinet El Hirafiyeen is a poor satellite city of Cairo and It 
never experienced the market boom the IFIs and NGOs expected. The social grouping of 
skilled craftsmen moved on. Many are said to have emigrated with broken livelihoods. Few 
passed their skills on to the next generation which was something that had happened for 
generations prior to the intervention. Those that remained there were overindebted, 
unskilled ‘entrepreneurs’ who had no market for their limited skills or basic products and 
were living in relative poverty, far from the commerce of Cairo.  
 
Elyachar’s work demonstrated the embedding of the term entrepreneur, the 
entrepreneurship narrative, and microfinance into the daily vernacular of Egypt. Despite the 
failure of Madinet El Hirafiyeen, today, youth, graduates, and the unemployed supported by 
NGOs are still told they can and should be entrepreneurs, borrow money, and start a business. 
The efforts by the SFD created hegemony for the entrepreneurial narrative. The IFIs, the 
Government of Egypt and the MFIs, all still promote microfinance for microenterprise, as a 
solution to unemployment.  
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The Egyptian Entrepreneur  
 
Whilst entrepreneurship as a narrative has always been associated with microfinance in 
Egypt, over the past 10 years, in response to growing rates of youth unemployment, this 
association has grown stronger. Government policy supported by the IFIs have reignited the 
narratives of the entrepreneur. At a grassroots level, government policy has been supported 
by NGOs, universities and other stakeholders who have promoted the idea across society. 
Culturally the association with entrepreneurship in Egypt is strong but the reality on the 
ground in terms of doing business, ranked as 120th in the world in the ease of doing business 
survey (WBG, 2019), at least formally, entrepreneurship remains unfavourable (Saeed and 
Wasfy, 2015; GEM, 2018). 
  
In 2010 the Egyptian Government’s Ministry of Planning began to focus on SMEs as a driver 
for employment. Due to rising levels of unemployment, a growing population and a shrinking 
public sector, the ministry developed a three-pronged focus on generating more SMEs. Firstly, 
it created start up hubs across Egypt, supported by IFIs, working to minimise bureaucracy 
associated with business start-ups. Secondly, the government through state bank lending 
targets eased access to credit for the MSME sector. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, 
the government started a communications campaign to demonstrate to the public the 
support they were providing to entrepreneurs. The drive towards SME-led development was 
reiterated in the Government’s 2014 development plans (GovOfEgypt, 2014). The campaign 
of publicity and promotion had an impact on the number of people considering 
entrepreneurship as an employment option (GEM, 2018). However, research data suggests 
fewer people are actually choosing it meaning that the impact of the publicity was only to 
prompt people to consider entrepreneurship. The government’s promotion of 
entrepreneurship came against a backdrop of a doubling in the rate of business failures due 
to increasing prices and limited profitability (GEM, 2018), demonstrating the real challenges 
of running a microenterprise.  
 
The Government’s campaign of publicity has had an impact on perceptions of 
entrepreneurship in Egypt. A survey taken in 2018 found that Egyptian society’s feelings about 
entrepreneurship are increasingly favourable with 72% believing it is a good career choice 
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and with 82% regarding successful entrepreneurs in high social status. This is a significant 
increase from 50% in 2010. Whilst perceptions of entrepreneurship have improved, the 
understanding of the real challenges facing entrepreneurs had not. 54% of the population 
believe there are not sufficient markets for any more entrepreneurs in Egypt and 70% believe 
they have none of the skills or abilities to successfully run or start a business. These statistics, 
provided by the London Business School’s Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM, 2018) 
demonstrate a positive change over the 8-year period in terms of positive perceptions in 
society. The marketing campaign of the government worked to influence perceptions but that 
did not translate into actions.  
 
Whilst the narrative of the entrepreneur is strong and seemingly growing in Egypt, the 
environment for entrepreneurs, especially start-ups, remains poor. Egypt ranks in the bottom 
quartile in terms of all measures to support business. This is compounded by the fact that 
access to finance is reported to be getting more difficult for existing businesses in the MSME 
sector, despite an increase in overall funding being provided to the sector. This is a symptom 
of financial over-provision to the non-productive microfinance sector at the expense of the 
real productive SME sector (Saeed and Wasfy, 2015; GEM, 2018). Market volatility, rising 
inflation, and poor levels of education in the field of entrepreneurship are further barriers to 
entrepreneurship in Egypt, a market that is considered hostile to business start-ups. Despite 
the challenges, the narrative remains pervasive because it is useful for the government as it 
is for the IFIs and MFIs.  
 
Methodological Foundations  
 
Using the case of Egypt, I sought to determine the role of narratives in the maintenance of 
the hegemony of microfinance through the perceptions, understandings, and interpretations 
of those involved. I selected an interpretivist epistemology to answer the research question, 
I wanted participants situated experiences to explain how and why they interacted with 
microfinance, allowing for thick contextual explanations (Bryman, 2012). Microfinance 
studies quantify humans, their activities, their repayments, their health, and their purchases 
to symbolise impact and demonstrate the success of microfinance as defined by a narrative. 
Their lives are constructed as entrepreneurs who have free choice. The narrative concludes 
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that they choose the optimal outcome for their own wellbeing from a range of options, 
entrepreneurial microfinance only being one of them (Bateman, 2010b). The literature has 
shown that the rational construct of microfinance borrowers as utility maximising 
entrepreneurs is far from certain (Banerjee et al, 2015:22). The broad range of data on 
microfinance borrowers shows realities that are more divergent than that of rational choice. 
Therefore, interpretivism provides a research logic that allows the distinctiveness of human 
behaviour to be reflected in my research output (Bryman, 2012).  
 
Interpretivism is part of the post-positivist tradition of research. Like constructivism and 
naturalism, it holds the epistemological position of the possibility of multiple realities within 
the human social world (Flick, 2009; Bryman, 2012). It differs from the positivist traditions 
which maintain that ‘truths’ about human reality are discoverable through methodologies 
borrowed from the hard sciences (Flick, 2009; Bryman, 2012). Interpretivist social research 
sees humans as self-conscious social beings with capacities of reflection and self-awareness. 
Humans draw on their own understandings and actions to construct their own social realities. 
Their constructed realities may be counter to the other, sometimes larger, social realities 
within which they exist (Ritchie et al., 2013).  
 
To answer my research question, I sought to better understand what goes on in the field at 
the point where the borrower meets loan officer, beyond the policy discussions, IFIs, MFIs, 
and academic commentary. Quantitative studies have both created and shattered the 
entrepreneurial narrative of microfinance. Although the industry claims great results, these 
studies conclude that microfinance does not have the expected or stated outcomes for the 
poor (Duvendack et al., 2011). Yet, the development industry still actively promotes the 
narrative of success. I, therefore, needed a qualitative approach to better understand the 
reasons why the narratives can promote one thing and people seemingly engage in another. 
I wanted to go beyond the economics of microfinance and understand the beliefs, 
perceptions, and realities of those that engage with microfinance on a daily basis. The 
following section details the process of designing my primary research in my case study 
country, Egypt.  
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Study Area and Participants  
 
My fieldwork for this thesis was undertaken over two years in Cairo, Alexandria, and the 
surrounding areas between 2016 and 2018. To answer my research question, I worked to 
obtain the perspectives of those involved in all levels of the microfinance industry. I sought 
to explore how the narratives of microfinance are promoted by the industry as well as to what 
depth those narratives resonate with those that engage with microfinance. I argue that 
neoliberal development ideology determined the narratives of microfinance. Both champion 
an individualistic market-based solution to the problems associated with poverty. Using a 
qualitative approach, I sought to better understand whether those narratives were present 
in the senso comune of those that lend and borrow. My primary research sample was made 
up of 35 participants, over the two levels, from the four different tiers. Five representatives 
of IFIs, five CEOs of the largest MFIs in Egypt, six lending officers from MFIs in Cairo, Alexandria 
and the Delta and 19 borrowers from the same geographic locations. 
 
The first tier interviewed were IFI representatives who were donors, funders, and advisors of 
microfinance programmes in Egypt. They were all of non-Egyptian origin and lived in Cairo as 
part of their roles. Their roles were either in the direct wholesale funding of MFIs or in the 
strategic orientation of microfinance at the policy level. The individual organisations that 
were selected for this study are the largest influencers of microfinance in Egypt. Their 
representatives’ perceptions are of particular interest because they are the drivers of the 
narratives of microfinance as well as the enablers of the growing microfinance industry. 
Collectively they channel hundreds of millions of dollars towards microfinance in Egypt every 
year.  
 
The second tier of the policy level were CEOs of MFIs. These individuals were uniquely placed 
between the policy and the practice levels. Their roles were viewed as the channel by which 
the global narratives hit the local. Many of them were connected to the IFIs, either through 
previous jobs at IFIs or through the sharing of policy platforms and an extended network in 
the microfinance industry. They were based in either Cairo or Alexandria and were Egyptian 
nationals. This thesis selected the five largest or most prominent MFIs in Egypt, four of which 
were NGOs and one a commercial MFI formed after the 2008 law.  Interviewing the CEOs was 
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important because they are directly attached to both the IFIs and the MFIs operations. They 
network with the global and talk to the local.  
 
The second group is also made up of two tiers. MFI loan officers were the third tier. They are 
individuals with direct contact to the borrowers as well as a connection to the CEOs of the 
MFIs. Loan officers are local to the specific areas they worked in and had daily contact with 
borrowers through the channel of the MFIs. The MFIs that the participants worked for were 
based in Cairo, Alexandria and in the Nile Delta, which covers the area between those two 
cities. The loan officers receive instructions from the directors of the MFIs and are therefore 
deeply exposed to the narratives the MFIs promote. The loan officers also are directly 
connected to the borrowers, which allows them to observe the intervention on the front line. 
The loan officers had a perspective which is rare in the study of microfinance: a mix of 
organisational narrative as well as direct interactions with clients.  
 
The second part of the practice level is the fourth tier of the thesis. This is made up of 
microfinance borrowers, individuals who had taken loans from an MFI. Many were borrowers 
of MFIs whose CEOs or loan officers were interviewed by this thesis. However, in order to get 
the largest sample size, borrowers of other MFIs were also included. These individuals are the 
ones that have had a narrative thrust upon them. They are part of the positive international 
discourse supporting microfinance, the ‘entrepreneurs’ or those that have now been 
‘included’. Their participation in my work was critical as their perceptions and interactions 
with microfinance can re-tell the story that has been told about them by the industry. Their 
experiences informed my work of their reasons for borrowing as well as about the processes 
of obtaining their loans. Their experiences and understanding of why they borrowed, as well 
as what they believed they are participating in, allowed me to understand how they perceive 
microfinance, not how the narratives tell us they perceive it.  
 
Recruitment of Participants  
 
Participants were drawn based on their position within the broad system of microfinance in 
Egypt. I was not seeking individual attributes or specific situations; therefore, no assessment 
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of situation was made in terms of the individual’s status, health, or poverty level. These 
attributes could be considered important for certain types of microfinance study. However, I 
wanted a broad range of perceptions and perspectives, not an assessment of the impact on 
levels of poverty. The participants needed to be positioned within the industry at one of the 
levels or tiers I had predefined. The recruitment process was semi-organic, using contacts, 
snowballing, and gatekeepers for access.  
 
At the outset I had three defined entry points for the participants. My work in Egypt provided 
me with a range of professional contacts within the IFIs. My connections, if they were not the 
specific individuals required for this research, provided me with introductions to the heads of 
the organisation’s microfinance office. Whilst I was designing my research and writing my 
proposal, I worked with Dr El Hadidi at the British University in Egypt. She was an experienced 
researcher in the field of microfinance in Egypt and had written extensively on the subject of 
microfinance and women (El Hadidi, 2016; El Hadidi, 2018). Through Dr El Hadidi I was able 
to make contact with the CEOs of two of the largest microfinance organisations in Egypt. I 
asked those CEOs for the details of other CEOs, which was an effective method in gaining 
access to the other key organisations (Bryman, 2012).  
 
Having been based in Cairo for a long period of time, I was able to find a trusted research 
associate to assist with contacting loan officers and borrowers. The research associate is a 
long-term professional contact of mine, who previously ran training programmes for INGOs, 
including the provision of training for women in entrepreneurship. My research associate is 
an experienced researcher with degrees in linguistics and translation and is skilled at working 
with the participants of NGO programmes. She was able to provide access to a number of 
loan officers whom she had been in contact with whist working with INGOs. Using 
snowballing, directly asking the participants if they knew anyone else who would be 
interested in participating (Bryman, 2012), I was able to access other loan officers and 
borrowers. The CEOs of the MFIs as well as loan officers also offered access to borrowers, 
their referrals made up 30% of the borrower participants. The remaining 70% were obtained 
by asking borrowers for referrals and snowballing.  
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Interviews with the representatives of IFIs and the CEOs of MFIs took place in English due to 
the level of detail provided and it was the prevailing language of business. They were recorded 
on a Dictaphone and later transcribed. I conducted the interviews with loan officers and 
borrowers in Arabic, I was assisted by my research associate. The research associate collected 
detailed notes during the interviews and I made field notes where the conversation allowed. 
Post interview, reflective notes were made and discussed between us. The notes were then 
combined, transcribed, and translated accurately as a collective effort between myself and 
the research associate. A detailed and anonymised interview schedule can be found in 
Appendix 1.   
 
Semi-Structured Interviews   
 
I selected semi-structured interviews as the method to collect my data as it allows for the 
deep examination of individuals experiences. Semi-structured interviews allow some freedom 
within the interview whilst still being driven by the guiding theoretical framework and the 
prevailing literature (Galletta, 2013; Mertens, 2010). The semi-structured nature provides an 
overall direction to the interview and allows the concepts of the literature to be integrated 
but not to dominate the discussion (Galletta, 2013). Stories and personal experiences can 
interact with the broader literature to provide a theoretically rich narrative (Galletta, 2013; 
Bryman, 2012). Whilst semi-structured interviews are time consuming at the delivery and the 
analysis stages (Wholey, Hatry and Newcomer, 2010), the empirical nature and the richness 
of the data is unparalleled for this type of study (Galletta, 2013).  
 
The direction of each interview was maintained by an interview guide, not fixed questions, 
open ideas to formulate open questions that covered the core theoretical themes. This 
ensured the issues that were discussed with the participants had consistent themes and focus 
and only varied based on individual context (Galletta, 2013). This was particularly important 
given the divergent social strata the interviewees came from. The flexibility of the guide also 
allowed additional questions to be asked as answers are elaborated on by participants 
(Bryman, 2012). Given the desire to elicit deeply personal stories, the space for interviewees 
to elaborate and digress was of particular importance. It was important during the 
formulation of the interview guide that it did not close off the possibility of adding questions 
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to explore alternative and unseen avenues of enquiry that became apparent as the process 
progressed (Lofland and Lofland, 1995).       
 
The formulation of the interview guide had three phases. The interview guide was 
constructed around the dominant themes of the literature structured to answer the research 
question. This guide was then tested on colleagues who were involved with microfinance but 
were not participating in the study. The guide was then further refined, incorporating the 
ideas and redrafting certain questions to give a more open and elaborate answer from the 
participants. The field-tested interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. During the study 
this was found to be about the right time for getting the appropriate data. Interviews with 
the IFIs and CEOs were all over one hour and the interview developed more detail and broader 
themes. Those with loan officers and borrowers varied, from 15 minutes to one hour, the 
average being about 30 minutes. The process of field-testing was limited due to access to 
participants but the procedures identified by Galletta (2013) in her research guide were 
followed to ensure the widest scope for refining the questions. A copy of a draft interview 
guide for IFI participants can be seen in Appendix 2.  
 
Analysis and Coding  
 
The data collected was analysed using the software programme F4 Analyse. To answer the 
main research question, 4 core codes were developed which covered all the tiers to unify the 
data. The codes were developed from key concepts and themes highlighted in the literature. 
The codes were reflective of the narratives of microfinance, entrepreneurial and financial 
inclusion, and this worked to focus the interviews on the promotion and consumption of the 
narratives. The codes were again refined and confirmed during the first analysis of the data, 
this allowed for non-core codes to be developed which were unique for each specific tier. The 
core codes for the analysis of data were:  
 
Entrepreneurship – This code was selected as it was the key narrative of the IFIs and MFIs in 
Egypt. The mechanisms of hegemony promoted this narrative to the Egyptians. Therefore, 
especially in the interviews with tiers one and two, the idea dominated. Research shows that 
microfinance is unsuccessful in creating and supporting entrepreneurs yet the IFIs and MFIs 
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are still willing to promote it. Using this code allowed for this thesis to observe the attempt 
at the maintenance of hegemony by the IFIs and MFIs as well as explore the depths to which 
that reaches in the interviews with tiers three and four.  
 
Poverty Alleviation – A key part of the narrative of the entrepreneur is that borrowers are 
able to escape poverty. The literature review concluded that poverty alleviation was not 
achieved through access to microfinance. This thesis seeks to understand how the IFIs and 
MFIs publicly present that concept in the face of evidence against it. While this thesis is not 
assessing the impact of microfinance, how the participants perceive the loans in relation to 
poverty is important.  
 
Financial Inclusion – As the global imperative of all the IFIs and the previous operational 
model of the MFIs, financial inclusion was a code central to understanding the extent 
neoliberal narratives were responsible for the success of microfinance. How the IFIs and MFIs 
communicated the newly imposed narrative of entrepreneurship over their global drive 
towards financial inclusion was of interest to this thesis. The narrative of financial inclusion is 
the core narrative of neoliberalism and how the IFIs and MFIs choose to communicate this in 
relation to entrepreneurship was a determinate of hegemony. From the perspectives of loan 
officers and borrowers, the narrative of financial inclusion is perhaps a truer test of the 
hegemony of microfinance.  
 
Consumption – Financial inclusion by one name is consumption lending by another. If loans 
are not for productive enterprise, then they must be for consumption. The narrative of 
financial inclusion avoids the use of the word consumption spending to distract from the fact 
it is loans for the poor to consume. How the participants of the interviews differentiated 
between financial inclusion and consumption spending is a determinate of the hegemony of 
both microfinance and the narratives.  
 
The codes were selected using the deductive coding method. A codebook was developed 
during the literature review and interview process that aligned the data with the literature 
and the theoretical framework. The data provided within those codes provided the deep 
insight into the narratives of microfinance and enabled the research question to be answered.  
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Positionality and Reflexivity  
 
As the principal researcher, it is necessary to consider in detail my positionality within this 
study (Savin-Baden & Major, 2013:71). I have a background in financial services and have 
worked extensively with elements of the microfinance industry, predominantly as an external 
financier, but also an advisor. Through my work, I was able to interact with microfinance at a 
policy level as well as observe the preparation of impact studies and regularly visit borrowers 
(none of whom were participants in this study). My work at the coalface of microfinance led 
me to question some of its key assumptions and practices, particularly the industry’s claims 
that microfinance represented a route out of poverty for borrowers. Accordingly, I am aware 
of how my work in the sector has influenced not only my subject of study but also my 
expectations (Rowe, 2014. Gary and Holmes, 2020: 2).  
 
Over the course of my career in finance, I became sceptical about the microfinance industry’s 
assertions with respect to entrepreneurship and financial inclusion when it came to the value 
of support loans to the poor. My conversations with key representatives in the sector always 
appeared more focused on issues of revenue generation, return on investment, and portfolio 
growth (as opposed to social upliftment through entrepreneurship). My scepticism of 
microfinance was further fuelled by my conversations with borrowers who invariably told a 
rather different story to that outlined by the industry’s proponents. As a result, when I 
embarked on this study, I was dubious that the claims made by the sector would withstand 
scrutiny. My sense of unease with respect to the disjuncture between the ‘official narrative’ 
promoted by the sector and the ‘realities’ I observed on the ground was what sparked my 
interest in this research. 
 
Alongside my professional background, I am a male non-Egyptian, and whilst with the IFI 
representatives I had a similar background, I was an outsider to the culture of the majority of 
study participants. I am aware of the insider/outsider debate in the literature of positionality 
and understand that as an outsider, the responses I get in my research will be based on the 
participants’ perceptions of me (Gary and Holmes, 2020: 6). Having lived in Egypt for many 
years I am able to communicate in an Egyptian dialect of Arabic, this has both advantages and 
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disadvantages much like the wider insider/outsider debate. This discussion becomes more 
complex as I was accompanied by a research associate who is an Egyptian woman. As well as 
there being considerable cultural differences with the majority of the participants, there were 
also the issues of both gender and social class to be considered. Borrowers are commonly 
women. The borrower participants in this study were 65% women and also could be 
considered vulnerable due to their social status and potential reliance on the MFI. The 
respondents remain anonymous and I address other aspects of this vulnerability below. 
 
Reflexivity is “the process of reflecting critically on the self as researcher, the human as 
instrument” (Guba, 2000:210). I, therefore, need to be clear on my position to identify the 
biases, dispositions, and assumptions that form the basis of my research. The process of 
defining my position in this research and within the microfinance industry should allow for a 
better understanding of the influences that led to this research (Palaganas, 2017). In 
identifying my position, I also worked to establish rigour in my research, developing research 
tools that gave validity to my quantitative work. In the designing and testing of my research 
guide, I worked with my research associate to test the materials to provide an open platform 
for participants to share their perceptions. In analysing the data, further consideration was 
given to interpreting the material, discussions between myself and my research associate 
gave balance to interpretations where one or other of us had a varying assessment of what 
was stated (Gary and Holmes, 2020: 8).   
 
When working with women borrowers, I ensured that in all cases the research associate made 
the initial approach and contact. This was to establish if the presence of a foreign male was a 
concern or appropriate, and to ascertain the optimal location for the interview. It was 
important to me that I was present at as many interviews as possible, primarily for the 
consistency of data. I determined that if all participants were faced with the same individuals, 
they would all have the same experience on which to base their perceptions and choose their 
responses. In the case of the loan officers and borrowers, the research associate was present 
for each interview. For the IFI representatives and the MFI CEOs different considerations were 
made. They were all professional males, predominantly Western educated and based in 
corporate offices. As I had professional relationships with many of these participants, or at 
least their colleagues, I undertook these interviews without the presence of the research 
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associate. To prepare I considered Harvey’s (2011) work on elite interviews to ensure that the 
approach and tone were appropriate.  
 
Research Ethics  
 
Ensuring the ethical collection of data was critical to this thesis. The data collection activities 
and the proposed subjects were approved by the University of Bristol Ethics Committee prior 
to undertaking the research. As part of this process, the study ensured that the participants 
were aware of who the researcher was and what was their reason for the study. Both verbal 
and written consent, in Arabic and English, was granted by each participant who was made 
aware of the following at that time:  
 
• The purpose of the research  
• That there was no monetary benefit to them of participating in the study  
• That the recording of the interview was at their discretion    
• That they were assured they could withdraw from the process at any time  
• That they participated anonymously 
• That the data would be used only for the research stated and not provided to anyone 
else  
• They had the contact details of the researcher should they wish to make contact.  
 
Information Management  
 
The information collected during the interviews, both audio files and comments as well as 
field notes and transcripts, were reviewed and triangulated to identify any gaps and errors in 
the process (Bryman, 2012). All the data was transcribed into English and stored on encrypted 
drives until they could be transferred to the University of Bristol’s secure drive. Participants 
were assigned a code and the details of the participants and their codes were recorded and 
stored separately to ensure anonymity. This data was stored securely until the analysis stage 
when it was modified and thematically analysed according to the coding. The anonymity 





This chapter has set out the context against which my research took place as well as detailed 
the selected methodology. The chapter is designed to act as a guide to understand both how 
and where they data was collected as wellhas how it was managed. In outlining the context 
of Egypt, both the political and economic situation, the chapter explained the backdrop of 
statism and neoliberal development ideals that supported the proliferation of microfinance.  
 
I argue that Egypt as the backdrop to my research is as important as a context as it is a 
location. Whilst the implementation of microfinance supported by narratives takes place 
across the world, Egypt is experiencing the promotion of multiple microfinance narratives 
which provides depth to my study of the hegemony of microfinance. The narrative the 
microfinance industry is promoting in Egypt is being played out for a second time, 20 years 
after it was removed. Entrepreneurship is encouraged against an economic model of state 
reduction and privatisation and the microfinance industry is again working to promote the 
notion the poor can start businesses to alleviate their own poverty. The reintroduction of the 
entrepreneurial narrative in Egypt creates a unique opportunity for my research to 
understand the extent that the narratives are present in the senso comune industry 
participants.  
 
Using semi-structured interviews, I was able to obtain thick contextual accounts of 
participants’ experiences and perceptions which told the story of microfinance from the 
ground up. Developing an interview guide allowed me to design questions that were literature 
driven whilst having open discussions and take multiple directions. A qualitative approach 
enabled me to elicit rich data from the respondents which addressed in detail my research 
question. I made considerations as to my positionality in this study and I worked to ensure 
that my research process accounted for that and acknowledged it where possible. All of the 
research was conducted using the highest ethical standards and following the procedures 
outlined by the University of Bristol.  
 
The aim of this chapter was to contribute to the literature review and theoretical framework 
in setting the scene for the detailed analysis of the data over the following four chapters. Over 
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the following chapters I analyse my data in order to understand how the narratives of 
microfinance are engaged with through the stories told by the participants. I have separated 
the participants into their respective tiers, starting with the IFI representatives and working 
down to the borrowers. The aim of each chapter is to contribute a specific piece of knowledge 










Chapter 5 - The View from Above – Perceptions of Key Microfinance Decision 




According to Cox’s definition, IFIs are mechanisms of hegemony (1983) and, as such, they 
collectively promote narratives that legitimise the norms of the prevailing historical bloc. I 
argue that the IFIs rely on narratives to support the implementation of microfinance and 
maintain its position as a hegemonic development policy. The narratives promoted by the IFIs 
have normalised the idea that high interest debt to the poor is a development imperative. To 
investigate my argument and answer my research question, I interviewed representatives 
from five IFIs and asked for their views and perceptions on the role of microfinance in Egypt. 
Exploring how they presented the role of microfinance allowed me to understand both how 
the IFIs are supported by narratives and also the extent to which those narratives were 
hegemonic at a policy level. 
 
In Egypt, the IFIs promote the entrepreneurial narrative which is at odds with their global 
narrative of financial inclusion. I sought to understand whether the narrative of 
entrepreneurship is presented as an effective tool in creating employment despite their 
organisations moving away from that narrative. Globally, the IFIs now promote the narrative 
of financial inclusion, the successor to the entrepreneurial narrative. In interviewing IFI 
representatives I aimed to understand how they navigated between two narratives, one that 
they publicly promoted in Egypt and one that their organisations supported globally, each 
with divergent aims and claims. Using the Gramscian theoretical framework to interpret the 
IFI representatives’ answers I aimed to observe their reliance on narratives and to better 
understand the role of those narratives in influencing senso comune at a policy level and in 
the maintenance of the hegemony of microfinance in Egypt.  
 
The Participants  
 
Throughout this thesis, the participants in this chapter are referred to as tier one. The 
institutions they represent, both globally and in Egypt, are considered among the most 
powerful of the global financial development institutions. In tier one, there were five 
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participants. Each represented their respective IFI at a policy level, being the most senior in-
county representative related to microfinance. The IFIs that participated are the largest active 
funders, promotors, and influencers of the microfinance industry in Egypt and therefore at 
the forefront of the promotion of narratives. To maintain the anonymity of the participants 
and the organisations they represent, their names and roles have been removed from the 
data.   
 
The IFIs that participated were critical in the foundation and operation of all the MFIs that 
participated in my research, demonstrating the interconnected nature of the IFIs and the 
MFIs. Each of the participants had not only active roles in the Egyptian microfinance industry 
but were also personally and professionally connected with the CEOs of the MFIs that were 
interviewed in the following chapter. The IFIs that participated play two key roles in 
microfinance in Egypt: as direct wholesale funders of MFIs and in the strategic orientation of 
microfinance at a policy level both for government and for MFIs. They are the primary drivers 
of the narratives of microfinance which I argue work to maintain hegemony. By interviewing 
each of the IFI representatives, I sought to explore whether the narrative of entrepreneurship 
was viewed by the IFI representatives as an effective tool to create employment or whether 
they offered different perceptions in contrast to the narrative. The aim was to observe the 
role of narratives in the work of the IFIs as well as to determine whether the narratives at a 
policy level were hegemonic.  
 
The Underpinnings   
 
I argue that the IFIs promote the narratives of microfinance which attribute positive 
properties to debt and work to convince populations that the neoliberal market system is in 
their interest. Hegemony is the validation of a particular groups interest presented as the 
interests of the whole. This, I argue, is the process that the microfinance industry has 
undertaken in Egypt. The narratives use a rights-based language focused on either supporting 
entrepreneurs or financial inclusion to promote the provision of debt as being in the interests 
of the whole population, not just those that profit from the loans. In observing the industry 
in Egypt, I saw how the narratives promoted by the IFIs were also supported by the 
Government, NGOs, religious and social organisations, and the media. Through the narratives 
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of microfinance, the IFIs promote poverty alleviation and inclusion, attempting to maintain 
hegemony and influence the senso comune of certain groups within the population. Whilst 
the IFIs promote poverty-reducing narratives, their wider actions in Egypt are based on the 
neoliberal structural reforms of the CPF. As I demonstrated in the literature review, neoliberal 
reforms often increase poverty and unemployment whilst being a catalyst for microfinance 
proliferation.  
 
According to Robert Cox (1983), the IFIs are the “mechanisms of hegemony” working to 
universalise the views of the hegemon. Based on that assumption, the representatives that 
participated in this research are expected to endorse the narrative of the entrepreneur, as is 
publicly communicated by their organisation. Through my interviews, I sought to determine 
the extent to which those who work for the IFIs supported the narrative they present in Egypt. 
The aim with the tier one participants is to better understand the narratives as tools and to 
determine whether at a policy level the narratives are hegemonic.  
 
As I was researching this thesis, the Egyptian Government, the IMF, and the World Bank were 
negotiating and implementing the CPF, a $12 billion loan with structural adjustment 
requirements. The loan carried a number of conditionalities, the most significant for my work 
being the rationalisation of the public sector. The Egyptian public sector has traditionally been 
a soak for unemployment and so its rationalisation would lead to a further increase in 
unemployment. The government, concerned about growing youth unrest and the prospects 
of another revolution, sought a solution to the problem of growing unemployment. The IFIs 
presented microfinance. This saw the IFIs in Egypt switch from their global narrative of 
financial inclusion to supporting the aims of the Egyptian Government through promoting 
entrepreneurial microfinance. The IFI representatives interviewed in this thesis are the drivers 
of the narrative change at a policy level, their perspectives of how entrepreneurial 
microfinance is understood by borrowers are critical in answering my research question.  
 
To analyse the data, core codes were developed that focused on the key themes and were 
useful for answering the research question. Each code was built from the participants’ 
responses to questions about the specific narratives of microfinance or the impact that it had 
on the borrowers. Using codes that responded directly to the research question allowed each 
 118 
to hold considerable explanatory power and generated a small but substantially strong set of 
codes that would work for the whole thesis. The codes respond specifically to the sub-
questions, which are to be used to answer the core research question. Those questions are:  
 
• Why do people engage with microfinance?  
• What do those people believe they are participating in?  
 
The codes developed help gain an understanding of what IFI representatives thought their 
work facilitated for the poor and why they felt their roles were important. The codes were 
defined as follows:  
 
• Entrepreneurship – The narrative promoted by the IFIs globally until the mid-2000s, 
dropped from their literature and vocabulary but now actively promoted in Egypt. This 
thesis seeks to understand how IFI representatives present this change back to 
entrepreneurship lending despite their global rejection of the narrative. The analysis gives 
critical insight into the shaping of the narrative and how the representatives 
communicated that publicly. The IFIs predominantly maintained that they worked in 
microfinance to support Egypt’s entrepreneurs in creating jobs.   
• Poverty Alleviation – As part of promoting entrepreneurship, the IFIs have consistently 
stated that microfinance assisted in the alleviation of poverty. Under the IFI’s global 
narrative of financial inclusion, poverty alleviation is no longer a stated aim, yet in Egypt 
it is still an integral part of entrepreneurial microfinance. How the IFI representatives 
navigated the topic of poverty alleviation in the face of their global narrative assisted in 
understanding what they perceived to be participating in; a key component of the 
research sub-questions.  
• Financial Inclusion – Globally, each IFI that participated in this research promotes 
microfinance under the narrative of financial inclusion. This narrative states that providing 
the poor with sustainable financial services, with no mention of entrepreneurship, is the 
mission of microfinance. I argue that the IFIs in Egypt support financial inclusion through 
the back door, not publicly stating it but using the microfinance law to open the market 
to the private sector. In understanding from the research participants how they navigate 
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between the global and the Egyptian narrative gives insight into the extent that the 
narratives of microfinance are hegemonic at a policy level.   
• Consumption – The idea of microfinance for the consumption of consumer products is a 
key determinant in understanding the hegemony of neoliberalism. The IFI respondents 
talked of consumption such as the purchase of electrical goods as a natural by-product of 
microfinance, more of an expectation than an exception. This code and how it was derived 
gives the clearest insight into perceptions of the IFIs, identifying that their development 
intervention is used as a pay day loan or as cheap consumer credit.  
 
The core codes were complemented by a specific code generated from the interviews with 
the IFI representatives and used only in the analysis of their data. The code is directly related 
to the core codes and was developed as the respondents sought answers to the challenges 
presented by the history of the failure of entrepreneurial microfinance. The code 
demonstrated what could be described as a defence by the IFIs of their change in narrative 
from financial inclusion back to entrepreneurship. The non-core code was:  
 
• Entrepreneurship Training - This code was developed due to the large focus and 
emphasis on non-financial services, notably training, which participants used in order 
to defend the narrative of entrepreneurship. Training was given a pronounced 
emphasis by the IFIs as the key difference between successful and unsuccessful 
entrepreneurial microfinance and was mounted as a defence of the narrative by the 
IFIs. The positioning of the argument from the IFIs presented microfinance as a 




We are not just flirting with aspirations that microfinance would help, it would support 
the growth of a region or a country (Interview Transcript - Subject 02, Paragraph 7). 
 
The IFI representatives were direct and certain that microfinance was the solution for 
unemployment and growth in Egypt. The IFIs had reintroduced the narrative of 
entrepreneurship and were committed that it could solve the problem it set out to solve. The 
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IFI representatives each explained that their assigned roles in Egypt were to promote 
economic growth and stimulate the employment market. These two actions would in turn 
address the issues of poverty. The IFIs promoted the individualist ideas of entrepreneurial 
self-help as the solution to Egypt’s problems, using the market to improve the wellbeing of 
the population. Collectively the responses replicated the old narrative of entrepreneurship 
(Yunus, 1999: 12), citing many of the attributes such as effectiveness in supporting innovation 
or small scale agriculture, something that has been questioned by the industry for some time 
(Duvendack et al., 2011). As I interviewed the IFI representatives, the evidence began to show 
that at a policy level, the narrative of entrepreneurship was hegemonic and collectively was 
present the IFI representative’s senso comune. The representatives presented the logic of 
entrepreneurial microfinance, as it was presented 30 years before, not expecting me to make 
a challenge to that claim:    
 
Microfinance in Egypt is a very strategic focus area. Firstly, given the level of poverty 
we have in Egypt, microfinance has a role in creating economic activity, promoting 
different sectors, or market segments. Microfinance players [MFIs] are guaranteeing 
the future of very small and small enterprises for the market (Interview Transcript – 
Subject 12, Paragraph 15).  
 
The decision was taken 3 years ago to focus on growth in employment, given the large-
scale unemployment issues in Egypt (Interview Transcript – Subject 16, Paragraph 23).  
 
Microfinance is a good tool to support entrepreneurship, both green fielding or those 
that have ideas but are lagging behind because they need some sort of technical 
support (Interview Transcript - Subject 02, Paragraph 33). 
 
Here in Egypt, we look at, in the majority of cases, not all, we look at supporting 
entrepreneurs, helping entrepreneurs grow their business (Interview Transcript – 
Subject 18, Paragraph 7). 
 
The IFI representatives confirmed that their motivation to promote entrepreneurial 
microfinance in Egypt was the government’s strategy to combat poverty and unemployment. 
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The IFIs had collaborated with the Egyptian Government in creating its development strategy, 
a strategy that focused on globalised free market drivers, fiscal containment, and 
employment generation through entrepreneurship. The government’s strategy (2014) was 
supported by a number of significant law changes (FRA, 2014), and was to be financed by the 
US$12 billion CPF (WBG, 2015). The IFIs maintained that despite the past performance of 
microfinance in both poverty alleviation and promoting economic growth, that in this context 
it was the policy that would increase employment and create economic growth. Whilst the 
narrative of entrepreneurship is currently promoted, evidence from the interviews indicated 
that the narratives of microfinance were interchangeable. In talking of the past, one 
representative explained their refocusing of microfinance, showing that at a policy level, 
narratives can position microfinance to achieve different outcomes instantly. At the point of 
implementation, the function of microfinance designated by the narrative was irrelevant. The 
lending required no change in process, the refocus was only at a policy level.   
   
Historically we did a lot in poverty alleviation lending, consumer lending, but in the 
refocus, the aim became to increase employment and economic growth (Interview 
Transcript – Subject 16, Paragraph 23). 
 
The IFIs shared their strong relationship with the Government of Egypt. They explained that 
globally they worked directly with governments to define each country’s microfinance 
strategy. The IFI representatives used the word strategy throughout the interviews as I use 
the term narrative. Their description of strategy was the operationalisation of the narratives.  
The IFIs were able to change between financial inclusion and an entrepreneurial strategy by 
refocusing the language. The loans, however, were the same, delivered in the same way by 
the same MFIs to the same clients. The ability to change the narrative allowed the Egyptian 
Government and the IFIs to present a solution to the growing unemployment that was already 
well-embedded across the country. In the interviews, the IFI representatives explained that 
the Egyptian Government were concerned about the potential for a further revolution and 
needed to pacify a growing number of youths who were unemployed.  
 
We work with the partner governments and tailor our services to be as closely aligned 
as possible to their own growth strategy. So, we don’t have a ‘model’ in the sense that 
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we apply all aspects of our services to all countries in which we work (Interview 
Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 8 - 9). 
 
The narrative of entrepreneurship unified the Government of Egypt and the IFIs strategies for 
Egypt. The policy decision to switch to the entrepreneurial narrative was transacted through 
the network of NGOs, MFIs, as well as universities and other organisations all of whom 
switched their lending rationale. The IFIs worked directly with the MFIs and others, advising 
them on bringing the new narrative of entrepreneurship to the market. The promotion of the 
narrative reflects directly the thoughts of Cox (1983), defining the IFIs as the mechanisms of 
hegemony.  
 
NGOs, MFIs, companies, universities, work with microenterprises, help in their cash 
flows, their payments and expanding their opportunities within the market they are 
operating in (Interview Transcript – Subject 12, Paragraph 27).  
 
We don’t lend directly you understand, we partner with institutions like ****** and 
******, we act as an advisory body for them and others (Interview Transcript – 
Subject 18, Paragraph 7). 
 
The evidence provided by the IFI representatives demonstrated the narrative of 
entrepreneurship was hegemonic at a policy level and they were not expecting it to be 
challenged. The representatives articulated the outcomes and explained how it was part of 
the government’s strategy while at the same time publishing documents stating that as a tool 
for entrepreneurial development microfinance is not effective (WBG, 2017). The 2017 World 
Bank report was not the only piece of research the IFIs produced dismissing the ability of 
microfinance to stimulate economic growth and address poverty (CGAP, 2012; WBG, 2014). 
In the past, the IFIs have abandoned the narrative of entrepreneurship and promote financial 
inclusion based on the findings of their own research. Yet the representatives in Egypt 
promoted the narrative of entrepreneurship as if it had not been discredited and as if I should 
not question it. I argue, based on my interviews with the IFI representatives, that I observed 
the process of promoting narratives to maintain hegemony.  
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The IFIs took a leading role in the creation of the Egyptian Government’s sustainable 
development plan (2014). The plan was drawn up post-revolution, against a backdrop of 
serious government distrust, growing unemployment, rising inflation, and increasing poverty. 
One IFI representative explained that the government, through the IFIs, sought a response to 
youth unemployment, seen as a key driver to the 2011 revolution. The government and the 
IFIs reintroduced the narrative of the entrepreneur and promoted it widely through the 
network of civil society actors. The aim was to demonstrate to the population that the 
government was listening and taking action on unemployment. The IFIs proposed 
microfinance to support the government’s plan and the narrative was promoted to convince 
the population that self-employment was a solution to unemployment. The role of narratives 
as a tool was indicated when one particular IFI representative stated that the narrative was 
designed to convince the youth that a viable option was entrepreneurship rather than it being 
an unlikely way out of poverty.  
 
Microfinance and entrepreneurship training are their [Government of Egypt] 
strategies for growth. They want to employ the youth, but seeing as there are not 
many jobs, they want them to think of their own business as an option (Interview 
Transcript – Subject 16, Paragraph 33) (Emphasis added).  
 
To maintain the narrative and promote the efficacy of entrepreneurial microfinance, one 
representative focused the discussion on the potential of microfinance to support innovation 
and larger enterprises. The associations they made were similar to those made at the outset 
of the entrepreneurial narrative (Aremu and Adeyemi, 2011), hiding the realities of $100 
unproductive survivalist microenterprises within the data of the SME sector. The IFIs and the 
Egyptian Government use the rhetoric of the SME sector as an engine of growth while offering 
microenterprise and microfinance as the method of achieving that growth. Microenterprises, 
however, the type supported by microfinance, are acknowledged as at best a survival 
methodology for those that run them. Despite the evidence from their own organisations, the 
representative continued to claim that microfinance can support production and contribute 
to GDP growth.  
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Sure, microfinance now is mostly going to petty trading or services, but we say it 
should be balanced, more balanced with supporting production, to contribute to the 
GDP. Improving production, improving innovation. This is a challenge for Egypt now, 
a challenge to the country to go back and build production again (Interview Transcript 
- Subject 02, Paragraph 38 - 41).   
 
Whilst the narrative of entrepreneurship appeared hegemonic at a policy level, one 
respondent’s statements indicated that there were gaps in its hegemony. They indicated that 
there was an anomaly with the idea that microenterprises and SMEs were comparable. The 
representative suggested that the narrative their organisation promotes does not reflect the 
reality they saw. 
 
I think there is a mix up between the notion of the micro and the SME sector in the 
government’s plan. The SME sector, and a really small proportion of the micro sector, 
are potentially innovative and could provide growth in employment, but the majority 
of the micro sector, which by the way is the majority of enterprises, are small family, 
home-based trading entities with little chance of significant growth. Those 
microenterprises that are truly innovative, what are they going to do with 1000 L.E 
(US$62)? (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 10).  
 
Whilst not all of the IFI representatives felt the narrative was reflective of the reality, there is 
evidence that the narrative promoted by the IFIs has begun to have an impact on the wider 
Egyptian population (GEM, 2018). Over the last five years, Egyptians have developed a higher 
than the global average entrepreneurial intention rate, 60% in Egypt to a global average of 
23%. The Egyptians have also developed a higher than global average percentage of the 
population who think entrepreneurship is a good career choice (72% to 60%,). On average, a 
higher status is given to entrepreneurs in Egypt than elsewhere in the globe (82% to 60%). 
These statistics demonstrate that the efforts of the IFIs and the Egyptian Government in 
promoting entrepreneurship through universities, schools, MFIs, and even mosques have 
increased the entrepreneurial intention rate from 25% in 2010 to 60% in 2018. Over that 
period, the microfinance industry has promoted the narrative of the entrepreneur, cleverly 
interwoven with images of the ‘innovators’ of Egypt such as Mohamed Ali Pasha and the 
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entrepreneurial economist Talaat Harb, defining the idea of “the Egyptian entrepreneur”. The 
media, universities, NGOs and others have perpetuated the idea that the youth of Egypt are 
poised for an entrepreneurial revolution (Saeed and Wasfy, 2015). The promotion of the idea 
of the Egyptian entrepreneur is an attempt to influence the Egyptian collective senso comune.  
 
We work through universities, we provide training to graduates and undergraduates 
in financial literacy, financial management, entrepreneurship and aspects of laws and 
regulations. Again, we don’t do this directly, we go through our partners, we are the 
technical partner. These are also partnered with MFIs designed to provide the funding 
for the start-ups (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 17).  
 
Using Gramsci’s conception, I argue that the IFIs have promoted the narrative through civil 
society who in turn have projected the narrative onto the population to convince them that 
entrepreneurship and microfinance is a viable route to employment. Evidence from the 
interviews demonstrates that the promotion of the narrative occurred because the Egyptian 
Government had run out of viable options to address the employment issue. The IFIs had 
historic experience in using microfinance and the entrepreneurial narrative across the world 
and the Egyptian Government needed something that could convince the youth action was 
being taken. The government, mindful of the role the youth played in the 2011 and 2013 
revolutions, needed to demonstrate they were acting to control growing youth 
unemployment. The IFIs understood that microfinance and the entrepreneurial narrative had 
a proven track record of curtailing collective action and occupying the large groups of the 
unemployed (Bateman, 2010b). The IFIs confirmed that the key to the policy was to create a 
situation where the youth thought they had an opportunity, working to shape senso comune 
rather than effect the reality on the ground.  
 
The focus on unemployment and microfinance is magnified here in Egypt, I think 
largely due to the limited availability of alternative ideas (Interview Transcript – 
Subject 18, Paragraph 32 - 33).  
 
Youth unemployment is a key focus of the government these days, you can look at the 
actions of the social fund, renewed focus on graduates, youth, the next generation. 
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You know the government are aware of the role the youth had in 2011 and 2013 
[revolutions], they don’t want another situation where the youth feel there are no 
opportunities (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 19) (Emphasis added).  
 
The responses from the IFI representatives in the first stage of the interviews demonstrated 
that at a policy level, the narrative of entrepreneurship was hegemonic. The interviews also 
demonstrated that the representatives understood the narratives are designed to convince 
the population into believing that action is being taken to address the issues facing them. 
Their responses included terms of the youth “thinking” and “feeling” rather than stating that 
they were presented with a real opportunity. In interviewing the IFI representatives I 
understood how Cox’s (1983) explanation of the mechanisms of hegemony worked. The IFIs, 
through universities, schools, media, and NGOs promoted a narrative created to convince the 
population that the solution to their problems is an individualistic endeavour funded by 
microfinance.  
 
Entrepreneurship Training  
 
In the next stage of the interviews, I discussed the reports that the IFIs had published 
challenging the impact of entrepreneurial microfinance. Certain IFI representatives argued 
that entrepreneurship training was their way to differentiate between the previous 
implementation of entrepreneurial microfinance and the current programmes. Training was 
now presented as the difference between microfinance as a debt trap and a success story. 
Entrepreneurship training was said to be key to the success of entrepreneurial microfinance, 
yet my interviews with MFI CEOs indicated it was little more than a revenue stream provided 
in the wake of the 2014 microfinance law. The IFIs sold training packages to the NGO MFIs to 
train their staff to sell and deliver entrepreneurship training to borrowers. I argue that training 
is an opportunity for the narrative to be reinforced, not as a tool to improve microenterprise 
performance (Karlan, 2014).  
 
It is important to work with the local institutions, those that are giving the loans, they 
are the ones who are placed to cultivate these skills, this business thinking. We provide 
them with advice and training (Interview Transcript - Subject 02, Paragraph 13).  
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We work to build the MFIs capacity, so MFIs build services to help microenterprises 
grow, training allows us to impact borrowers more widely (Interview Transcript – 
Subject 16, Paragraph 23). 
 
If you don’t have a level playing field [trained entrepreneurs], then microfinance 
would be a debt trap (Interview Transcript - Subject 02, Paragraph 11).  
 
The success of microfinance is when there is linking between financial and non-
financial services (Interview Transcript - Subject 02, Paragraph 23). 
 
We are working on entrepreneurship, if you consider entrepreneurs as micro, they 
establish small start-ups, trading start-ups, with a small amount of money. We work 
with our MFI partners who are doing the lending at this level and provide capacity for 
training entrepreneurial skills to those borrowers. We have seen that this is the 
difference between success of a business or failure (Interview Transcript – Subject 
16, Paragraph 17) (Emphasis added).  
 
I argue that the IFIs promote training at a policy level as a tool to defend the reintroduced 
narrative of entrepreneurship in Egypt. Entrepreneurship training had however long been 
associated with microfinance and was conclusively disproven by the IFI supported, pro-
financial inclusion scholar Dean Karlan (2014). I presented Karlan’s report to one specific IFI 
representative who concluded that in the past, the training was not done correctly, hence its 
failure. Now in Egypt however, this had been corrected.  
 
[Training programmes] very crucially they are often neglected, and this is the problem 
we see with microfinance impact. Even if they are done, if done, they are not done 
comprehensively and that is why there is a problem with the success of microfinance 
and microenterprises (Interview Transcript - Subject 02, Paragraph 17).  
 
The IFIs responses were comparable to the continual consumption of counter narratives by 
the hegemon (Cox, 1981). By endorsing training, the IFIs continue to promote the narrative 
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of entrepreneurship, deflecting challenges levied against microfinance as a tool to generate 
employment. I argue that training not only was used as a defence to cover the previously 
discredited narrative of entrepreneurship but as a method for the IFIs to integrate closely 
with the MFIs and promote the narrative more widely.     
 
Financial Inclusion  
 
There are countries in which we work in a broader financial inclusion capacity, Egypt 
isn’t one of them for a critical reason, but we are involved in financial inclusion globally 
(Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 8 - 9).  
 
In my interviews with IFI representatives, a unified narrative of entrepreneurship was 
championed to meet the needs of the Egyptian Government. However, I argue that the 
narrative is designed to persuade the Egyptian youth into believing that entrepreneurship is 
their ticket to employment rather than to provide true employment opportunities. A narrative 
is a tool for shaping senso comune while the IFIs and the Egyptian Government undertake a 
new round of structural adjustments under the CPF. The evidence from the IFIs presented 
continued and consistent assurance that the entrepreneurial narrative this time was 
different. Whilst the majority of the representatives held this narrative throughout, one 
representative shared a varying opinion that broke from the entrepreneurial narrative and 
the position of their organisation in Egypt. The representative confirmed that they had 
introduced the narrative to occupy the youth rather than employ, and that they felt it had 
only limited scope.  
 
Sure, I know from my own experience, they want jobs, they trained in particular fields 
to work in that field, and then they are told by us this is their chance, it is a difficult 
sell. It is just the government’s view on how to occupy and satisfy the Youth, in my 
opinion I think it is a challenge (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 21).  
 
In discussing the realities of microfinance as they viewed it, it was explained that within the 
NGO MFIs they directly work with, there was little chance that the loans were used for 
enterprise purposes. The constraints of poverty meant that loans were spent on a wide range 
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of things, especially consumption. The narrative was presented to meet the requirements of 
the government, an intervention that promoted employment. The narrative worked to 
promote ideas to the youth that they had a chance to start a successful business. The reality 
was that consumption lending continued in the same way it had prior to the reintroduction 
of the entrepreneurial narrative. The reality they presented was reflective of my experiences 
of working in microfinance. Loans were used by the poor to consume.  
 
I think it is no secret that loans are used for all sorts of things, it is the same 
everywhere, more so in low-income environments where there are serious income 
constraints (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 28 - 29).  
 
The majority of borrowers use their loans for multiple expenses, low down on the list, 
possible buying something to sell on but in reality, not actually productive (Interview 
Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 35).  
 
The IFI representative continued to present evidence against the narrative of 
entrepreneurship, demonstrating that it was not totally hegemonic at a policy level as I 
initially had observed. They explained that large populations remote from Cairo were 
struggling with a lack of investment and a serious decline in tourism since 2011. Upper Egypt 
was at the forefront of the government’s efforts in promoting entrepreneurship through the 
social funds group lending portfolios, an attempt to boost employment. Speaking 
hypothetically, the representative made the assumption that the loans were actually used for 
entrepreneurship and used their understanding of the market to immediately discredit the 
narrative.  
 
If I take the average client of the group lending programmes in Upper Egypt, if they 
were to spend the money on running a business, given average failure rates etc. we 
would be looking at a minute number of start-ups that would be successful and that 
is unlikely to address a growing populations employment needs (Interview Transcript 
– Subject 18, Paragraph 35) (Emphasis added).  
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Statistical evidence on start-up failure rates discredits the narrative, demonstrating that 
microfinance is unable to have an impact on employment. Even through the comprehensive 
training packages that the IFIs were offering to the MFIs, entrepreneurial microfinance was 
demonstrated to be nothing more than a misdirection using clever associations to paint a 
false picture of reality. The same representative challenged a peer at another IFI who stated 
that training was the key for effective microenterprises (Subject 16, Paragraph 17), 
discrediting his peer as well as the narrative of the organisation they worked for.  
 
I don’t know, I think we are talking about two different things in reality. If someone 
wants to start a business, has a skill, whatever, but isn’t trained in aspects of 
commercial life, maybe that person who already has the desire can change. I think 
what is confused here, is that I would expect, certainly at the 1000 LE (US$62) end of 
the microfinance market, these people have no choice but to borrow, for whatever 
reason, and that is likely to make them different in the receipt of training. He [referring 
to the IFI representative who referred him to me to interview] might be right in that 
statement, but I don’t believe that applies to the majority of microfinance clients here 
in Egypt (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 30 - 31). 
 
The evidence from this particular representative demonstrated that the entrepreneurial 
narrative was used to address the problems faced by the government but the implementation 
on the ground had not changed. I argue this shows the narratives of microfinance as a tool 
for political means, the narratives fit the strategy but the activities on the ground do not need 
to change. The representative’s responses were not critical of microfinance, microfinance was 
a useful tool for borrowers, they were just open about the realities of the impact. 
 
Prior to 2014 our focus here was poverty lending, which I know is often talked about 
as development, but it is about survival. Those people who are hanging on, eking out 
a life doing whatever they can, now of course we say it is enterprise development, but 
the practice hasn’t changed. I think more importantly at that level ($100), which is the 
majority of microfinance in Egypt, it is about making do. The law changes the language, 
but the reality is the same (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 35-37).  
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According to the representative, the real solution to jobs in Egypt was the investment by the 
government and a proper industrial strategy that builds from medium and large enterprises.  
The focus on microenterprises as an engine for job creation was explained by the IFI 
representative as a confusion made by the Egyptian Government. Yet the IFI developed 
strategic development plan (GovOfEgypt, 2014) demonstrates that microenterprises 
inclusion is by design not by accident. I argue the inclusion was to ensure that the Government 
had a tool to stratify the youth and the IFIs had a method of supporting the microfinance 
industry. When development strategies focus on microfinance and microenterprise, 
productive finance for the SME sector is channelled to the unproductive microfinance sector 
due to higher capital returns (Bateman, 2010b). In the long term, this has a negative effect on 
economic growth and employment, as productive firms struggle to gain financing. 
Furthermore, returns on the capital investments made in microfinance are often channelled 
abroad due to the MFI investment strategies championed by the IFIs. A strategy focused on 
microfinance, therefore, is detrimental to the long-term health of the SME sector and the 
economy (Bateman, 2010b; IDB, 2010; Mader, 2015).  
 
There is confusion, in the government, of how to support or to help with the issue of 
unemployment. There are different ways to do that, at the same time. First of all, you 
have to encourage large and medium sized companies, who grow, invest, develop. 
They create linkages with smaller enterprises feeding industries. You cannot work 
without the large and medium sized enterprises. I think microfinance can only ever 
have a limited impact on employment generation. By limited I mean limited to the fact 
that existing firms in the smaller parts of the real MSME sector could possibly utilise 
the access to finance and employ someone, but other than that no. Really that sector, 
let’s say the SME sector, needs proper commercial financing or even investment 
capital, at the higher end, to have any chance of effective growth (Interview Transcript 
– Subject 18, Paragraph 39).  
 
The evidence demonstrated that the government’s sustainable development plan supported 
by the IFIs was unable to deliver on its promises. The narrative of entrepreneurship is 
promoted by the IFIs and the government because it is compelling at a policy level and 
appears to demonstrate quick results. The ideas of a long-term sustainable development plan 
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built on state investment and an industrial strategy fail to create an urgent and compelling 
narrative for a cash strapped government or for a restless, unemployed youth population. 
This evidence demonstrates that the narrative of entrepreneurship in Egypt plays a political 
role and that role is possible because the narrative is hegemonic at a policy level. 
 
From my interviews, it was clear that in Egypt entrepreneurial microfinance was hegemonic. 
However, globally, the IFIs focus their attention on financial inclusion. Financial inclusion was 
the narrative the IFIs promoted in Egypt until 2014 when the microfinance law was introduced 
and changed the focus away from financial inclusion and onto the positive notions of 
entrepreneurship. Whilst the IFIs have focused attention on entrepreneurship, they have 
worked to create a market in Egypt for financial inclusion. The market for financial inclusion 
is outside the control of the NGOs and in the hands of private and foreign capital. This was 
made possible by the wider stipulations of the CPF. The evidence given by the IFI 
representatives demonstrated that the entrepreneurial narratives served to distract from the 
wider private expansion of the microfinance industry. The interviews with the IFI 
representatives focused on the entrepreneurial narrative and they explained that in Egypt 
they did not pursue financial inclusion. However, in reading the 2014 microfinance law, which 
opened the Egyptian market to financial inclusion via foreign private MFIs, each of the IFIs 
played a role in its foundation. In interviewing the CEOs of MFIs, I further discovered that the 
IFIs I had interviewed were heavily involved in wholesale funding for international commercial 
MFIs in Egypt, something they did not mention in my interviews.  
 
I mentioned earlier why we focused on enterprise lending here, well I think it is no 
secret, it is because the NGOs have little choice. The law (2014) concentrated on the 
provision of commercial financial services from NGOs, so all of the existing NGOs, 
some of whom were providing consumer loans, housing loans, education loans, health 
loans all had to stop those lending activities and focus on enterprise. New entrants, 
like Tanmeyah, they can operate consumer finance divisions, but any NGO formed 
prior to the 2014 law [over 90% of current Egyptian MFIs], enterprise lending only 
(Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 27).  
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The IFIs were actively working to present the narrative of entrepreneurship as the only one 
they were engaged in Egypt. The IFIs had influenced the microfinance law and the sustainable 
development plan since they were also party to the CPF. The IFI representatives presented 
the narrative of entrepreneurship throughout our interviews as if it were the sole purpose of 
their work in microfinance in Egypt. However, in one particular interview, it became clear that 
the IFIs’ broader agendas were deep within the laws and frameworks they had influenced 
(Harrison, 2004). They had created a position where they supported the government in their 
aims as well as operating as wholesale funders for commercial gain (CGAP, 2019a).  
 
We need to be able to work with that [private] sector, with these microfinance 
companies and NGOs, to try to get them to focus on finance for the very small 
enterprises across Egypt and then push them towards, to meet the needs, along with 
other financial intermediaries, to cover the entire spectrum, financial inclusion 
(Interview Transcript – Subject 12, Paragraph 15).  
 
It was explained to me in the interviews that the microfinance law allowed for different 
organisations to perform different functions within the microfinance space. This was shown 
as unproblematic for the IFIs, despite them identifying that the process of lending for 
entrepreneurial microfinance and financial inclusion are broadly identical. There were 
effectively two parallel narratives of microfinance present in Egypt. One was hegemonic at a 
policy level and supported the government’s actions. The second, more hidden narrative 
served to cover up the expansion of commercial microfinance and the financialisation of 
poverty.  
 
A big push on loans without a focus on jobs, wouldn’t have worked here for the 
government (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 37).   
 
I argue that the IFIs have relied upon the hegemonic narrative of entrepreneurship to open 
the Egyptian microfinance market to private and foreign capital through the back door. Using 
the microfinance law, the IFIs positioned the NGOs to support entrepreneurship at the 
request of the Egyptian Government whilst private capital was able to take on the significantly 
larger market of financial inclusion. In my interviews with loan officers and borrowers, I was 
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shown that with the law came small changes in paperwork for NGOs and their clients but the 
loans did not change. Borrowers that borrowed for consumption were asked to sign 
paperwork that their loans were for enterprise purposes despite them being for consumption. 
These borrowers indicated that they were now looking to move from the NGO MFI to a 
commercial provider as they felt uneasy about falsely signing the paperwork to take a loan. 
The CEOs of NGO MFIs explained that they had been left with the poorer borrowers who the 
commercial MFIs had no interest in servicing. The microfinance law not only switched the 
narrative back to entrepreneurship, but it also channelled the most profitable clients into the 
market of the commercial MFIs. The IFIs understood that the real value lay in the low-income 
employed segment, a market they had provided to commercial MFIs. It was stated that the 
best thing for jobs in Egypt was traditional industrial development. Industrial development, 
skilled work and proper jobs did not have to be to the detriment of the MFIs. 
 
In providing loans to those people, they gain access to things they perhaps never had, 
health care, education, water, sanitation, all these things, but those people need 
incomes to pay it back. If you are looking from a growth perspective, low-income 
clients with jobs, that can service debt for housing, for health, for education, that is 
your key market (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, Paragraph 37) (Emphasis added).  
 
I know it is probably outdated, but proper industrial type development, skilled work 
with regular wages, government jobs. This is the only way I can see real improvement 
here, and it doesn’t have to be to the detriment of MFIs. You know Tanmeyah as a 
company can provide consumer loans to people (Interview Transcript – Subject 18, 
Paragraph 39) (Emphasis added).  
 
Conclusion - The Narratives of Microfinance and the IFIs  
 
From the evidence collected in my interviews, I argue that the IFIs promote the narrative of 
entrepreneurship in Egypt to align microfinance with the development plan of the 
government. The promotion of the narrative maintained the hegemony of microfinance at a 
policy level. The terms of the entrepreneurial narrative were present in the senso comune of 
the IFI representatives, who explained it in detail and assured that it was capable of providing 
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jobs for the unemployed youth. The narrative appeared more widely hegemonic and the 
government’s efforts to convince the general public of the merits of entrepreneurship 
showed that the population on average is moving in favour of entrepreneurship as an option 
for employment (GEM, 2018). The narratives provide a tool to affect the senso comune of the 
Egyptian youth, presenting microfinance as a solution to their unemployment. I argue the 
narratives allow for the government to cut public sector jobs and further privatise the health 
and education sector. Using Cox’s definition of the five functions of mechanisms of hegemony 
(1983), I contend that the IFIs fulfil that role in Egypt. They have worked with the Government 
to promote the narrative as a norm held by the Egyptian people, maintaining the hegemony 
of microfinance.  
 
IFI representatives demonstrated how they promoted the narrative of entrepreneurial 
microfinance in Egypt to support the strategic plan of the government. When I challenged the 
efficacy of entrepreneurial microfinance, the respondents explained that they had developed 
training programmes to ensure that the failures of the past were not repeated. Their 
responses were an act of the hegemon deflecting the counter-hegemonic narrative. There 
was clear evidence that entrepreneurship training for microenterprises, like the 
entrepreneurial narrative, is discredited (Karlan, 2014). Despite the challenges I presented to 
the representatives, the majority of them maintained that entrepreneurial microfinance had 
a key role to play in the development of Egypt.  
 
Data from one specific IFI representative demonstrated that the narrative of 
entrepreneurship has allowed both the Egyptian Government and the IFIs to enact changes 
that negatively impact the Egyptian people. Using the positive associations of 
entrepreneurship, the post-revolution Egyptian Government needed a tool to occupy the 
youth while they continued the neoliberalisation of the Egyptian state through the CPF. In my 
interviews, IFI representatives referred to creating ‘perceptions’ and ‘thoughts’ amongst the 
youth, distracting them from the CPF that was privatising their key services and creating 
further unemployment. One specific IFI representative understood the power of the narrative 
in altering the senso comune of a population and explained that the narrative was a tool to 
change perceptions.  
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Whilst the IFIs demonstrated that they supported the narrative of entrepreneurship publicly, 
as my interviews went on they indicated that they had larger intentions to promote financial 
inclusion. The IFIs constructed the 2014 law to promote the entrepreneurial narrative yet 
through the law they opened the market for commercial private sector MFIs. Throughout the 
interviews, the representatives worked to hide their association with financial inclusion in 
Egypt, yet the IFIs are the largest wholesale funders to the commercial microfinance sector 
(EBRD, 2017; 2019). Loans to commercial MFIs yield a significantly higher rate of return than 
those to the NGO MFIs, making the microfinance law highly profitable for the IFIs, something 
they did not discuss.  
 
Through the evidence in this chapter, I argue that the IFIs rely on the narrative of 
entrepreneurship to maintain the hegemony of microfinance, to privatise the microfinance 
sector, and to financialise poverty (Harrison, 2004). The narrative is presented as a chance for 
the Egyptian population to escape unemployment, working to support the Government who 
are fearful of further revolutions. The narrative has been presented as the main aim for 
microfinance in Egypt yet financial inclusion through the private sector has been facilitated 
by the IFI’s actions. The process of promoting narratives has worked to distract the attention 
from the privatisation of microfinance and the financialisation of poverty.  
 
In the following chapters, I will explore more deeply how the entrepreneurial narrative 
reaches others within the microfinance industry, to better understand whether the 
hegemony of microfinance is maintained by narratives. If the narrative is hegemonic at a 
policy level, disconnected from the affected populations, then in interviewing the other tiers, 
I aim to determine whether hegemony has penetrated more deeply. CEOs of MFIs are the 
next tier of interviewees. Their perceptions bring depth to the argument of hegemony at a 





Chapter 6 - The Market Makers – Perceptions from the CEOS of Egyptian 




The evidence from the IFI representative interviews confirms that the entrepreneurial 
narrative is promoted by the IFIs to create the impression that entrepreneurship is a solution 
to unemployment and poverty. Through the lens of Gramsci, I argue that the promotion of 
the narrative is to maintain the hegemony of microfinance while forwarding the 
financialisation of poverty. Like the IFIs, the MFIs are considered mechanisms of hegemony 
(Cox, 1983). They form part of civil society and therefore work to maintain the position of the 
hegemon. Within this chapter I develop the argument of the microfinance industry’s reliance 
on narratives further, exploring how MFIs position their lending activities. The 
entrepreneurial narrative acts as a shield to cover the privatisation of public services and 
further government cuts. The MFIs promote the narrative of entrepreneurship in order to 
comply with the microfinance laws as well as to maintain their position as a key development 
policy provider. To support my argument, five MFI CEOs were interviewed, each sharing their 
views and perceptions of the role of microfinance in Egypt. Four are from NGOs and one from 
a large commercial MFI. In interviewing the CEOs, I sought to determine how the MFIs relate 
to the narrative of entrepreneurship promoted by the Government of Egypt and the IFIs.  
 
All MFIs in Egypt in the late 1990s promoted the entrepreneurial narrative. By the mid-2000s 
they switched to financial inclusion. In 2014, when the law mandated a new change, the NGO 
MFIs were forced to switch back to the entrepreneurial narrative they once promoted. The 
MFIs have experienced the realities of the entrepreneurial narrative and moved away from it 
because their clients demanded consumer lending. Using the Gramscian theoretical 
framework I sought to investigate the roles narratives played for MFIs and how they publicly 
project a narrative which they have once rejected. With this chapter, I aim to further answer 
the question of the role of narratives in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance in Egypt 
through the perceptions of those that both receive and transmit the narratives.  
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The Participants  
 
Throughout this thesis, these participants have been referred to as tier two. The institutions 
they represent are considered among the largest and most influential of the MFIs in Egypt. 
Four of them were NGOs and one was a commercial MFI formed after the 2008 microfinance 
law. Each of them had deep connections with one or more IFI, either being founded by one, 
continually supported or having significant amounts of wholesale funding provided. The 
representatives were all CEOs and all were Egyptian nationals based in Cairo or Alexandria. 
 
The NGOs promote the entrepreneurial narrative of microfinance. They lend directly to 
entrepreneurs as well as provide entrepreneurship and business skills training. Their ability 
to lend only to entrepreneurs is dictated by the microfinance law of 2014. Throughout the 
interviews, the NGO CEOs implied strongly that their loans were a social good as opposed to 
those of the commercial MFIs, whose loans were considered bad. Therefore, for 
categorisation, the CEOs of NGOs have been termed ‘the good’ in this chapter. The 
commercial MFI by the same 2014 law is able to offer a full suite of loans to clients for 
enterprise and consumption and practice financial inclusion. Following the fact that the NGO 
CEOs cast commercial MFIs as bad, the interview with the commercial MFI CEO is labelled 
‘the bad’. These do not describe moral judgements I have made but are a simple reflection of 
the language used by the participants and the role that plays in assigning narratives to loans.  
 
The CEOs of MFIs, both NGO and commercial were of interest in my research because both 
play a key role in promoting the narratives of the microfinance industry. The IFIs communicate 
predominantly at a policy level but the MFIs hold a different position, where policy and 
practice are connected. The CEOs perceptions were of particular interest because they hold 
positions that connect the global with the local. They share international platforms with the 
IFIs as well as speak directly to borrowers through their loan officers. The MFIs form part of 
Gramsci’s superstructure and therefore they promote narratives to maintain the hegemony 
of microfinance. The CEO responses allow for an understanding of how those narratives work 
to maintain that hegemony.  
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The Underpinnings   
 
According to the 2014 Microfinance Law, NGO MFIs in Egypt are only allowed to lend for 
enterprise purposes and therefore promote the narrative of entrepreneurship. Whilst the 
same law allows for commercial MFIs to practice financial inclusion, in Egypt the commercial 
MFI that participated in this thesis promoted the same narrative as the NGOs. Public 
statements from Egyptian MFI websites claim their aims are to: “Provide poor and low-
income entrepreneurs especially women with sustainable access to quality microfinance 
services to build their businesses, eliminate poverty in Egypt and improve the quality of life 
of our clients”. The MFIs now promote a narrative they previously had rejected. I argue that 
this demonstrates the role of narratives in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance rather 
than their belief it is a tool for entrepreneurs.  
 
The interviews with the IFI representatives provided evidence that the narrative of 
entrepreneurship works to address the government’s concerns of a future revolution by 
attempting to convince the youth that entrepreneurship is their route to employment. 
Evidence from the MFIs public communications demonstrates that they further promote this 
narrative in support of the Government and the IFIs. The 2014 law meant that NGO MFI have 
lost, at least legally, a significant portion of their business to the commercial MFIs. The 
commercial MFI CEO confirmed they chose entrepreneurship as their publicly promoted 
narrative despite being able to offer other types of loans. Whether entrepreneurial 
microfinance supports entrepreneurship or consumption, the MFIs push the same 
entrepreneurial narrative in Egypt that is hegemonic at a policy level.   
 
The perceptions of MFI CEOs interviewed in this chapter provide insight into the 
implementation of microfinance and how narratives interact with delivery. From the IFI 
interviews, it was understood that narrative changes can signal big shifts in policy but little 
change in reality. The MFI CEOs provide insight into that reality. The data from this chapter 
contributed to the broader research question of the role of narratives in maintaining the 
hegemony of microfinance in Egypt. The core codes developed for this research applied to 
the MFI CEOs as they did to the IFIs. I assigned specific attributes to the codes based on the 
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data derived from the CEO interviews, which allowed for focus on the research question 
through the responses:  
 
• Entrepreneurship – The narrative promoted through the government, the IFIs and 
projected onto the MFIs. This thesis seeks to understand how the narrative, which has 
failed once, is delivered to the population of Egypt and what effect the CEOs think it has 
on their borrowers. Is the entrepreneurial narrative hegemonic to the extent it can overlay 
reality and affect senso comune?   
• Poverty Alleviation – Complementing the entrepreneur narrative yet counter to the 
current literature which criticises it. This code is designed to provide an understanding of 
the extent to which the CEOs will promote the claims of the entrepreneurial narrative 
which they have enforced upon them. Understanding the extent that CEOs are willing to 
promote the narrative of the entrepreneur helps determine how, or if, hegemony can 
mould opinions.    
• Financial Inclusion – This is the imperative of all the MFIs that participated pre-2014, and 
is still legally possible for the MFIs that are not NGOs. I argue that financial inclusion is the 
true purpose of the microfinance industry. The opening up of microfinance from 
entrepreneurs to everyone else enabled exponential sustainable growth for MFIs. The 
CEOs’ opinions of this aim, as well as the law that now governs, will help determine the 
objective of the microfinance industry as well as understand the role of narratives in 
covering those objectives.  
• Consumption – This refers to the consumption of consumer products, health care and 
education, a logical outcome from financial inclusion but often obscured by the rights-
based language used to promote it. Financial inclusion’s connection to neoliberalism 
determines that debt for consumption is part of the goal of the narrative. The CEOs’ 
perceptions of this will define whether financial inclusion microfinance really has a social 
aim or whether the narrative sells a social aim to conceal the financialisation of poverty.  
 
The core codes allowed me to focus on the research sub-questions of understanding what 
people in the industry felt they were participating in and why those people engage with 
microfinance. The core codes collectively contribute to the understanding of the role of 
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narratives in the maintenance of the hegemony of microfinance. During the interviews with 
the CEOs, further codes were generated, allowing a deeper dive into the responses given. The 
method of deriving the codes was still deductive, using the original codes as a reference but 
drawing in new unique codes for the CEOs. The non-core codes were:  
 
• Training – The MFIs are connected to the IFIs and offer the training packages sold by 
them. The narrative of entrepreneurship is passed directly from the IFIs through the 
MFIs and then, using their loan officers as trainers, to the borrowers. The mechanism 
is the direct transfer of the narrative from the global to the local. The CEOs responses 
as to the reasons for and outcomes of the training can explain how successful they 
perceive the narrative of entrepreneurship is in working to maintain hegemony.  
• Profitability and Transformation – The CEOs were all focused on the profitability of 
their MFI, NGO or commercial. The law had impacted the NGO MFIs ability to remain 
profitable, so they were seeking new income streams such as training to replace the 
loans lost to the commercial providers. The NGOs were investing in a change to 
become private corporations but for political reasons, they chose not to change their 
legal status. The exploration of the subject of transformation uncovered the political 
power wielded by NGO MFIs which embedded them into civil society.  
 
The Good – Perceptions of 4 CEOs from NGO MFIs   
 
Entrepreneurship and Poverty Alleviation  
 
There is a very important role that microfinance is playing. These days you are not 
going to create jobs for everybody, entrepreneurship is going to remain the only way 
a large segment can earn a living (Interview Transcript - Subject 11, Paragraph 69 - 70).  
 
In the same way, the IFI representatives first responded, the CEOs asserted the importance 
of microfinance for the entrepreneurs of Egypt despite only recently changing back to 
promoting the idea. They confirmed that they saw microfinance as a key tool in creating jobs 
for the unemployed and alleviating poverty. The NGO MFIs had an average loan size of 1000 
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L.E (US$62) and their loan officers had portfolios of 300 to 350 clients each. The IFI 
representatives, as well as evidence from the literature, indicated that loans of that size are 
unlikely to be productive microfinance loans (Bateman, 2010b; Bateman and Maclean, 2017). 
The law had mandated that the NGOs lent for enterprise only, yet even in the early part of 
the interview the CEOs indicated they were aware of varied loan uses amongst their clients.   
 
As I said, some people will take advantage of that and grow a business and eventually 
grow out of poverty, but others will use microfinance just to survive. Sustain their 
existence (Interview Transcript - Subject 11, Paragraph 69 - 70).  
 
It [microfinance] is definitely an effective tool to grow businesses, encourage 
entrepreneurship and in many other cases just to make ends meet (Interview 
Transcript - Subject 19, Paragraph 4 - 5).  
 
All of the NGO CEOs were connected to the IFIs and shared how the IFIs had founded their 
MFIs. Whilst all the NGOs started with a subsidised credit model, by design they were 
expected to become sustainable financial institutions. The majority of the CEOs had been IFI 
employees in the past and shared how the IFIs had created the MFIs as part of larger NGOs. 
The aim was to use their surplus from lending to fund the social goals of the NGOs, 
implemented in response to the IFIs cutting NGOs direct funding of social activities. As the 
microfinance market developed, the loans themselves became the social activities. This is 
where I argue that the narratives played a role. The microfinance industry through the IFIs 
has relied on the narrative which worked to affect the senso comune of the development 
industry and transform microfinance from ‘debt to the poor’ to ‘an opportunity for an 
entrepreneur’.  
 
We were originally funded by USAID in the early 1990s, this project helped in 
establishing 7 microfinance activities, actually at that point in time I was an employee 
of USAID, and the idea then was to look at a vehicle that had the heart of a 
development institution combined with hard-nosed private businessmen approach 
(Subject 01 - Interview Transcript, Paragraph 6).  
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In the beginning, you have to know, when microfinance started in Egypt, it was a tool 
for NGOs to continue, the 1990s. The idea of microfinance in Egypt was to allow NGOs 
to self-fund their activities, it was USAID’s policy. USAID gave funding for activities 
such as education, health, so to make the NGOs sustainable, they gave them a grant 
to start microfinance operations. This is the start. The idea started to go well, the 
NGOs began to look for people who didn’t have access to financial services, all NGOs 
were using the economic goals of sustainability through microfinance to sustainably 
fund their other social goals. The market then changed, it improved, and the NGOs 
started offering microfinance exclusively as their social offering (Interview Transcript 
– Subject 15, Paragraph 93).  
 
The narrative of entrepreneurship was hegemonic in these interviews. The CEOs talked of the 
entrepreneurial loans they offer to clients and the impacts those loans have on the client’s 
business. The narrative shared by the CEOs implied that the loans from their MFIs were drivers 
of creativity and economic vibrancy, presenting stories of successful small businesses rather 
than tiny survivalist enterprises their loans actually supported.   
 
So, these are things we are trying to change, creating a culture, we are not offering 
loans we are creating economic vibrancy, development. Whatever it takes to do that, 
we will do it. Bringing everyone in to participate in the economy. If you only have half 
the members of society participating, you will not be walking you will be limping 
(Subject 01 - Interview Transcript, Paragraph 43).  
 
This is not the petty traders you mentioned earlier, I mean workshops, carpentry 
business, recycling, light manufacturing (Interview Transcript – Subject 19, Paragraph 
5). 
 
The narrative’s hegemony was challenged by one CEO, who presented their portfolio as 
something more varied than the narrative might imply. The CEO claimed that approximately 
only 20% actually ran any sort of business as a main source of income but also claimed that 
50% of borrowers ran home-based businesses as well as working elsewhere. As I interviewed 
other tiers within my research, I was told by the loan officers and borrowers that many just 
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fabricated a home-based business to be able to access NGO loans under the new law. The 
CEO highlighted what was said previously in the literature, that it was difficult to identify what 
borrowers did with the loans when loan officers had over 300 clients.   
 
30% of our portfolio, the loan is everything for them to survive, to eat, to live. They 
stay the same, their loan allows them to survive but not more. 50% have business, and 
they also have jobs; the business is not the main source of income for them, maybe 
they work for the government, but they do have a home-based small business. 20% of 
them do run a business and in some way, grow and progress, not always a lot but it is 
clear. But 30%, they are just surviving, just for the next day (Interview Transcript – 
Subject 15, Paragraph 80 - 81). 
 
This is challenging to prove, but we try and prove this by visiting their homes, evaluate 
the business and do an investigation in to their homes (Interview Transcript – Subject 
15, Paragraph 8).  
 
Despite the narrative not being fully hegemonic amongst the group, many CEOs repeated 
anecdotes about borrower successes, reflecting the early promotion of narratives by the 
microfinance industry. I shared some of the research that demonstrated that microfinance 
was not effective in generating significant impact on employment or businesses. It was 
explained that researchers could never understand the feeling that practitioners have from 
the ground.  
 
We have a lot of success stories, people who were able to grow their businesses, 
employ people, other people as well. So, it is working on the ground, you would read 
about formulas to approach impact which might not totally agree with what 
practitioners are saying……… I am not telling that we as practitioners have the right 
formula for impact, but there are things we can feel on the ground that is in the 
abstract very different (Interview Transcript - Subject 11, Paragraph 16 - 19) 
(Emphasis added).  
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The strength of entrepreneurial narrative was demonstrated when one of the CEOs told a 
story that used all of the associations the industry created. The story not only entailed a 
successful business, but told of accessing education for their children, healthcare for their 
parents, and generally building a better life. The CEO shared an emotive and vivid personal 
story, reflective of the stories told by Mohammad Yunus at the outset of the entrepreneurial 
narrative, ‘proving’ that entrepreneurial microfinance worked. The story was told of a 
businesswoman, who had successfully started and grown a business, employed others, and 
drastically improved her and her family’s lives. Whilst there is no reason to doubt this story, 
evidence from the literature, the IFIs, CEOs, loan officers and borrowers show success stories 
like this are the tiniest exceptions rather than the rule.  
 
We were still funded in the early years by USAID. Occasionally they had dignitaries 
visiting the country and so on. So, there was a senator called Joe Lieberman, Mrs. 
Lieberman, his wife, was in town and they were actually taking her around. They asked 
us to take her to one of our clients. We went to an area, very narrow alleys and so on, 
she had security details. We took her to a place, not far from Maadi, but really slums. 
We had this particular client, a woman, who, actually to get there was really, I mean, 
with the large cars and so on, so we all were walking, Mrs. Lieberman, her bodyguards, 
USAID mission, and went to this lady who had, we had to go downstairs into sort of a 
basement where she lived. The story of this lady was, she had four kids and she was 
married to a guy who was a taxi driver who got cancer and was incapacitated. She 
knew, nothing, really, in life, her sister taught her how to sew and she had the bright 
idea to make belly dancers costumes that she would sell in Khan el Khalili, it was great 
business. So great that she decided to open up in Sharm and Hurgada, to sell there. 
She was there, explaining her story, I was translating to Mrs. Lieberman and the others 
and she did so well that she employed many other ladies from the neighbourhood to 
help meet the demand. While she was telling the story, you could tell she was bubbly, 
you could feel she was empowered, she sent her elder daughter to university. She was 
able to give medical attention to her husband. While she was telling the story, it was 
so moving that Mrs. Lieberman started to cry, her bodyguards had tears in their eyes 
(Interview Transcript - Subject 11, Paragraph 80 - 88).  
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Despite the presentation of success stories, the effectiveness of entrepreneurial microfinance 
as it had been set up by the government was understood to be limited. The new law had 
positioned the NGOs in a difficult place, they were cast as tools to support people into 
employment while structural adjustment took place but evidence suggests they were not 
suited to that role. If jobs were to be created, it was not microfinance that would do it, one 
CEO explained. Investment and public spending were key for jobs in Egypt, the MFIs role was 
not one of job creator. Building on the evidence from the IFI interviews, it is demonstrated 
that the role of MFIs was never to be employment generators but to be bankers to the poor. 
Whilst the narrative had considerable value in the maintenance of hegemony in Egypt, it failed 
to fully influence the senso comune of the NGO CEOs.  
 
We are an NGO, so impact is part of our mission, and this is the challenge here. The 
unemployment in Egypt is out of our control, this is a big problem for the government 
to deal with, there needs to be investment in infrastructure, in education, they need 
to promote investment, all the things your government does to create jobs. We cannot 
be responsible for dealing with unemployment, there is no capacity in microfinance 
for this (Interview Transcript – Subject 19, Paragraph 5).  
 
Training and Profitability  
 
The CEOs confirmed that microfinance in Egypt is a profitable enterprise and NGOs have been 
able to generate a surplus from their lending activities and amass significant reserves. 
According to Mohammad Yunus (1999:74), he formed Grameen Bank as a challenger to the 
informal money lender who was charging exorbitant interest rates to the poor. Dr. Yunus 
claimed the proliferation of microfinance in Bangladesh was the pent-up demand from 
entrepreneurs. In Egypt, the CEOs explained that the MFIs grew rapidly because of their cheap 
accessible loans.  
 
We have been operational for 27 years, we were able to of course achieve our 
operational break even and then our financial, fully financial, breakeven, and then 
accumulate earnings throughout the years, and we have reached an equity of L.E 550 
million (US$35 Mil) (Subject 01 - Interview Transcript, Paragraph 6).  
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The reason why we took off, the whole microfinance sector, has built volume, 
relatively quickly, was because of the lack of any service provider on the supply side. 
When this activity started, no one was offering institutionalised credit, other than 
money lenders and loan sharks. We could provide loans for everything, to everyone. 
They [money lenders] used to charge 100% interest rates or more, so when we 
entered the market with a 16% flat interest rate, it is heaven on earth. So that is why 
we went up in volume very quickly (Subject 01 - Interview Transcript, Paragraph 8 - 
10).  
 
Each of the MFIs had experienced high growth over the last 10 years. The NGO CEOs were 
now worried about their growth and profitability following the 2014 microfinance law. The 
law had limited their clients and each of the NGOs had experienced a fall in revenues since 
the law’s introduction. The CEO’s comments reinforced my finding that the IFIs created a 
market for private capital through the law and under the guise of a narrative.  
 
When they [Government of Egypt] put the law, they didn’t have in mind the existing 
NGOs. It’s like the law was put not for us, but for the new companies. It’s not clear. I 
think this will affect the market. Yes, many new companies will open, we understand 
that, and they come from huge investor funds, international funds. When we ask what 
the category of clients is you will serve, they will focus on the existing saturated areas 
in Cairo and Alex. The poor people in the rest of Egypt won’t have access. It will affect 
them; it will affect us [NGOs] as businesses (Interview Transcript – Subject 15, 
Paragraph 95).  
 
The NGO MFIs had begun working with the IFIs to build new sustainable income streams, 
most prominently entrepreneurship training. The CEOs used the same language as the IFI 
representatives I interviewed. Debt without training was suddenly considered irresponsible 
despite their near 30-year history of operating without training. The IFIs had sold each of the 
NGO MFIs a consultancy package for entrepreneurship training and the CEOs were working 
to mainstream entrepreneurship training for their clients, predominantly due to the value of 
the income stream. Given the long history of working with the narrative of financial inclusion 
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the CEOs had to work to convince colleagues, loan officers, and borrowers that training was 
more than an income stream. They presented it as a market differentiator between them and 
the other MFIs and as the difference between the success and failure of a microenterprise. 
Their efforts demonstrated that the narrative of entrepreneurship was only hegemonic at the 
most senior of policy levels. Others within the MFI failed to see the importance of 
entrepreneurship training for their clients because they did not view their clients as 
entrepreneurs.  
 
You cannot only give money, it’s a one-time deal. Giving money to anyone with a 
business idea or not is not a socially responsible thing to do (Subject 01 - Interview 
Transcript, Paragraph 24).  
 
I am using this analogy with my colleagues, you should look at non-financial services 
and financial as two wings of a bird, if they are not fully synchronised the bird will fall. 
So, this is where we are [hand indicates low point] and this is where we want to be 
[hand indicates high point]. This is our market differentiation position, on which 
nobody can compete with us (Subject 01 - Interview Transcript, Paragraph 26).  
 
Let me give you some quantitative reflections on our ideas. If I constantly look as non-
financial services as a stand-alone activity, I will logically look at it as a revenue 
generating activity. But if I link it to the financial services I am offering, then, linking it, 
no sorry I don’t mean linking it, I mean mainstreaming it in my product range, then 
the situation is completely different (Subject 01 - Interview Transcript, Paragraph 28).  
 
The IFI’s entrepreneurship training required the understanding that the loans were used for 
a microenterprise. Evidence from the NGO CEOs themselves confirmed this was largely not 
the case. The CEOs responses changed as the discussion regarding training continued. They 
moved further from the narrative of entrepreneurship, indicating it had not influenced their 
senso comune, they were repeating it because they had to. It became clear that financial 
inclusion was where they understood there to be value for clients in microfinance. They refer 
to training as important not because it helps entrepreneurs, but because they needed an 
income stream to replace the lost revenue. The evidence from the interviews demonstrated 
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that they were certain the training was an income stream but were not certain it gave any 
real value for their clients.  
 
Our clients for microloans, they come to us, borrow or make a payment and leave, 
they don’t want to waste more than 10 minutes with us (Interview Transcript – Subject 
19, Paragraph 23).  
 
When you have poor people, who do anything they can to get by, this is a different 
sort of person to train. We need to ask ourselves why I am training these people, what 
do I think they will get from this. If they are borrowing money, 1000 LE, what do they 
need to learn, there is no scope for growing this business, this is about putting food 
on the table. Their time is so limited, often they have other jobs, or big families, 
making them sit through hours of instruction so they will learn how to be 
entrepreneurs is ridiculous (Interview Transcript – Subject 19, Paragraph 23).  
 
Financial Inclusion and Consumption  
 
The new law allows the new companies to operate outside of this, like Tanmeyah but 
this is impossible for us to become like that. I believe there is a good market in Egypt, 
but we just cover 2% of the possibility, we can only cover the businesses, all the 
remaining personal financial needs are unmet. So why people are claiming to have 
businesses and using the loans for other things is this. The potential for financial access 
is huge (Interview Transcript – Subject 15, Paragraph 95) 
 
The CEOs had all consulted on the 2014 microfinance law but none of them had been 
prepared for the outcome which excluded them from their main market. The Government of 
Egypt and the IFIs had sold the law to them as important to regulate their industry but actually 
it conspired to exclude them from it. The law meant they could no longer offer their loans for 
‘social goals’, described as education, healthcare and consumption. This meant they lost large 
parts of their previous market. It was at this stage within the interviews that the narrative of 
financial inclusion was asserted. The NGO CEOs felt they had been excluded from the financial 
inclusion market and this meant the poor would be socially worse off because of it.   
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We as MFIs requested the new laws and regulations. Through our ministry, the 
ministry of social solidarity, who by the way don’t have the capacity or knowledge for 
financial regulation, we asked for a new law and to be under the supervision of a 
financial ministry. By the way, the new law, was less than our expectations. We as 
NGOs, working with poor people, we have a social goal, of course we have a financial 
goal as well, but the social goal comes first. We decided to work with poor people. The 
law now, allows us to work with business only, so all of the NGOs have a problem, 70% 
of their previous portfolios was for social goals, like education loans, health care loans, 
consumer loans, so they find themselves not being able to re-lend to their existing 
portfolios (Interview Transcript – Subject 15, Paragraph 93). 
 
The CEO’s articulation of the loss of their key market illustrated that the narrative of 
entrepreneurship was only promoted because of the law. The narrative that was hegemonic 
amongst CEOs was financial inclusion. The NGO CEOs constructed their past loans as a social 
good and their aims as socially responsible. Those CEOs also constructed the commercial MFIs 
as being bad, and a social ill, despite the loans and interest rates being identical. The lack of 
social mission behind the commercial MFIs was problematic to the NGO CEOs, commercial 
MFIs were constructed as unethical and accused of malpractice.  
 
Newly formed companies would do just about anything to increase their portfolio and 
their market share and so on and in the process, they would offer much larger loans, 
to customers that could not afford it. Unfortunately, there is no protocol or guidelines 
for them not to do that. Yes, there is client protection, certain guidelines, but they are 
not enforced, or not effective (Interview Transcript - Subject 11, Paragraph 30).  
 
[The problems are] because of the malpractices of the new companies are doing. They 
are coming and they are dumping our clients with money, more than they can absorb, 
more than they technically, more than their debt service capacity (Subject 01 - 
Interview Transcript, Paragraph 18).  
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Evidence from the NGO CEOs demonstrates that the narrative of financial inclusion is 
hegemonic amongst the senior management of MFIs. The conviction of the social good of 
their loans has allowed microfinance to remain a hegemonic development policy in Egypt. 
Commercial MFIs were replicating the actions of the NGOs yet because the commercial MFI 
do not associate positive social outcomes with their loans through a narrative, their loans 
were not a social good.  
 
The NGO CEOs explained that consumption loans were popular with their clients from the 
1990s, when the entrepreneurial narrative was first introduced. As the interviews progressed, 
the CEOs expressed little conviction that the narrative of entrepreneurship was effective. For 
the NGO CEOs, financial inclusion was not about consumption for consumption's sake, it was 
born of a real need for the poor to access public services that were no longer free. Their 
statements demonstrated how structural adjustment had cemented the need for financial 
inclusion, one neoliberal idea worked to support another. The evidence from the NGO CEOs 
demonstrates that the narrative of financial inclusion is present in their collective senso 
comune. The NGO CEOs claimed that their loans were the best way for the poor to navigate 
the challenges of being poor. The economic base had become a reflection of the 
superstructure. The neoliberalisation of economies had led to the financialisation of poverty 
and the CEOs implicitly supported that.   
 
From the early days, our audit team were picking up that loans were not used for 
business, so we spoke with clients, focus groups and asked them why. They explained 
to us because you didn’t give us loans for these things, for our needs. So, we decided 
to design these products and before the law they were very successful, for them and 
for us. The law stopped this. So, now if you go to clients, you will find that they have a 
loan for business, but they didn’t use it for business. He used it for his daughter’s 
wedding, his son’s school, maybe if he faces a health problem, he uses it for that 
(Interview Transcript – Subject 15, Paragraph 66 - 67).  
 
When I view financial inclusion and coming from the need for the poor to have all of 
the spectrum, it is a bit different from what I see being the bandwagon in Egypt right 
now. So, this is where I see there is a need to coherent national strategy on that, to 
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really define what is financial inclusion (Interview Transcript - Subject 11, Paragraph 
15).  
 
Within the 2014 law, there was a clause and a process, albeit a complex one, that allowed 
NGOs to transform into commercial MFIs. I asked the CEOs why they did not make the change 
given they could keep their social aims and participate in the wider microfinance market. It 
was explained that being an NGO held a particular type of political power, power that the 
board of the NGO, made up of large business owners, did not want to give up. NGO board 
members could use their position to influence ministers in favour of their own private 
enterprise; access they could not get if they were not part of an NGO. After the revolution in 
Egypt, NGO MFIs were seen by the government as the holders of power and influence over 
their borrowers. The NGO board members understood that position and leveraged the power 
for their own personal gain. The NGOs were not transforming to commercial MFIs because of 
their own governance boards. The transformation from NGO to commercial organisation 
came at expense of political power, demonstrating the broader political economy in which 
microfinance operates. The MFIs are not necessarily grassroots-oriented altruistic NGOs but 
actors driving their own individual agendas (Banks and Hulme, 2012).  
 
The board of trustees would lose power. They are businessmen at the end of the day, 
they have corporate interests outside of this role. Being part of an organisation [NGO] 
like this allows them to knock the doors of any minister, even to reach the president, 
as we represent ‘this’ NGO. Our active client base is 330,000 clients, critical mass, over 
1.5 million people connected by family, critical social mass. And then you have to 
understand the power. This is a tool. If you are a private sector entrepreneur, big 
private sector entrepreneur, you should be part of this, you can take decisions to 
support some governorates, some ministries, which will make you walk both sides of 
the street. You can influence and effect ministers with your NGO actions, in return can 
benefit you (Subject 01 - Interview Transcript, Paragraph 51 - 52).  
 
The Narratives of Microfinance and the NGO MFIs  
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The evidence from the NGO CEOs demonstrates that the narrative of entrepreneurship plays 
a role in the maintenance of the hegemony of microfinance but is itself not hegemonic 
amongst those CEOs. As I demonstrated in chapter five, the entrepreneurial narrative 
amongst the IFIs is hegemonic but according to the CEOs of MFIs, on the ground it sets 
unrealistic expectations and is not a reflection of microfinance reality. The NGOs are shown 
to sell entrepreneurship training to replace a lost income stream. The CEOs were unconvinced 
of its effectiveness for clients but were aware of how it would add value as a sustainable 
revenue source.  
 
Financial inclusion was the narrative that the NGOs wished to pursue. They repeatedly 
confirmed that it was their social responsibility to provide loans to the poor. This 
demonstrates that at the senior management level of MFIs, financial inclusion as a narrative 
was hegemonic. In Egypt, through the various SAPs or CPFs, public services have been 
removed or privatised so that microfinance and the NGO MFIs have always been there to 
support the working poor through structural adjustments. The NGO CEOs were concerned 
that their clients are now unserved, leaving them excluded from many everyday services they 
once borrowed money for to access.  
 
I argue that the narrative of financial inclusion is hegemonic at an MFI senior management 
level. While entrepreneurship holds strongly at the IFI policy level, MFIs who had been lending 
money for decades were acutely aware of its limitations. Financial inclusion is at the core of 
the NGO MFIs in Egypt, it was present in the senso comune of the CEOs who state their loans 
are a social good. The NGOs promote the narrative of entrepreneurship to remain able to 
operate legally but they ultimately wish to practice financial inclusion to ensure their clients 
can access services in a neoliberal economy.   
 
The Bad – The Perspective of a Commercial MFI CEO 
 
Entrepreneurship and Poverty Alleviation  
 
Absolutely not, to be perfectly honest, we set this up because we saw a market gap 
and an opportunity to make money. We can’t claim to have entered the market for 
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any other reason than to make money. We have no social goal or developmental goal. 
We do know that the side effect of business investment is employment which can 
improve poverty levels, but that is not our reason for operation. Our main target is to 
make money. We never in any of our policies considered, let’s say reducing prices, 
because it is better for borrowers. So long as the market dictates the rate we are 
selling at, we are selling (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 36 - 37).  
 
Microfinance in the commercial world was not about poverty alleviation or social inclusion, it 
was about making money. Yet despite the MFIs being able to offer consumption lending, they 
chose to promote a narrative to publicly advertise the MFI. The website presented enterprise 
lending first, all other forms of finance were concealed behind that narrative. In the early 
stage of my interview, the CEO promoted the narrative of entrepreneurship. He explained 
that the enterprise loans from his MFI were not the tiny survival businesses that NGO MFIs 
supported but larger more innovative microenterprises. The CEO explained that the NGO 
model is flawed and that focusing on the larger family-run enterprises was profitable for both 
the enterprise and the MFI. In asserting his MFIs role in supporting business, the CEO further 
explained that it had no role in solving the complex issues of poverty but only could support 
businesses in growing faster than they otherwise would. The CEO stated that microfinance 
had no ability to address societal problems such as poverty, improved education, and 
women’s empowerment (Bateman, 2010b; Bateman and Chang, 2012; Mader, 2015; 
Bateman and Maclean, 2017). The commercial MFI CEO challenged the NGOs and stated that 
they use a women’s vulnerability to force them to repay (Czura, 2015), not the women’s social 
empowerment the narratives claim.  
 
There is a mismatch always between what happens and what the organisation, also 
the funders say will happen. MFIs in Egypt are victims, in fact MFIs globally, of what 
they were told about microfinance from the 80s. They were never taught how to think, 
they were told what to do. The modus operandi today is nearly the same as it was 30 
years ago, 40 years ago. As far as I am concerned it is sickening, I don’t like this guy 
[Mohammed Yunus]. I have been with him on a couple of occasions, and I really don’t 
like this guy. I am sure he has done a lot of good things, but what he taught to the 
industry is totally wrong. All of the new investors, all the innovators, the mobile 
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financial technology companies, companies like ours are proving them wrong 
(Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 60 - 61).  
 
Look at the way they lend, they take a bet that none of the women in the group will 
jeopardise themselves in the group, the women will always find a way to repay, this is 
not working on development, they are taking a bet that the women will pay back the 
loan, that’s it (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 61).  
 
Whilst the NGO CEOs cast the commercial MFIs as being unethical, the commercial CEO saw 
the opposite. He stated that commercial MFIs were responsible lenders, however, their loans 
were not for the purpose of ‘development’. The CEO explained that they operated as a 
commercial bank. There was no narrative of entrepreneurship or financial inclusion, just the 
provision of financial services. The CEO was aware of the narrative of entrepreneurship, yet 
claimed they were not pursuing that narrative. They stated their MFI was not trying to 
convince the poor that they could escape poverty through loans, they were providing a 
service to the unserved for a profit. Despite the rejection of the narrative, the commercial 
MFI had structured their whole external communications strategy around the promotion of 
business loans, demonstrating the success of the enterprise for its clients. I argue that the 
CEO understood the value of the narrative and presented it to distract from the larger part of 
their business, consumer debt, which was more difficult to positively spin.  
 
New companies, us for example, are doing it differently, we are responsibly lending to 
business, we are not doing that because it is the right thing to do, we are doing it for 
profit. These actual businesses are at least tools of employment above that of survival 
and subsistence, business that have been functioning for at least one year (Interview 
Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 61).  
 
Non-Financial Inputs  
 
I don’t believe in the entrepreneurial development microfinance, I think it just covers 
consumer lending for providers who are not able to perform that function, I don’t 
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believe you can train people like that (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 
39).  
 
I used to be a trainer, a trainer of trainers for entrepreneurs. We ran a programme in 
Egypt, supported by the social fund for development, which taught people how to be 
entrepreneurs, in the late 90s. It is amazing that they are still doing this. Let’s say, from 
every 10 only 2 would make it to the final stage of the training and out of those two, 
one or actually less than one would become an entrepreneur. Of those that started 
businesses less than 2 in 10 would survive the first year. Maybe I wasn’t a good trainer, 
I don’t know, but I looked at the outcomes and the direction and thought it couldn’t 
work (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 50).  
 
Despite using the entrepreneurial narrative to publicly promote the MFI, the commercial CEO 
reconfirmed that the ideas of entrepreneurship were flawed, especially the idea that the poor 
could pay to be trained as entrepreneurs. The CEO explained that he had been party to the 
introduction of the entrepreneurial narrative in Egypt in the 1990s. Then, like now, he 
explained that it was designed to support a government that had a lack of alternative ideas 
to address poverty and unemployment. The reintroduction of entrepreneurial microfinance 
as part of the 2014 law was seen as an ego problem within the IFIs, with them failing to 
acknowledge the method did not work. This evidence from the commercial CEO 
demonstrates that despite being dismissive of the ability of microfinance to impact 
entrepreneurship, they clearly understood it had a greater value than impact. The narrative 
of the entrepreneur at a policy level was hegemonic and the commercial CEO understood the 
value that had on protecting their business from any negative associations of high-interest 
consumer debt.  
 
I don’t know what it is, there are a lot of egos in play, a lot of international donor 
organisations not willing to admit the change in perspective and acknowledge that 
these things don’t work (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 50).  
 
This is a huge mistake in my opinion, of Egypt and of NGOs here. Thinking that the 
private sector, I mean people becoming entrepreneurs is the best alternative for 
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them. Entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial spirit is not something you learn, maybe 1% 
can learn it, but 99% of entrepreneurs have that spirit in them. But if you present 
loans, put them in front of people with no alternative, even loans from the social fund, 
finance a lot of people into trouble (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 43). 
 
The other alternative, I was an economist working for the ministry of finance at the 
beginning of the microfinance industry here, the late 90s. This was a problem we were 
trying to fight, we knew that this would not work, to give people money and to try and 
get them to do things is not going to end up very well. This was the prevailing thought 
at the time, that it would work. The best way for this is grow existing businesses, 
medium enterprises, state enterprises, ease access to markets for products, let’s say 
an industrial strategy. Leave it up to the individual if they want to become an 
entrepreneur. Provide the job opportunity option more than anything else, of course 
entrepreneurs need finance, but they need more of VC like funding, not small debt 
(Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 43 - 45).  
 
Financial Inclusion and Consumption 
 
We build high street branches to provide a whole selection, a diverse range of financial 
products for underserved low-income groups. That is how we were set up; we are able 
to provide a wide range of financial products including consumer finance (Interview 
Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 5).  
 
In the interviews with the IFI representatives, there was consensus that “a big push on loans 
without jobs would have been a difficult sell” to the Egyptian government. I argue that is the 
reason why the commercial MFIs use the narrative of entrepreneurship when promoting their 
business. Whilst promoting the efficacy of enterprise loans publicly, the CEO explained to me 
that the whole set up of their MFI was to provide a full range of financial products to a full 
range of consumers. I asked the CEO if their strategy was ‘financial inclusion’, to which he 
explained that the loans were not ‘financial inclusion’ for any sort of development imperative 
or social good, but because it was a profitable and underserved market. 
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The branches are on the high streets, they are designed to be visible, accessible, we 
usually put them near transportation hubs, microbus stands, metro stations. They are 
branded like one of the TELCOs, Etisalat or whatever, on a smaller scale. Every branch 
has an ATM we had specially designed and the whole idea was not just to sell 
microenterprise loans, which are a core product, but to sell the hub itself as an access 
point to our clients for other services (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 5).  
 
The CEO was clear that NGOs lend for consumption purposes despite the law and was very 
critical of their process. The CEO claimed that it was the NGOs that were unethical because 
they did not make the appropriate assessment for consumption lending. 
 
There is always a tendency for consumption in lower income countries, so we are not 
comfortable with not lending correctly. Consumer loans need to be measured against 
regular incomes; business loans need to be to invest to increase business income, 
assessed against a business plan. Mixing the two uses is negative (Interview Transcript 
– Subject 17, Paragraph 52). 
 
To highlight the risk of improper lending by NGOs, the CEO talked of a charity which had been 
set up to work with over-indebted microfinance clients. The charity, a member of which was 
interviewed in the process of developing my thesis, worked with women clients who were 
imprisoned for failure to pay microfinance loans. The commercial MFI CEO claimed that their 
company had the lowest percentage of clients on the charity’s list of all the MFIs, including 
the NGOs. The NGO CEOs accused the commercial MFIs of malpractice and now the 
commercial CEO was accusing the NGOs. It was the perspective of the commercial CEO that 
NGOs were a problem in the microfinance sector. Their enterprise loans were ineffective at 
creating enterprises and their consumption loans were badly assessed.  
 
I am sure you know the charity who have representatives travelling around the 
country trying to bail out women who are in prison for not paying loans, business 
loans, that they obviously used the loan for consumption. They approached the 
microfinance industry and asked is anybody in trouble for not paying their loans, we 
gave them access to our clients in arrears, as did all the NGOs, and we were very happy 
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that we had the lowest % of clients in arrears (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, 
Paragraph 52 - 53).  
 
The microfinance law had allowed MFIs to become banks, able to maximise income and 
shareholder value by lending to the poor. In discussing profitability, the CEO stated that they 
were looking to buy into group lending portfolios, something they had earlier criticised NGOs 
for because they were detrimental to women. The portfolios however were secure and 
profitable as well as being associated with the positive narrative of entrepreneurship, so they 
were looking to invest. The commercial MFI would have funded the loans and taken a margin 
while the NGO would have administered the loans and managed the clients. The commercial 
MFIs had money to invest and they were looking for the best return.  
 
We have been studying very carefully whether we should get involved in group 
lending. We were looking at acquiring a large group lending portfolio from other MFIs, 
but we would act as an Apex organisation in that we would fund the portfolio, but 
they would administer and collect (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 15).  
 
The CEO further criticised NGO lending practices and confirmed that they would not buy a 
portfolio from an NGO as first planned but they would start their own. The commercial MFI 
would fully assess the financial risk and measure the reward. The impact was not important 
but profitability was and bad lending practices led to ultimately lower profits.  
 
That is why we have decided not to buy a portfolio of group debt and perhaps going 
into it ourselves. Because even though we see very low risk levels in those portfolios, 
we don’t think the money is being used appropriately and at any time this can backfire, 
financially or reputationally. I don’t think [NGO] and [NGO], the NGOs that had the 
portfolios we were looking at had the maturity to understand that having huge 
portfolios of consumption or consumer loans can backfire because they are non-
productive by nature (Interview Transcript – Subject 17, Paragraph 57).  
 
Commercial MFIs and the Narratives of Microfinance    
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The evidence from the interview with the commercial CEO demonstrates that the narrative 
of the entrepreneur, whilst disproven and disliked by the CEO, was useful in promoting their 
business. The commercial MFIs were not obliged to lend for enterprise purposes yet the 
commercial CEO used the entrepreneurial narrative to open the interview and promote their 
business. The CEO was direct in saying that their loans were not for development or social 
good, yet their website shared the positive associations of the narrative of entrepreneurship.  
I argue that the CEO understood the value of the narrative of entrepreneurship and used it to 
associate the commercial MFI with the positive framing the NGOs had in Egypt. The 
commercial CEO was clear that they believed that entrepreneurship could not solve the 
greater problems of unemployment in Egypt. That was the role of the government and the 
industrial sector. The role they saw for their MFI was to be the banker to the low income 
employed, not the provider of jobs through microenterprises.  
 
The evidence from the IFI and commercial MFI interviews demonstrates that the industry 
understands the wider value of the narrative of entrepreneurship in maintaining the 
hegemony of microfinance in Egypt. The IFIs promote the narrative above that of their global 
financial inclusion narrative and the commercial MFIs use it to associate themselves with the 
positive environment for NGOs. The narrative of entrepreneurship is widely promoted by the 
IFIs and the Government of Egypt. This gives it significant value for commercial MFIs. The 
narrative of entrepreneurship is much more persuasive when promoting microfinance to a 
general audience especially when there is growing unemployment. The commercial MFI used 
the positive associations of the entrepreneurial narrative to cover their lending of 
consumption loans to the poor. The evidence shows the commercial MFI uses the narrative 
of entrepreneurship to maintain the hegemony of microfinance in Egypt. It is used not 
because commercial MFIs are unable to make consumption loans but because high interest 
debt to the poor is something that is not yet considered palatable when there is growing 
unemployment and a chance of unrest.  
 
The Market Makers, Good vs Bad – The Conclusion  
 
From the data gathered in my interviews with MFI CEOs, I argue that both groups understand 
the value of narratives. They rely on them to support their business and maintain the 
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hegemony of microfinance. The NGO CEOs are mandated by law to lend for enterprise 
purposes and therefore promote the narrative of entrepreneurship to enable the 
continuation of their business. The entrepreneurial narrative is not hegemonic amongst the 
NGO CEOs. They argue that they should be able to provide social loans to the poor and assign 
social good to those loans through the narrative of financial inclusion. The interview with the 
commercial CEO reinforced my argument that the narrative of entrepreneurship is hegemonic 
at a policy level. Despite personally rejecting it in the interview, their organisation promotes 
it publicly to associate with the well-perceived NGO sector.    
 
I argue that at a CEO level, the narrative of financial inclusion is hegemonic. Evidence 
demonstrated that the CEOs were certain that their loans for school fees, health care, and 
other types of consumption had great social value to their clients and their communities. 
Using Gramsci’s notion of the base and the superstructure, the evidence demonstrates that 
the process of shaping senso comune is part of a reciprocal process between the two. The 
economic conditions of the base, which is reinforced by the superstructure, have conditioned 
the CEOs to not question the issues that the poor may face in borrowing high interest loans 
for basic services like health. The neoliberal conditions created by the SAP and CPF have 
financialised poverty and created a market for the MFIs. Within that process, the NGOs have 
assigned a social good to their loans with a narrative. The findings show that the narrative of 
entrepreneurship is used to comply with the law but the narrative of financial inclusion is 
hegemonic at this level.   
 
The commercial MFI which participated in this thesis rejected the IFI driven narratives of both 
entrepreneurship and financial inclusion. They were clear that their loans were filling a gap in 
demand and they offered them to maximise the shareholder value of the MFI. From 
experience, they were clear that entrepreneurship loans were ineffective and were continued 
only because of egos at the IFIs. They were also clear that there was no social good in their 
consumption loans, incomes were constrained, people wanted to consume, and they were a 
financial provider. I argue that despite the strong rejection of narratives, the commercial MFI 
benefits from the positive associations of the entrepreneurial narrative to endorse their loans 
and grow their business. I argue that the commercial MFI chooses the narrative of 
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entrepreneurship, rather than financial inclusion, because it is difficult to attribute real social 
value to loans.  
 
At an NGO CEO level, the narrative of financial inclusion is hegemonic. The positive 
associations of loans to the poor through this narrative is present in the senso comune of the 
CEOs. Whilst the entrepreneurial narrative is hegemonic at a policy level, illustrated by IFI 
representatives, this hegemony is not seen amongst the NGO CEOs. They reject the idea but 
promote the narrative to comply with the law. The hegemony of the entrepreneurial narrative 
at a policy level is reinforced by the fact that the commercial MFIs in Egypt use it to promote 
their business. There is a shared understanding amongst the CEOs that the entrepreneurial 
narrative has a value and they rely on it in different ways to maintain the hegemony of 
microfinance. Narratives are shown throughout as a valuable tool in covering the 
financialisation of poverty.  
 
The data from this chapter has furthered the understanding of how the industry relies on 
narratives and has contributed to the answering of my research question. The perceptions of 
the MFI CEOs have demonstrated how they promote narratives to achieve a goal related 
directly to the position or profitability of their organisation. The next chapter will track those 
narratives further down the chain of the microfinance industry and explore how they 
resonate with MFI loan officers. The aim is to better understand whether on the ground the 
















In understanding the role of narratives in the maintenance of the hegemony of microfinance 
in Egypt, I wanted to look at all levels of the microfinance industry. The IFI and CEO interviews 
demonstrated that the narratives themselves are hegemonic among certain groups and they 
are understood to have significant value for the industry in allowing it to operate profitably 
as a development policy. MFI loan officers are the first line of the consumers of hegemony 
(Cox, 1983) and whilst they work for the MFIs who form part of civil society, I do not consider 
them part of the mechanism of hegemony. I interviewed six loan officers, each sharing their 
perceptions and perspectives of microfinance, and how they understood it for their clients. 
Loan officers are the least frequently discussed part of the microfinance industry despite 
them holding the direct connection between MFI and borrower. I sought to test the extent 
the narratives exist on the ground, as well as understand whether the narratives themselves 
are present in the senso comune of the loan officers. The loan officers interviewed have 
provided both consumption and enterprise loans. Their insight into the reasons why 
borrowers take loans provided me with an understanding of the realities underneath the 
narratives and contributed to the answering of the research question.   
 
The Participants  
 
Loan officers form the first of the two tiers that I term the consumers of hegemony. Whilst 
they are employed by the MFIs, they themselves are different from the CEOs and distant from 
the policy levels of microfinance. Of all the groups that participated in this thesis, loan officers 
were the most difficult to reach. Six loan officers participated: three from NGOs, one from a 
commercial provider, and two from religious MFIs that lend money as part of their Zakat 
programme. The MFIs they work for are spread across Cairo, Alexandria, and the Nile delta 
region. Four of the loan officers are male and two were female. The loan officers are of 
particular interest because they interact with both the policy makers and those that the policy 
makers talk of. The organisations the loan officers work for are the promotors of the 
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narratives in Egypt yet they play a role far removed from the corporate offices by lending 
directly to the borrowers. The loan officers are local staff, confirmed by the CEOs as being 




Microfinance loan officers are the least researched aspect of microfinance. Whilst loan 
officers are a critical part of the mechanism of microfinance, their roles are often studied from 
an MFI performance perspective which looks at how loan officers are critical for 
organisational stability or portfolio growth. Loan officers are rarely questioned on the realities 
of their work or the outcomes for their borrowers. Loan officers, like borrowers, are often 
addressed in the literature through statistical analysis researching how they are managed, 
how they manage clients, their workloads, and how they could be more effective. Seldom are 
the voices of loan officers heard in the story of microfinance.  
 
One of the few studies that does take a qualitative approach to researching loan officers is 
Juliana Siwale’s work (2007; 2016) in Zambia. Her work observes the day-to-day challenges 
that loan officers face in working with and managing poor clients, especially solidarity groups. 
Siwale provides insight into the social and cultural aspects that make up being an MFI loan 
officer. Siwale’s work is critical of MFIs in a number of ways, pointing out the pressure put 
upon loan officers to pursue repayment through aggressive or inappropriate methods and the 
stresses faced by them going about collecting loans, especially delinquent loans. As loan 
officers were often from the same local areas that they worked in, they faced considerable 
anxiety and community isolation when they had to use the police and confiscate assets as 
part of their role as ‘debt collector’. There was considerable emotional stress placed upon 
loan officers as they had to suppress any feelings of compassion for their clients that defaulted 
so they could confiscate possessions or forcibly collect money. These defaulters were often 
people who the loan officer would see daily, regardless of their work (Siwale, 2007).  
 
Siwale’s work accepts the view that MFIs perform a social good. Despite the complex 
discussion of power and gender relations involved in enforcing the collection of delinquent 
debt from the poor, there is no consideration that microfinance itself might be a problem 
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within her work. The findings contribute to the earlier studies which claim microfinance relies 
on patriarchal societies  (Duvendack, Palmer-Jones and Vaessen, 2014), yet her proposed 
solution is not that microfinance is not fit for purpose. Siwale proposes that there are more 
female loan officers to provide a gender balance in loan collection. The conclusions of the 
studies are said to have “added to the literature that highlights the importance and complex 
work of alleviating global poverty through microfinance”. Siwale suggests the “strengthening 
of the people side of the equation will go a long way to ensuring that microfinance institutions 
do their part and remain financially sustainable” (2007: 24).  
 
Perhaps the most comprehensive and insightful study of loan officers is that of Sohini Kar 
(2018). In her ethnography of Indian MFIs, Kar demonstrates how MFIs and loan officers 
capitalise on the poverty of their clients. Kar’s deep insight into the operations of MFIs in India 
uncovers the use of shame and embarrassment by male loan officers to enforce repayment 
by female borrowers and details the toll that takes on both loan officer and borrower. Kar’s 
work also facilitates an understanding of the processes by which loan officers make their 
decisions. Loan officers observe tiny details of borrower’s lives, from whether they drink 
alcohol to how clean their house is, and from their marital status to their existing collection 
of electronic equipment. Kar talks of the moral economy of credit, where she observes how 
social and cultural constructions of worthiness determine loans rather than any objective 
process. Her embedded work provides access to the realities of MFI operations, the 
descriptions of which fall far short of the narratives the MFIs promote.  
 
The only other significant or notable piece of qualitative literature focused on loan officers is 
produced by the Pakistan Microfinance Network, funded by UKAID and Citi Bank (Aziz, 2015). 
The study aimed to learn lessons from the ‘foot soldiers’ and was designed to inform MFIs 
and interested parties at a policy level. The study provided insight into perceptions and 
motivations of loan officers, most of whom were noted as being from a “modest economic 
background being hired from the local communities in which they work” (2015:4). The study 
found that loan officers were successful when they themselves could portray the “right kind 
of social and financial discipline” (2015:1) in their areas. Aziz also noted that loan officers had 
“limited understanding of the objectives of microfinance sector and philosophy behind its 
existence” (2015: 11). I argue that this justifies their position in this thesis as consumers rather 
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than mechanisms of hegemony. I found it difficult to access loan officers for research, which 
might explain the limited availability of studies that focus on them. Alternatively, the industry 
could be avoiding publicising their perspectives and critical researchers might not have fully 
understood the insight they provide.  
 
The Underpinnings  
 
In the second level of interviews for my thesis, I wanted to change the focus from the 
promotion of the narratives to their reception. Through the loan officers, I wanted to better 
understand how the narratives resonated with them and how they were reflective of the 
reality they saw of microfinance. The hegemony of the narratives at this level would be 
demonstrated if they were present in the loan officers collective senso comune. The role of 
the narratives would be understood by their perceptions of their clients’ activities. Previous 
research identified that loan officers’ motivation for working for MFIs was primarily to do with 
limited alternatives and the job being a reasonably well-paid position. The same study 
indicated they were disconnected from the philosophy of microfinance (Aziz, 2015). If loan 
officers promote the narratives of microfinance, then the value of the narrative in maintaining 
hegemony permeates deep into the microfinance industry. If the loan officer’s responses 
suggest that the narratives are not present, then the hegemony of microfinance is maintained 
on the ground by a different mechanism, one that will be explored in the interviews with the 
borrowers in the following chapter.   
 
Building on the previous two chapters which demonstrated the promotion of the narratives 
of microfinance, this chapter explores how or if they shape reality. The IFIs claimed that 
microfinance had a role in supporting entrepreneurship and addressing the issues of 
unemployment. The CEOs of the MFIs claimed they were providers of financial inclusion, a 
social good for the poor. Loan officers are well placed to identify the end use of loans. Further, 
their views and perceptions of microfinance on the front line provide valuable insight into 
how the narratives are reflected in reality. Through the loan officers I sought to understand 
what remains of the narrative when the borrower meets the MFI. The answers from the loan 
officers will address the research question from a different perspective than the IFIs and CEOs. 
Their perspectives will not determine how at a policy level microfinance is perceived but 
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reveal in practice why the borrowers borrow. For the purpose of understanding this analysis, 
respondents 08 and 09 had the CEO from their MFI present at the time of interview. Their 
presence may have influenced their responses.   
 
The core codes I developed for my research are maintained at the loan officer level. They 
were as follows:  
 
• Entrepreneurship – The narrative promoted by the organisations the loan officers work 
for, these were described as business loans by the participants. I sought to understand 
how loan officers perceive the narrative and see it replicated amongst their clients. The 
analysis gives critical insight into how the narratives are received by the borrowers and 
how that reflects in their use of their microloan.   
• Poverty Alleviation – Complimentary to the entrepreneurial narrative, the MFIs claim their 
loans assist in the alleviation of poverty in Egypt. How the loan officers explained their 
client’s experiences of poverty and its alleviation assisted in the understanding of what 
they perceived the role of microfinance to be in their clients' lives.   
• Financial Inclusion and Consumption – From the perspective of the loan officers, this is 
related directly to consumption. The narrative of financial inclusion and the positive 
attributes of debt from a social inclusion perspective was not present in their 
understanding of microfinance. I questioned the loan officers to explore whether they 
assigned any of the positive attributes outlined in the financial inclusion narrative to the 
loans they offered to their clients.  
 
The core codes were complemented by a specific code generated from this set of interview 
data. It was developed as the analysis progressed. The method was still deductive, using the 
original codes as a reference but drawing in a new unique code for the loan officers. The non-
core code was:  
 
• Family Status – Loan officers were frequently talking of the status of the families they 
had as clients. Status seemed to be associated with wealth and even the employment 
of family members such as husbands or children. Family status could be elevated by 
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borrowing, further status was attributed to them being successful borrowers. Loan 
officers indicated an intangible but real change in borrower’s psychological wellbeing, 
deeply tying microfinance ideas of self-fulfilment through capitalist means. If 
borrowing raised someone’s status internally and externally, then the ideas of 
neoliberalism are hegemonic and microfinance is a tool of this hegemony.  
 
Entrepreneurship and Poverty Alleviation  
 
Some people don’t have any schooling, no training in anything so their option is buying 
and selling things on a small scale (Interview Transcript - Subject 09, Paragraph 18).  
 
We have unemployment problems and that is where we can help. Our clients don’t 
have jobs, often they had jobs before, but they are no longer employed, sometimes 
new graduates too. If there are no jobs in the market, then our services can give 
opportunities to people who are without jobs. They start working for themselves, they 
can earn money for their family, these are the chances we have here (Interview 
Transcript - Subject 08, Paragraph 51 - 53).  
 
They come as a group, together with the plans and I review them. It is important for 
me that the whole group have viable plans, because if there is a weakness in the group 
it causes problems for all………...They should all have good plans, and all be committed 
to the idea (Interview Transcript - Subject 08, Paragraph 14).  
 
Each one [woman] has an idea, a business, sometimes they worked in it for long, some 
people want to start something. I meet with the group and process these cases, 
evaluate them and see the viable cases. I can then support the group loan to the 
manager, and he can approve (Interview Transcript - Subject 09, Paragraph 6).  
 
For the loan officers who I interviewed with the CEOs present, the narrative of 
entrepreneurship was well embedded and well understood. The CEOs ensured that the loan 
officers demonstrated an understanding of the narrative and its impact. In contrast, those 
loan officers who were unaccompanied explained that it was just their obligation to ask if a 
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client was running a business. Loan officers found the question of running a business 
unimportant in their daily work because they were instructed to complete income and formal 
employment assessments on the clients and their families. The loan officers confirmed that 
the MFIs would not rely on income from a microenterprise to repay a loan. Income needed 
to be from formal employment, rendering the entrepreneurial narrative irrelevant. As I 
argued in the previous chapters, MFIs promote the narrative of entrepreneurship only to 
comply with the law and because of its positive associations. Loans are granted based on the 
family’s ability to repay from income from employment, meaning that entrepreneurship 
lending is only accessible to the employed poor.   
 
It is mostly a trading business that they say, usually from the home, for me it isn’t too 
important as I know the repayment can come from their other income. So, if the 
business is successful or not, it doesn’t matter too much (Interview Transcript - Subject 
33, Paragraph 13).  
 
Sometimes there are other jobs, husband has a job, wife has a job, children work, we 
get to know the whole family (Interview Transcript Subject 04, Paragraph 10 - 11).  
 
I lend money to people because I can see they have jobs, or their husband has a job, 
their children have jobs. If it was just the business, I am not sure, I think unless it was 
one, I could see or I knew, I don’t think I would lend money to them (Interview 
Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 34 - 35).  
 
The NGO loan officers explained that granting loans under the new 2014 law had added a 
layer of paperwork to their process but had not specifically changed anything else. They now 
had audit processes to follow, which proved that they were following the terms of the law 
and granting loans only for enterprise purposes. As I continued my research and interviewed 
borrowers, I discovered that loan officers encourage borrowers to sign the paperwork 
pretending they have a business. Occasionally, loan officers would coach borrowers on what 
to say so they comply with the rules and could access a loan. My research demonstrates that 
at a loan officer level, in the absence of the CEO, the narrative of entrepreneurship is not 
reflective of microfinance reality. The 2014 law has created no more than a new 
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administrative burden and the loans NGOs offered are still assessed against income from 
employment.  
 
We have a list of questions we need to ask and answer for our audit process, we fill 
out the questions on a form and that allows us to understand the business (Interview 
Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 20).  
 
That is what they say, it is usually that the wife says she will sell somethings in her local 
area, sometimes clothes, veg, these sorts of things…………It is important that we only 
lend to businesses, by law that is how we have to operate, so what I need to know for 
my manager is that there is a business within the family (Interview Transcript - Subject 
33, Paragraph 23 - 25).  
 
It was clear that entrepreneurial microfinance had been tried in Egypt. One unaccompanied 
loan officer shared a story of a client who had tried to run a business with a loan. The story 
not only explained some of the unacknowledged challenges the poor face when they are 
trying to run a business but also was stated as the reason the MFI no longer lent for enterprise 
purposes, despite being an NGO. The narrative of entrepreneurship depoliticises poverty and 
simplifies the environment in which borrowers are situated. From the earliest conception, the 
microfinance industry constructs an environment where there is no competition and no wider 
economic conditions to address. The narrative asserts that all that start an enterprise will be 
successful. This is not a reflection of the often hostile political economy within which the poor 
operate (Wood, Maitrot and Devine, 2016:7). The loan officers demonstrated that on the 
ground in Egypt, business activities take place in a highly competitive environment, 
competition locally as well as more desirable cheaper imports from China. The promoters of 
the narrative of entrepreneurship, the IFIs, have facilitated the liberalisation of trade in the 
CPF which has, in turn, created an increasingly competitive environment for any Egyptian 
entrepreneurs, micro or otherwise.  
 
She has the sewing machine, she says I am really good with it, I can make bed sheets, 
but suddenly, she found out that people, want something different. Something 
already made, something like that, they are cheap from China. At some point, she told 
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us that no, the people in the neighbourhood, they either don’t want, or they cannot 
pay (Interview Transcript Subject 03, Paragraph 41).  
 
One of the main reasons the loan officers explained why entrepreneurial microfinance failed 
to work from an organisational perspective was the fact it took up too much time. Loan 
officers had sales targets and were driven to meet those, visiting homes to verify businesses 
was unrealistic given their portfolios and their targets. Furthermore, they were measured 
against loan repayments, so verifying a loan against an income was a more certain way of 
ensuring repayment. MFIs have often used repayment as a measure of the success of 
microfinance, conflating repayment with generating income and employment. This was one 
of the key associations that drove the narrative at the outset of microfinance. If loans were 
being repaid, borrowers were creating jobs and escaping poverty (Kochar, 1997; Khandker, 
2003; Karlan and Zinman, 2009). The loan officers told of a different reality, they were busy 
and sales target driven. They were rewarded for successful repayment. Securing loans against 
employment income made sense to them and any enterprise was irrelevant. Yet, at an MFI 
level, the narrative of entrepreneurship would infer that the repayment of loans meant 
successful microenterprises. Kar (2018) found similar outcomes in India, loan officers would 
focus on repayment statistics over tracking the use of the loan. Repayment was key to success 
in their roles and income from employment was key to repayment.   
 
My main role is sales, our office must make 100 new loans each week, that is the 
target. We are 5 so we need to make 20 each, it takes a lot of time. We are based 
there reviewing the business cases and getting loans approved. Once that is done and 
the loan is approved it is up to them (Interview Transcript Subject 04, Paragraph 38 - 
39).  
 
Well, what is critical for us is repayment statistics. We have repayment measures, for 
us if our clients are repaying then we are succeeding as an office. That is one of our 
measures. The manager keeps a check on the loans being repaid, then we know that 
the clients are working. We know we are making good decisions if the client is repaying 
(Interview Transcript Subject 04, Paragraph 46 - 47).  
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All I can see is that our loans get repaid, that is my measure of their success. But I don’t 
know about the business, I have no time for reviews or looking at the premises, so I 
can just see repayment is OK and I am OK (Interview Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 
26 - 27).  
 
In the previous chapters, I investigated the IFIs and CEOs perception of the role training can 
play in entrepreneurship and microfinance. I asked the loan officers how their clients 
responded to being sold training packages. The majority of loan officers were unable to 
understand why the majority of their clients would need training. They explained that they 
had not yet been mandated by their MFIs to offer the training services as compulsory with 
loans but felt that would come. Currently they avoided pushing the training on clients because 
they understood the loans were not for enterprises. One of the loan officers who was with 
the CEO explained that they offered training to clients. They also said that they had to spend 
considerable time explaining to clients why they would find the training valuable. The CEO 
stepped in and explained that they were in the process of working with the IFIs to get the 
content of the training to be more suitable for their clients and that currently the curriculum 
was not suitable for borrowers. The interruption of the CEO in the interview indicated that 
the sale of training packages was forced upon loan officers and the loan officers did not 
understand its value to the MFI or the borrower.  
 
They can learn financial skills, marketing, basic things like stock rotations, some of 
them are new and don’t understand these concepts. We promote these trainings for 
clients to help them, others don’t do this, and they see problems with their clients. 
This is why we are different and successful (Interview Transcript - Subject 08, 
Paragraph 25).  
 
I spend time explaining to them [borrowers] how valuable the training can be to them 
(Interview Transcript - Subject 08, Paragraph 26 - 27). 
 
It’s something we need to work on, we are working with our partners on this and 
getting an idea of how to make it more effective for clients (Interview Transcript – CEO 
of Subject 08, Paragraph 28).  
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Financial Inclusion and Consumption Lending  
 
Up until recently, we gave loans for anything, if they could pay the loan back, from a 
job or a business we would lend them money. For shopping, TVs, Internet installation, 
for the school fees, anything (Interview Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 40). 
 
I think all of them. I don’t remember from the beginning, like 2008 or whenever, but 
3 or 4 years ago, all of my loans were for spending on needs, shopping, weddings, Eid, 
things for the home (Interview Transcript - Subject 04, Paragraph 36).  
 
Financial inclusion as a term was not one that the loan officers were familiar with. They 
discussed the loans as loans for consumption, demonstrating the role of narratives at a policy, 
not practice, level (Aziz, 2015). The loan officers did not assign any social value to the loans 
as their CEOs did. The officers saw them as loans that the borrowers could afford to spend on 
what they wanted. The loan officers would assess the family income and make the loan 
accordingly. It was a straightforward financial transaction. The loan officers were clearly 
aware of the law change and they were sure to articulate that they no longer offer loans for 
consumption. They explained that their lending assessments had not changed. They still 
assessed income from employment but they did have new paperwork to complete. The 
borrowers were now asked to sign forms claiming the loans were for running a business. The 
loan officers also explained that despite the law change, they still had the majority of the 
same borrowers now as they had before the law. The loan officers implied that they were 
aware that their clients were just creating a business story and signing the papers to be able 
to take a loan. In Kar’s (2018) ethnography, she notes that discrepancies in stated and actual 
loan uses are frequently overlooked by loan officers. In this case, it was not that the difference 
was overlooked it was that it was encouraged. What really mattered to the loan officers was 
the fact that the borrowers could repay.  
 
But why I am telling you, maybe 70% of my clients, I still have from before. I used to 
lend them money for school fees or at Eid for the feast, but now I am lending them 
money for a business from their home, I don’t know really. What is important for me 
 174 
is can they repay it, many I have known for a long time, I know they can repay so I am 
comfortable (Interview Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 31).  
 
I don’t know, I don’t visit them, they come to me, I can only tell you what they tell me. 
But I do know many of them, like I said, from a long time, people who always borrow 
money in the summer to pay for the school, still come in August for a loan (Interview 
Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 33).  
 
The loan officers were aware of their legal obligation to offer enterprise loans only. Therefore, 
most stopped short of claiming their current loans were used for things other than enterprise. 
The fungibility of money, along with limited time and large portfolios, meant they could rely 
on vagueness to cover their activities. The key factor for loan officers as always was the 
borrower’s ability to repay (D’Espallier, Guérin and Mersland, 2011).  
 
Of course, how can anyone know all things. It is hard to track, people can do many 
things, many things they need. Some sure need to run their business, maybe some 
have other issues alongside. Sometimes we know they buy other things because we 
see them with things, a motorbike, but what can we do now? Maybe that is to get 
them to their job or for deliveries. The important factor is that they can repay 
(Interview Transcript Subject 04, Paragraph 51).  
 
Given the terms of the narrative of financial inclusion were not something that the loan 
officers understood, I asked how important they felt the loans were to their clients. The loan 
officers understood that the rising cost of living for their clients meant that they needed loans 
for access to goods and services they otherwise would have to save for (Dichter and Harper, 
2007). The loan officers did not reflect the narrative of financial inclusion that their CEOs 
promoted. The loans were not considered by the officers as a social good, they were a tool 
for those with a constrained income to expand their consumption because life in Egypt was 
becoming more and more expensive.  
 
Many people owe money because life here is becoming expensive (Interview 
Transcript Subject 05, Paragraph 13 - 14).  
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By getting things. Yes, they do, they can’t always afford those things, like school fees 
are expensive in one payment, so for sure they do so their children can go to good 
schools (Interview Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 42 - 43).  
 
Mostly they have jobs, some for the government, some for companies. Everyone 
spends more than they earn, if you have a family in Cairo, it is expensive, so they don’t 
have everything for sure, but they are not hungry (Interview Transcript - Subject 33, 
Paragraph 49).  
 
Evidence from my research demonstrates that the narrative of financial inclusion, especially 
the assignment of social good to loans, fails to reach beyond the policy and CEO level (Aziz, 
2015). Loan officers provided loans predominantly to the low-income poor for them to spend 
on goods and basic services. There was no attributed value to the loans. The CEOs claims of 
inclusion were not reflected: the borrowers needed and wanted the loans, but they did not 
have a value above their financial utility (Dichter and Harper, 2007). The loan officers were 
salespeople. Even those that worked for NGOs had their minds on maximising the number of 
loans granted and getting the maximum amount repaid (Siwale, 2007). The privatisation of 
basic services meant the clients needed more loans and this meant the loan officers could sell 
more loans. The changing of the economic base for the borrowers meant that loan officers 
could lend more money. The narratives played no role at this level, for the loan officers nor 
the borrowers. The SAP and CPF had created a neoliberal environment for the people of 
Egypt. This was the reality and there was no need for a narrative in maintaining the hegemony 
of microfinance amongst the poor.  
 
Most of my clients come every year, sometimes a few times and borrow money for all 
things. If they need healthcare they can borrow, for school they can borrow, if their 
wife wants something new for the house they can borrow. So, it helps them a lot, 
otherwise maybe they couldn’t get treatment when they are sick or would not be able 
to send their children to a good school. These are important things for people, it helps 
them manage (Interview Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 50 - 51) 
 
 176 
Family Status  
 
Throughout the interviews with the loan officers, I observed certain terms and language that 
were not necessarily reflective of the narratives of microfinance but were value statements 
associated with debt. The loan officers deeply associated loans and being a successful 
borrower with one’s family status. Those of a higher status could borrow reliably and those 
of a lower status could not be relied upon, reflecting findings of Kar (2018: 148). Those from 
a lower status that did borrow could see their status raised. Status was presented by the loan 
officers as self-fulfilment through personal consumption and asset accumulation. Value 
judgements were made arbitrarily about the deservedness of the borrowers and how they 
lived was measured before the loan officers would lend. Decisions of the loan officers used 
local cultural assessments of borrowers to determine who was creditworthy and who not, 
using values rather than due process (Thompson, 1971).  
 
The loan officers selected who was a deserving person and who was not. This was counter to 
the narrative their CEOs presented. Microfinance was supposed to be universal and non-
judgmental. The loan officers’ responses demonstrated the exclusionary nature of 
microfinance, working to directly exclude those they were supposed to be including. This 
illustrated that the components of narrative of financial inclusion are challenged in reality as 
the loan officers demonstrated that the conditions for financial inclusion were underlying 
social and cultural forces. The loan officers had unofficially created a system of values by 
which they would lend money. I found this reflective of the idea of the moral economy argued 
by Thompson (1991). This value-driven assessment was particularly challenging to the policy 
narrative of entrepreneurship. Low status, in the words of the loan officers, was defined as 
those that do not have a job. The actions of the loan officers illustrate how realities on the 
ground are far removed from the policy level where narratives support the maintenance of 
the hegemony of microfinance. On the ground, the loan officers’ actions demonstrate that it 
is not narratives that give microfinance its hegemony but the underlying economic base that 
has been altered to conform to neoliberal policies.  
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We meet the family; we look at their living and their life and we decide if they deserve 
help. We look at their family, any income or anything and decide (Interview Transcript 
Subject 03, Paragraph 15).  
 
I speak with the family, ask questions, get to know their status, their income, all of the 
details about the family (Interview Transcript Subject 04, Paragraph 7).  
 
If their income is low, they have some problems that we think they cannot commit to 
repayments. In some cases, the family have bad conditions and they cannot commit 
to the loan, we see from the start that they will not repay (Interview Transcript Subject 
04, Paragraph 16 - 17).  
 
I then ask them questions about where they live, their flat, their jobs. To gauge the 
status, if they can afford to repay. Then if I am satisfied, I get the paperwork ready and 
they sign (Interview Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 11).  
 
A feeling let’s say, if there is no other income in the family, they are low status, then 
no I will not lend the money (Interview Transcript - Subject 33, Paragraph 38 - 39).  
 
The evidence is reflective of the findings of Kar’s work in India (2018) where loan officers were 
observed making arbitrary decisions on granting loans based on the lack of “class” or because 
a borrower’s “home was dirty”. The narratives of microfinance are proven to be just 
narratives at the point they are operationalised. Loan officers’ prerogatives can deny 
entrepreneurs an opportunity or exclude those looking to be included, this is the reality, and 
it is not reflective of the narratives. If low status borrowers were able to borrow, the act of 
borrowing and successfully repaying is said to improve their status socially. The loan officers 
explained this as a key positive impact on borrowers, they had the ability to socially improve 
through debt.  
 
When I was analysing this data, I observed the linking of social status and debt and reflected 
on its deeper connection to neoliberalism. The loan officers attributed self-worth to being 
able to successfully navigate a capitalist economy. The economic base in Egypt had many 
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neoliberal components, the superstructure had normalised consumption and debt 
accumulation and this condition was highlighted by the loan officers’ views of their clients. 
This was not the narrative of financial inclusion as promoted by the CEOs but in a deeper way 
it indicated that it was in the senso comune of the loan officers that social improvement came 
from debt and consumption. The loan officers assert that people can become “decent” people 
through borrowing, normalising debt and the financialisation of poverty.  
   
Many of my clients are better off in this sense, socially they improve (Interview 
Transcript Subject 05, Paragraph 45 - 46).  
 
He feels like, I am someone, like I am a decent person now (Interview Transcript 
Subject 03, Paragraph 67 - 69),  
 
Social status and financial inclusion were directly linked by loan officers to formal jobs and 
employment, not to entrepreneurship. Loan officers confirmed they would not lend to those 
families without jobs, again directly rejecting the narrative of entrepreneurship. Loan officers 
clearly state that formal employment, not entrepreneurship, is the solution to unemployment 
and poverty for their clients, illustrating the value of the narrative only at a policy level. More 
broadly, the loan officers asserted that those without jobs could not borrow money, could 
not build meaningful lives. According to the narrative, they could not be financially included. 
This further illustrated that narratives at the implementation stage are not relevant, they are 
consumed only at policy levels. For loan officers, jobs were associated with all of the key status 
symbols in Egypt, most notably housing, marriage, and a family. If the unemployed did not 
find formal employment, then they could not get married or plan a family.  
 
In my opinion, the government should provide employment, work for the people, but 
this is out of my hands. They need jobs with salaries, things are more and more 
expensive here, life is becoming very difficult, people need to have jobs so they can 
plan (Interview Transcript Subject 05, Paragraph 52).  
 
People want to marry, have families, this is culture. You can’t marry if you have no 
money, no job, it’s impossible (Interview Transcript Subject 05, Paragraph 52).  
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From their point of view, they prefer to have a stable work. To earn somehow, good 
money, instead of being at the risk of the loans. He will feel, our mentality here, our 
culture, they need stable work, they need work each month, each month I will have 
this salary (Interview Transcript Subject 03, Paragraph 75).  
 
Conclusions from the Front Line  
 
In interviewing the loan officers for this chapter, it was evident that both entrepreneurship 
and financial inclusion narratives of microfinance had no impact on the ground. The 
entrepreneurial opportunities and the inclusive nature of finance that was assigned to the 
loans by the IFIs but the CEOs failed to reach the front line and were far removed from the 
realities that the loan officers shared. The loan officers that worked for NGOs were aware of 
their legal obligations under the 2014 law but saw it as additional paperwork to allow them 
to continue to serve their existing market. The financial inclusion narrative that the loan 
officers’ CEOs discussed was not reflected in the responses from the loan officers themselves. 
The loans were provided to expand consumption and to enable borrowers to pay for basic 
services that were now privatised under the CPF. There was no social good assigned. Whilst 
the narratives of microfinance did not reach the front line, there was an aspect of inclusion 
that the loan officers explained. The loan officers each confirmed that social improvement 
and becoming someone “decent” could be achieved through borrowing. An individual’s status 
in their community was defined by their success as borrowers.  
 
Entrepreneurial microfinance had created an administrative burden for loan officers yet they 
continued to grant consumption loans in the same way they did before the law. The loan 
officers measured income from employment to grant enterprise loans, demonstrating the 
narrative and the reality are divergent. I argue that the narrative is redundant on the front 
line because loan officers confirmed that if the borrower had no job, then the MFIs would not 
lend, making it impossible even for real entrepreneurs to start a business with a loan.  
 
The narrative of financial inclusion, especially the assignment of social good to loans driven 
by the CEOs was also absent at the front line. Loan officers described loans as basic financial 
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transactions which they had targets to achieve. Their clients borrowed money to expand 
consumption, sometimes of goods and sometimes of basic services, many of which have been 
privatised under the SAP and CPF. The loan officers did reflect on the utility of the loans. The 
utility did not mirror a social good as described by the financial inclusion narrative. These 
findings provide me with evidence that illustrates the narratives play a role in the 
maintenance of hegemony at a policy level but on the ground the narratives play no role.  
 
Outside the narratives of microfinance, the loan officers explained how they used value 
judgements to assess loans. They told how a borrower’s status in the community was raised 
by being a good borrower. It was possible, through borrowing from an MFI, for individuals to 
become a “decent” person in the eyes of society. The loan officers classed borrowers as 
worthy or not and employment was a large part of this judgement. This demonstrates that 
when loans are granted on the front line, both the narratives of microfinance are redundant. 
A job is required for an enterprise loan, and those who are not worthy are excluded. I argue 
that what maintains the position of microfinance on the ground is the poor with constrained 
incomes and the continued privatisation of basic services. At a transactional level, 
microfinance is a tool to support structural adjustment and financialise poverty. The loans are 
not for a wider social purpose but are a necessity to exist in a neoliberal Egypt.  
 
In my interviews with the IFIs and CEOs, narratives played a role in their communication with 
me and with the wider policy discussions on microfinance. On the front line, the narratives 
are redundant and evidence from the loan officers shows that they lend to the low-income 
poor so they can access basic services which are now not provided by the state. The SAP and 
CPF have privatised much of the state’s service provision, which at a borrower level, as shown 
in the next chapter, has led to an increase in personal debt. I argue that the increase in 
personal debt and the rising importance of the microfinance sector in Egypt is reflective of 
Kotz’s (2008:2) theory of financialisation. My research has demonstrated that the 
microfinance industry relies on narratives at a policy level to cover the financialisation of 
poverty. The narratives of microfinance are not designed to affect the senso comune of those 
who borrow and the process of hegemony takes place in populations far removed from the 
borrowers. The narratives work to ensure that those removed from the realities are not 
appalled at the idea of making a profit from the poor. The reality from the loan officers has 
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demonstrated that irrespective of the narratives, the economic base within which the poor 
live has been altered to the point that microfinance is a necessity for them to manage their 
lives where poverty is financialised.  
 
In the following chapter, I explore this argument further, interviewing the last of the tiers of 
microfinance participants, the borrowers. I sought to explore how they understand 
microfinance, why they borrowed, and the outcomes they were expecting from their loans. 
The aim was to better understand whether the borrowers’ realities are reflected in the 
narratives of microfinance or whether they reflected financialised poverty where loans are 


























Microfinance borrowers as research subjects have been continually constructed and 
reconstructed within the narratives of microfinance. They are the most frequently talked 
about and least frequently talked to participants in the industry. They have been 
entrepreneurs as well as the financially included. The constructed identities of borrowers 
have been presented in the narratives of microfinance to maintain its hegemony. In this 
chapter, microfinance borrowers share their perceptions and experiences of microfinance in 
Egypt, focusing on how they understand or interpret the narratives. In interviewing 
borrowers, I sought to determine whether the narratives reflected their realities or, like with 
the loan officers, the narratives were far removed. I wanted to better understand whether 
narratives had a role in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance on the ground.  
 
I view the borrowers in Egypt to be of particular interest to my research into the narratives of 
microfinance. They have been recently recast by the IFIs, the Egyptian Government, and the 
MFIs as aspiring entrepreneurs. In my interviews with the IFIs and CEOs, the evidence 
illustrated that the narrative of entrepreneurship works as an overlay to support the 
Government of Egypt’s development plans and maintain the hegemony of microfinance at a 
policy level. The IFI representatives and the CEOs stated the limitations of the entrepreneurial 
narrative and concluded that their real interest was financial inclusion. I argue that after 
speaking with loan officers, financial inclusion in Egypt is tantamount to the financialisation 
of poverty. The financial inclusion narrative holds little meaning to loan officers, but they state 
that debt is now a necessity in the world they live in. Microfinance borrowers represent the 
point where narrative meets practice. I aim with this chapter to determine the role of 
narratives in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance amongst those who borrow and 
reflect on the difference in the role narratives play at a policy level.   
 
The Participants  
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The borrowers of microfinance are more likely to be from a highly vulnerable group and 
therefore careful considerations were made throughout the process of engaging with them. 
As detailed in the methodology chapter, the University of Bristol’s Research Ethics Guide 
provided tools to manage my research with the lowest possible risk of harm to borrowers. 
Voluntary informed consent was explained to all and given prior to the commencement of all 
interviews and all data was secured and anonymised to provide assurances to those that 
participated.  
 
Access to borrowers was facilitated through a number of channels, through the MFIs, by using 
my own contacts, and by snowballing from other participants. I interviewed 19 microfinance 
borrowers, the majority based in Cairo, two from the delta region and two from Alexandria. 
The borrowers were 60% women and 40% men, a lower percentage than the global average 
of women borrowers but in line with what has been said about the borrower profiles in Egypt. 
As previously stated, I made no assessment about the social status of the borrowers The aim 
was not to determine the success or failure of microfinance but to observe the narratives as 
they reach the ground. One of the borrowers that participated was recommended by an MFI 
CEO and they accompanied the borrower in this interview. This was of interest to me because 
the interview varied significantly from the other 18 borrowers I interviewed. To ensure I 
reflected a wider range of perspectives than those borrowers whom the CEOs wanted to 
introduce, I used personal and professional connections to reach other borrowers. 
Snowballing was used to expand the participant group and reach participants that were 
removed from my connections. I was accompanied by my research associate for the borrower 
interviews. The presence of a local woman helped in the introduction to borrowers, especially 
those that were female.  
 
The Underpinnings  
 
Like the analysis of the loan officers, the borrower’s interviews have been analysed to 
determine the extent to which narratives of microfinance are reflected in their perceptions. 
Interviews with IFI representatives and CEOs demonstrated that the narratives were present 
in their collective senso comune. They each promoted a narrative that they felt improved the 
lives of borrowers in certain ways. The loan officer interviews demonstrated that once 
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microfinance was removed from policy space, the narratives were redundant. What 
maintained the hegemony of microfinance in the view of loan officers was the fact that the 
poor needed loans to pay for life in neoliberal Egypt. I sought to understand the borrower’s 
perspectives on microfinance, whether they represented the entrepreneurial ambition they 
had placed upon them by policy or whether they felt their loans were now just a necessity in 
everyday life.   
 
To explore the perceptions of borrowers in Egypt, a random selection of participants were 
chosen using solely the criteria of being a microfinance borrower. The borrowers’ loan use 
that was stated at the outset of the interview broadly dictated the direction the interview 
went. Those who borrowed and stated they started a business discussed their perceptions of 
this. Those who borrowed for other reasons shared their thoughts on those reasons. Unlike 
in the previous chapters when individuals were asked about the multiple narratives, the 
interviews with borrowers, given their status, focused on the stated use of their loan only. As 
I analysed the data, two groups emerged which were aligned with the two narratives of 
microfinance. I considered those the two core codes. The codes respond specifically to the 
sub-questions of this thesis as they provide insight into why borrowers engage with 
microfinance. The codes were as follows:  
 
• Entrepreneurship – This was the original global narrative of microfinance, disproven 
by the IFIs but reintroduced to Egypt in 2014. Through assertive policies, marketing 
and promotion through NGOs, some of the participants stated they had started 
businesses with their loan because of encouragement from NGOs. There were varying 
degrees of detail offered indicating that whilst some tried to become an entrepreneur, 
others used it as a deflector to be able to access NGO loans. The responses were used 
to assess the reality of microfinance against the narrative of the entrepreneur and to 
understand how borrowers related to that narrative. 6 of the 19 borrowers were 
categorised in this group.  
• Financial Inclusion – The new global narrative of microfinance, part of the 
microfinance landscape in Egypt prior to 2014 and promoted by the IFIs there through 
the commercial microfinance sector. Borrowers whose response corresponded with 
the narrative of financial inclusion ranged from the low income employed who 
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borrowed for school fees and household goods etc. and were comfortable with the 
repayments. However, they also included those who had borrowed money for basic 
survival including food. The responses given were used to determine the realities of 
financialisation against the backdrop of the narrative of financial inclusion and to 
understand what maintains the hegemony of microfinance on the ground. 13 of the 
19 borrowers were categorized in this group.  
 
The borrowers’ interviews generated a further code. Whilst based on a small amount of data, 
it gave significant insight into how they perceive alternatives to microfinance. This data helps 
answer the research sub-questions and understand how individuals perceive microfinance 
within their wider political economy. The code is labelled alternatives to microfinance.   
 
• Alternatives to Microfinance – This code explored what participants stated as 
alternatives to microfinance when it came to employment. It illustrated the lack of 
engagement with the narrative of entrepreneurship and explored their perceived 
alternatives. The borrowers understanding of the ineffectiveness of self-employment 
to escape poverty demonstrated that the narrative of entrepreneurship only has value 
for those removed from the reality.  
 
Are they Entrepreneurs?  
The Posterchild  
 
We borrowed money for the next 2 machines, we borrowed, 10,000 L.E (US$ 625) and 
purchased 2 machines for two new people we needed because our demand from Cairo 
was growing (Interview Transcript – Subject 14, Paragraph 7). 
 
In what I argue was the CEO of an MFI promoting the narrative of entrepreneurship to me the 
researcher, the borrower accompanied by the CEO explained how they had used a loan to run 
their successful business. Within the 19 borrower interviews, the data from this participant 
was an outlier which presented the narrative of entrepreneurship in its textbook form. Their 
business employed c. 30 people at peak times, had used loans to buy machines and materials, 
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and made the owners family very comfortably off. The CEO presented the business as one of 
the successes of his MFI, a business that had been helped with both loans and training. The 
CEO had specifically selected this borrower for me to meet and it was not the first time the 
borrower had met an interested party. I argue that the CEO was presenting me with 
“evidence” that loans and training work.  
 
They [the borrower] were part of one of our cash management training programmes 
and also the bookkeeping. We had an opportunity to work with them and explain the 
cash cycle for their business as it was growing, how we could help with loans………We 
try and put everyone through our training programmes, because we see the value 
(Interview Transcript – Subject 14 Accompanying CEO, Paragraph 10). 
 
For me it was very important to understand this [cash flow management], we would 
have run out of money if we didn’t have the loan for stock (Interview Transcript – 
Subject 14, Paragraph 14). 
 
The borrower and the CEO were well-versed in presenting the value of microfinance loans to 
the business. The CEO explained how entrepreneurship was a clear hope for addressing 
unemployment. Given the business premises that the interview took place in, it was difficult 
to argue with what I was being presented. However, based on the evidence provided by each 
tier of interviewee, the example I was being shown was far removed from the realities of the 
majority of 1000 L.E (US$62) microfinance loans. The CEO was following examples set by the 
industry, mixing the SME and micro sector to demonstrate the narrative. It became clear in 
the interview that the borrower had not used a loan to become an entrepreneur but had 
inherited a family legacy from a traditional craftsman. The borrower confirmed that the first 
loan they took was 10,000 L.E (US$625) and was used to buy two specialist sewing machines 
when the company already had two. The business now had a loan of 50,000 L.E (US$3125) 
which it had used for materials and storage space. The borrower that the CEO had chosen 
was the exemplar of the narrative of entrepreneurship and reflective of the stories the 
industry has told to further the narrative. I argue that whilst these stories might be ‘true’, they 
are the exceptions and not representations of the realities for most borrowers.  
 
 187 
I started working with my father in the workshop. He had been working in the small 
site all his life, he taught me about leather and how to make things (Interview 
Transcript – Subject 14, Paragraph 5).  
 
This was an exceptional case selected by the CEO to demonstrate and promote the narrative 
of entrepreneurship to an outsider. It was not a reflection of the microfinance industry but a 
misrepresentation to promote the narrative. The example I was shown was an SME and not 
a microenterprise. As a researcher, I am interested in the SME sector and the role finance can 
play in the creation of jobs, but it is not microfinance as presented in the narrative. The 
evidence from my research as well as the literature shows the realities of microfinance being 
vastly different from this case. The 1000 L.E (US$62) average loan tells a different, less 
marketable story to the one in this example. The average microfinance borrower tells a story 
that is less compelling than the narrative would suggest.  
 
What Really Happens  
 
Eventually I decided to do it [take a loan], I had no other choice, I needed to find some 
work for rent and food (Interview Transcript - Subject 32, Paragraph 12). 
 
The stories told by the other five borrowers that stated they used their loan for 
entrepreneurial activities were less idealistic than the first interview described. The 
borrowers took loans of 1000 L.E (US$62) and were forced to attempt to start a business due 
to the lack of feasible alternatives. They were actively encouraged by an NGO MFI to take a 
loan and start a business. There was a theme across all the participants’ experiences of 
starting a business with a loan. It was clear the borrowers were not entrepreneurs according 
to the definition of the narrative. The narrative of entrepreneurship creates a falsehood about 
the capacity of the poor to not only be entrepreneurs but to also be successful ones. In the 
responses from the borrowers, the realities are significantly divergent.  
 
I didn’t really have a choice, I was looking for work, there was nothing for me to do, I 
had my family to care for, my husband works but he doesn’t earn much (Interview 
Transcript - Subject 31, Paragraph 14).  
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There was no option at that time. I worked for some families [as a cleaner] but because 
the economy is bad, they didn’t want me anymore. Some women here were meeting 
to go to a loan office to go and get loans, so I joined with them and went to the office 
(Interview Transcript - Subject 22, Paragraph 11).  
 
There were no jobs there anymore for us, so we did many different things, I tried 
working as a cleaner in a school, and also tried for a job in [Company Name]. There 
were no jobs for me there, and cleaning was not enough work for me. Then I tried this, 
now I am stuck with it until the loan is paid (Interview Transcript – Subject 21, 
Paragraph 53).  
 
The borrowers explained that they had been recruited to borrow money by NGOs that had 
been in their communities for many years. The NGOs had previously offered other types of 
social programmes, childcare and health checks. The loan office locations were trusted sites 
where the NGOs had previously shown their value to communities. The NGOs transformed 
their social centres into loan offices, started promoting loans for enterprise, and began to 
convince people, predominantly women, to take loans and start a business. The borrowers 
explained the NGOs worked to convince the women to start businesses which directly 
contradicts the narrative of entrepreneurship which claims a tacit demand for loans from 
poor entrepreneurs (Yunus, 1989, 1999). The NGOs cultivated borrowers to fit the narrative, 
not the other way around.   
 
They [NGO] used to give schools and doctors there [the loan office], then they started 
giving loans for us (Interview Transcript – Subject 21, Paragraph 13). 
 
They [the NGO] convinced me to take money and buy a sewing machine and make 
simple things to sell (Interview Transcript – Subject 21, Paragraph 17).  
 
The borrowers each claimed they ran simple home-based trading businesses; the businesses 
were described by borrowers not as a business but as a “distraction” or “a struggle”. The IFI 
representatives claimed in the interviews that the home-based businesses were useful tools 
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to assist the poor in earning extra money. The realities told by the borrowers did not reflect 
the narrative. The borrowers explained that their activities were ineffective at generating 
additional income and left them short of money when it came to loan repayments. The 
borrowers explained that trading took up considerable amounts of time, which was not 
reflected in the reward. They felt like they were wasting days for a small return. The reward 
was small but the borrowers did it out of necessity for food and basic services.  
 
I have no time for anything else, I leave my children alone to come here when they 
are not at school. I do all that work and for maybe 200 L.E (US$12) per month extra. 
We need it, for food and basics but it isn’t worth the time (Interview Transcript - 
Subject 31, Paragraph 28) 
 
I am trying each day to go and sell them, but this is the last time, it is a waste of my 
days, I am walking all day for nothing (Interview Transcript - Subject 22, Paragraph 27).  
 
The realities of entrepreneurship with microfinance were not as the narrative states. The 
borrowers all claimed they would stop their business once the loan was repaid although they 
did not say they would stop borrowing. Across the participants, there was a sense of 
insecurity. They were concerned about the repayments and where that money would come 
from. There was no sense of empowerment and an escape from poverty that the narrative 
had thrust upon them. They were uncertain of their immediate future and what that meant 
for their family.  
 
I don’t know, probably, yes. I can sell them all at the market on Friday, so I have the 
money for the repayment, if I am going to be able to make the repayment easily, it 
depends (Interview Transcript – Subject 21, Paragraph 43).  
 
I can’t pay back if I don’t have the money from selling. Then I am taking things from 
elsewhere to pay back the loan. My husband sometimes has work, so he can give some 




The narrative of the entrepreneur depoliticises poverty and casts its reduction as an 
individualistic task that requires only one input, capital. The complexities of life, especially a 
life of poverty is disregarded. Poverty is financialised and becomes an issue of capital (Yunus, 
1999:288). The borrowers’ accounts of running a bottom of the pyramid business told a 
different story about how the political economy they operated in was hostile and complex 
(Wood, Maitrot and Devine, 2016). The narrative of entrepreneurship assumes if the poor 
have something to sell, people will buy. The reality told by the borrowers was different. Just 
because someone had something to sell did not mean that people would buy. It was 
important for the seller to be known and in areas where they weren’t, they were unsuccessful. 
The narrative of entrepreneurship fails to account for the informal power structures that 
govern the environment in which the borrowers trade.  
  
There were serious problems with the people who run the streets, they don’t just let 
you sell things, you need to meet with them, talk to them, pay some money for them 
to let you. Any money that I had went to them, all of the rest of the loan. Just to be 
able to sell there (Interview Transcript - Subject 32, Paragraph 18).  
 
That is the problem here, I didn’t know that at the time, no one said anything to me. 
When I came, I realised there is a system, a hierarchy, politics, who can walk where, 
who can sit where. All these things mean that it is hard to get good business here 
(Interview Transcript - Subject 29, Paragraph 27 - 28).  
 
The borrowers I interviewed had paid to participate in training programmes to be able to 
access their loans. They explained that the courses were ineffective and poorly suited to the 
types of business they were going to run. The IFI developed training programmes were 
focused on bookkeeping, finances, and entrepreneurial skills. Whilst they might be suited to 
the business I interviewed at the outset of this chapter, they are unsuitable for the majority 
of borrowers. The curriculum was said to be poorly suited for their life but the training centres 
provided food and refreshments, so borrowers chose to stay. In my interviews with the IFIs, 
they claimed that all that was required for the microentrepreneurs to be successful was 
training yet the borrowers themselves claim otherwise.  
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No, it [the training] was difficult to follow, I didn’t understand it, I was trying but there 
was nothing specific for me. I went because I thought it would be good for me to know, 
but after one day I did not want to return, I wanted to just go and leave, but I should 
stay because that is what I agreed (Interview Transcript – Subject 21, Paragraph 21 - 
23).  
 
I went, it [the training] wasn’t very interesting or useful, but they gave us coffee and 
lunches, so I stayed (Interview Transcript - Subject 29, Paragraph 16).  
 
The participants each shared similar experiences of their attempts to become an 
entrepreneur. Their stories were far removed from the narrative presented by the 
microfinance industry. The borrowers told of an uncertain and insecure life, where debts 
mounted up if they were not successful. The majority of borrowers’ lives were not the same 
as the first participant in this chapter and not reflective of the narrative they are supposed to 
be living up to. The narrative and reality are divergent for those that attempted 
entrepreneurship with a loan. This reinforces my assertion that the narrative is only effective 
at a policy level in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance. On the ground, the economic 
realities present little alternative to those without jobs or opportunities.  
 
Alternatives to Entrepreneurial Microfinance  
 
Why? Why would you do that [borrow money to start a business] if you had another 
option? People want jobs in companies, in the government. Not to sell things like this, 
it is poor work (Interview Transcript - Subject 24, Paragraph 38).  
 
Entrepreneurship, at least in the way that microfinance borrowers conceive it, is nothing 
more than poor work for people with no other options. This was reflective of the attitudes of 
the loan officers. Those without formal employment were considered less worthy than those 
with jobs. Each of the respondents wanted to get back into paid employment and cease any 
trading activity they were doing. The narrative of entrepreneurship oversimplifies the lives 
and aspirations of the poor. Interviewees spoke of future family security, pensions, and sick 
pay, something basic trading with a loan would never provide. The narrative of 
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entrepreneurship creates multiple false realities of the lives of the poor. They are cast as 
entrepreneurs and that their lives exist in simple de-politicised financialised terms. At a policy 
level, these ideas are dominant. The narrative works to maintain the hegemony of 
microfinance on those basic terms. The realities for borrowers are different, the expectations 
set by the narrative are absent from their understanding of taking loans. The loans are only 
ever a last resort when it comes to employment.  
 
It was not really something I liked the idea of, I don’t like the idea of small business, it 
always seemed to low, not good for a proper life here (Interview Transcript - Subject 
32, Paragraph 12).  
 
Yes, I want a solution to this life, I am not secure in my work, I am hiding from [NGO 
MFI], my mind can’t take it much more (Interview Transcript - Subject 32, Paragraph 
32).  
 
I wanted a job, maybe in a school or for the government. I am starting to think about 
the future and a pension (Interview Transcript - Subject 31, Paragraph 14).  
 
The borrowers sought jobs, government jobs that provided security for them to be able to 
make long term plans and have families. Entrepreneurship was not the solution for them as 
borrowers and even less so a solution to the wider problems of unemployment being faced 
by Egypt. If Egypt wanted its people to live better lives it needed to provide steady jobs with 
regular incomes. The narrative of the entrepreneur reflects so little of the realities of those it 
talks of. The narrative is created to be consumed elsewhere than the front line. On the ground 
the thoughts of entrepreneurship are far removed from reality and the entrepreneurial 
narrative has no role in maintaining microfinance as a development policy. Recent events in 
Egypt, most notably youth-led riots citing concerns over the cost of living and employment 
opportunities, demonstrates that the narrative even at a policy level may be coming apart 
again already (New York Times, 2019).  
 
Financial Inclusion – Low Income Employed and Hungry Consumers  
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The narrative of financial inclusion is based upon the moral imperative of including the 
excluded into the globalised financial world. As a development imperative, it is said to help 
the poor manage their finances because being poor was bad but being poor and not being 
able to manage money was now considered worse (Collins et al., 2009). I argue that the 
narrative of financial inclusion is created to assign moral value to the financialisation of 
poverty in support of wider neoliberal reforms. The NGO CEOs I interviewed talked of “social 
lending” when they lent to borrowers for school fees or healthcare, connecting a social good 
to high interest debt to pay for basic services.  The narrative of financial inclusion, like that of 
the entrepreneur, constructs a simplistic view of life in poverty. The narrative obscures the 
neoliberal economic changes being enacted and fails to acknowledge the challenges of the 
poor borrowing money to pay for basic services. The majority of borrowers I interviewed for 
my thesis were borrowers of what I term financial inclusion loans, meaning the money was 
not for enterprise purposes.  
 
Low Income Employed  
 
If you are looking from a growth perspective, low-income clients with jobs, that can 
service debt for housing, for health, for education, that is your key market. (Interview 
Transcript – Subject 18 IFI Representative, Paragraph 37).  
 
The above quote was from an IFI representative talking of financial inclusion, clearly stating 
that the low income employed are the key market for MFIs. The loans are to improve 
borrowers lives with better health or schooling, assigning social good to debt. The following 
quote was from a borrower, who explained their loan was useful to spread the cost of 
expensive consumer goods.  
 
TVs are expensive, so we like to pay for things like that over a year, we have done it 
many times. It means we don’t have to use our savings for big things (Interview 
Transcript - Subject 30, Paragraph 16). 
 
I argue that the IFI representative’s quote is the promotion of the narrative of financial 
inclusion, presenting loans to the poor as a tool for health and education. The quote from the 
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borrower illustrates that loans are not considered a social good, just a tool to facilitate a basic 
standard of living. The narrative of financial inclusion needs to assign a social good to loans. 
Otherwise, the hegemony of microfinance is challenged as a development policy. Many of the 
participants in this thesis fell into the low income employed category and are relativity 
sophisticated financial consumers. They compare loan providers for interest rates and use 
debt to spread the cost of large purchases. They used loans to pay for white goods, private 
school fees, and in some cases healthcare. I asked them about the importance of the loan, 
reflecting the language of financial inclusion. They assigned no moral or special value to the 
loans, only stating that they were convenient in allowing them to consume.  
 
We have borrowed money from them [INGO] for a long time, 10 years maybe, I don’t 
remember exactly. We borrow for many things, a television, a cooker, a fridge, a few 
times for my sons’ school (Interview Transcript - Subject 35, Paragraph 5).  
 
Yes, always the same place for the loans, once they know you it is easy to borrow from 
them. I can just go and ask and then I can have the money in a few days. I can buy the 
television or an air conditioner and pay back week by week (Interview Transcript - 
Subject 35, Paragraph 12 - 13).  
 
Yes, sure, why not. Any time we need things I will borrow the money for. The payments 
are small, we can have our fridge straight away, it is easy (Interview Transcript - 
Subject 28, Paragraph 27).  
 
I have been a client of theirs for maybe 5 years or more. Usually, I borrow between 
2000 L.E (US$125) and 4000 L.E (US$250) per time. I have been borrowing mostly to 
pay for my children’s school fees, they take 2000 L.E (US$125) per term, my husband 
puts some from savings and we borrow some to share the cost (Interview Transcript - 
Subject 34, Paragraph 9).  
 
The social value that the narrative attributes to the loans is not reflected in the borrowers’ 
responses. The loans allowed them to consume goods more quickly than they otherwise 
could, like using a credit card. The ‘social’ loans that the CEOs presented allowed better-off 
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borrowers to pay for private healthcare or for their children to attend private schools rather 
than the cheaper state alternatives. Both the health and the education market had been 
liberalised and opened to foreign capital as part of the first SAP. The SAPs acted as a 
mechanism to financialise poverty. These structural changes worked to maintain a role for 
microfinance on the ground. The narrative of financial inclusion at a policy level is relied upon 
to conceal the privatisation of services and the promotion of debt. Those far removed from 
the reality of poverty consume the narrative and the hegemony of microfinance is 
maintained. On the ground, the poor have little alternative but to pay for basic services. Their 
lives are financialised and they are given microfinance as a tool to participate. The economic 
base that has been changed by the SAP and CPF maintain the position of microfinance. The 
poor have no alternative but to borrow and the hegemony of microfinance is maintained by 
the neo-liberal economic base.  
 
Market Making through the Microfinance Law 
 
The IFI-developed microfinance law of 2014 limited the provision of financial inclusion 
microfinance to commercial MFIs. The law excluded NGOs, who were only allowed to lend for 
enterprise purposes. Evidence from the CEOs demonstrates that over 90% of the 
microfinance market in Egypt is for purposes other than enterprise. I argue that the 2014 law 
was the IFI’s method of driving the majority of microfinance borrowers away from NGOs to 
the commercial MFIs. A key role of the IFIs is the promotion of a market economy and driving 
private foreign investment (Harrison, 2004). Through the 2014 law, the IFIs achieved this 
objective within the financial sector. On the ground this meant that borrowers of NGOs were 
now being asked to sign loan documents that stated they would run a business with the loan 
when they actually wanted a loan for consumption spending. The borrowers and the loan 
officers spoke of the uncomfortable situation where the borrower would lie about a business 
just to access a loan they had been repeatedly taking for many years. In some cases, the loan 
officers were coaching the borrowers on how to talk about their fake business.  
 
I have to lie to them really, I know they know I don’t have a business; it all feels strange 
(Interview Transcript - Subject 35, Paragraph 15). 
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My husband thinks we should try another place for loans next time, there are many 
around so maybe we should. It doesn’t really feel decent the way it happens now; it 
feels like we do something wrong. I will see what happens next year when we go for 
it and decide then (Interview Transcript - Subject 34, Paragraph 23).  
 
The result of the law was that borrowers were looking to move to private MFIs where they 
could borrow without the lies. The evidence from the borrowers demonstrates that the IFIs 
have acted as market makers for private capital and the narratives of microfinance have 
helped cover up the privatisation. The IFI’s promotion of entrepreneurship at a policy level 
has distracted attention from the realities on the ground. The microfinance market in Egypt 
has been privatised and the narratives at a policy level have helped to achieve that 
privatisation. The entrepreneurial narrative and the social value assigned to loans by the 
NGOs has distracted from the realities of the financialisation of poverty.  
 
Financial Inclusion and the Low Income Employed, Development or Consumerism?  
 
It [a loan] is not changing too much really, it is nice to feel like less expenses go out in 
one time, but it is not critical for us really. We have a good situation, my husband has 
a good job, we have most things we want. So maybe a bit easier but it is not too 
important (Interview Transcript - Subject 34, Paragraph 35). 
 
The evidence from the low income employed demonstrates that the narrative of financial 
inclusion does not reach the level of the borrowers. The idea of social value at a policy level 
dominates the modern microfinance landscape, especially the SDGs (Mader, 2017a). I argue 
this works to maintain the hegemony of microfinance. The evidence from borrowers 
illustrates that microfinance is a financial tool that they are happy to pay for so they can access 
better goods and services. When I spoke to the borrowers about the value of their loans, their 
responses did not reflect the narratives presented by the CEOs. Microfinance loans were 
interchangeable with other types of credit like store credit. Microfinance loans were often 
cheaper and allowed borrowers to spread the cost of large purchases.  
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I don’t use the store credit, I take a loan, plan the payments, 200 L.E (US$12) per week 
or whatever, and that’s it. I don’t feel it each week. If I take 10,000 L.E (US$625) from 
my savings, I see 10,000 L.E (US$625) less in my account (Interview Transcript - Subject 
35, Paragraph 25).  
 
I am happy he [the son] can go to a good school so that is good (Interview Transcript 
– Subject 20, Paragraph 64). 
 
The narrative of financial inclusion is not present on the ground, but some of the rationale 
behind it is. Borrowers did not view their loans as a social good but they did value their access 
to finance so they can consume in a market economy. The neoliberal economic base 
determined that the poor needed finance to improve their lives and the improvement defined 
as consumption. The SAP and the CPF have created a market economy and the lives of 
Egyptians have been slowly transitioned from their social contract with the government to a 
market-based economy.  
 
The Poorest of the Poor  
 
In my interviews with those that I term the low income employed, microfinance appears 
benign. Those on a moderately low income expand their consumption with a loan, not as a 
development imperative but because borrowers said they valued the ability to consume. As I 
stated in the introduction to this chapter, I made no official classification of poverty amongst 
the respondents but certain respondents indicated that borrowing was not as comfortable as 
for others. A group of borrowers told a more survivalist story of borrowing to make rent 
payments, pay for food, or get basic healthcare. These borrowers were also part of the 
financial inclusion narrative, not borrowing for enterprise purposes, but their stories were 
different to those who were employed. The goods they bought for the house were more basic 
than the white goods the other group purchased and, along with other purchases, they spend 
considerable sums on basic foodstuffs.  
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I borrowed this time 2000 L.E (US$125), I wanted to buy some things for the house, a 
ladder, buy some stock of my food, rice and things, for Eid mainly (Interview Transcript 
- Subject 25, Paragraph 9).  
 
We paid rent, it is old rent, so it is cheap, we bought things for the house, food. Mostly 
just food, each week I use it to buy groceries, anything we need (Interview Transcript 
- Subject 27, Paragraph 17).  
 
The borrowers in this group talked of their loans as being the last resort for expenses that 
they had to pay. Payments for healthcare were more frequent amongst this group of 
borrowers, indicating worse health and also a lack of insurance or savings to pay for 
emergencies.  
 
I borrowed 2000 L.E (US$125) to pay for my husband’s operation. He was very sick and 
needed an operation on his stomach (Interview Transcript - Subject 23, Paragraph 9).  
 
I borrowed money to pay for medical expenses for my son, he had an accident, he 
needed treatment, so I had to pay (Interview Transcript - Subject 06, Paragraph 4).  
 
The basic transactions amongst this group were the same as the low-income employed but 
the underlying reason was different. The aftereffects of the loan differentiated significantly. 
These borrowers demonstrated desperation and the malign nature of debt to the poor. The 
borrowers had borrowed to cover basic expenses or for emergencies but then struggled to 
meet repayments. This placed the borrowers under great stress, causing anxiety, marital 
problems, and even caused people to leave their homes to escape imprisonment for not 
repaying. The quick fix of debt left the borrower and their families in a more vulnerable 
position than when they started. The narrative of financial inclusion fails to account for the 
impacts of debt on the poor, when repayment needs to come from the existing already 
constrained income.  
 
It [borrowing] was easy, and yes, it helped for sure, we could buy food, pay rent, it felt 
relaxing for the first few months, to have some money there. But once it was gone, 
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then it became different, just a stress, a constant problem we had to face, it affected 
me with my friends, my husband, my family (Interview Transcript - Subject 27, 
Paragraph 29).  
 
The poorer borrowers were all encouraged by the NGOs to explain that they ran a 
microenterprise with the loan. They had less bargaining power than those with formal 
employment and therefore were more frequently forced to participate in training 
programmes which they would pay for within the loan. The poorest had no choice but to use 
an NGO and the commercial MFIs would not lend to people who were informally employed 
or unemployed. NGOs would regularly send loan officers to borrowers’ homes when they 
were unable to repay which isolated borrowers from their communities and was counter to 
any narrative of inclusion.   
 
When they [NGO MFI] keep coming to the house, calling, trying to get you to pay with 
money you don’t have. It gets too much, so they are forced to. I don’t like this idea, I 
want to finish this loan and then stop, it has caused too many problems, too much 
stress (Interview Transcript - Subject 27, Paragraph 27).  
 
I have too many loans now, too many. Thousands too many. I have some loans from 
[NGOs], 2 from there, and I have 3 from [NGOs], different parts. They are all causing 
me problems now, many of them. I needed the money in the beginning for my son, 
then it just went and went and went. They are looking for me and calling me (Interview 
Transcript - Subject 07, Paragraph 8).  
 
The poorer borrowers were more likely to discuss the increasing costs they faced for 
education and particularly healthcare. The previous group had used the loans to access better 
private provision while this group of respondents were paying for the basic state service. They 
each shared that when they were younger, education and healthcare were free, either from 
the government or even provided by the same NGO they now borrow from. The change to a 
neoliberal market economy had left these borrowers more vulnerable and more excluded 
than they previously were. Their world had been financialised and they had been provided 
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loans to be able to participate. They knew that their debt was unsustainable, and they felt 
they were becoming further excluded.  
 
What can I do, I have no option? I don’t feel bad for the loan, I understand what I did 
to take it. It is expensive but there is no alternative. Before the hospitals were free, 
now we have to pay for everything. If my husband can work again all will be OK, if not 
soon we will have problems (Interview Transcript - Subject 23, Paragraph 27).  
 
Evidence from the poorer borrowers I interviewed challenges the narrative of financial 
inclusion. Financial inclusion is supposed to help those who are excluded become included 
and the loans are supposed to be a source of social good. However, the poorest borrowers 
excluded by the market economy are made more vulnerable by the debt that they can barely 
afford. Financial inclusion is shown by this evidence as being no more than a policy-level 
narrative to cover up the financialisation of poverty. The realities for those that borrow 
diverge significantly from the narrative. It is not the social value that makes them borrow but 
the neoliberal economy in which they now live.   
 
Conclusion - Voices from the Ground  
 
Evidence from the interviews in this chapter demonstrate that the narratives of microfinance 
do not resonate with borrowers. At a policy level, the narrative of entrepreneurship maintains 
the hegemony of microfinance through the promotion of the idea of the poor as 
entrepreneurs. Evidence from the borrowers illustrates that the narrative is not reflective of 
reality. Borrowers that borrowed to start a business told of challenges and the implausibility 
of escaping poverty through their business. The narrative of financial inclusion at the level of 
the CEOs was hegemonic. The evidence from borrowers shows that the loans hold no greater 
utility to the borrowers than the goods they pay for. I argue that the narrative of financial 
inclusion also plays a role at a policy level to maintain the hegemony of microfinance and 
cover up the financialisation of poverty. The microfinance industry promotes narratives at a 
policy level which work to maintain the hegemony of microfinance. The narratives conceal 
the expansion of neoliberal capitalism through structural adjustment and help hide the 
realities that adjustment creates for the poor.  
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I argue that the entrepreneurial narrative at a policy level in Egypt is hegemonic and plays a 
role for the IFIs in supporting the continuation of microfinance. The realities of 
entrepreneurial microfinance for borrowers are divergent and the narrative fails to reach the 
front line. The realities of entrepreneurship presented by the borrowers I interviewed 
demonstrate the complex nature of bottom of the pyramid entrepreneurship. Complexity 
which the narrative removes from sight. At a policy level, there is something compelling about 
the entrepreneurial narrative. The IFIs representatives confidently stated that microfinance 
for enterprise would solve the problems of Egypt. However, when borrowers are asked about 
the realities of starting a microenterprise with a loan, their responses do not reflect the 
rational choice of an entrepreneur but speak of a situation in which they have no other option 
than to try to survive.   
 
The narrative of financial inclusion at a policy level is hegemonic and the presence of the 
narrative in the SDGs demonstrates that position. The interviews with the CEOs further 
support that conclusion. The CEOs promoted the social good of their loans. They were 
convinced that the borrowers’ lives were improved by them. Evidence from my interviews 
with the borrowers demonstrates that the narrative is a construct and bears no resemblance 
to their lived realities. The borrowers’ responses illustrated that loans under the narrative of 
financial inclusion facilitate consumption in a market-driven economy. The loans allow the 
working poor to expand their purchasing power and access new commercial goods or private 
education. For the poorest, the economy in which they now live is financialised and the loans 
offer inclusion but only because the economic structure has excluded them. The poor are 
forced into more vulnerable positions than when they relied on the state for health and 
education. Financial inclusion is a narrative at a policy level which the IFIs have relied upon to 
cover up structural economic change. The reality for those that are to ‘be included’, is that 
their lives are now financialised, and they have little choice but to pay private providers for 
basic public services.  
 
Evidence from the borrowers of microfinance demonstrated that the narratives of 
microfinance are not designed to be consumed at the front line. The narratives are carefully 
crafted for consumption at a policy level far removed from the realities of microfinance. At a 
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policy level those narratives are hegemonic and they allow for the continuation of 
microfinance as a development policy. The role of narratives for the microfinance industry is 
key. I argue that they work to disguise the financialisation of poverty. The industry in Egypt 
relies on the positive associations assigned to entrepreneurial microfinance to create 
favourable perceptions of microfinance at a policy level. The MFIs maintain that their loans 
for financial inclusion are a social good, yet the market is opened up to private capital for 
expansion of consumption and the financialisaton of poverty. My research demonstrates that 
without the narratives, microfinance is just high interest debt to the poor. At a policy level 
this is unpalatable but once a narrative assigns it a social good, high interest debt to the poor 
can become a widely supported development policy. Whilst the narratives maintain 
hegemony far removed from the reality of the borrowers, what maintains the hegemony of 






















Chapter 9 - Have We Sold the Poor the American Dream?  
 
The Narratives of Microfinance  
 
This thesis has investigated the role of narratives in the maintenance of the hegemony of 
microfinance in Egypt. The aim was to better understand how, as I perceived it, the 
microfinance industry relies on narratives to keep microfinance as a core development policy 
while covering up the financialisation of poverty. The evidence I gathered demonstrates that 
the industry promotes narratives which, at a policy level, work to maintain hegemony whilst 
on the ground the narratives fail to resonate. Microfinance is shown to be little more than 
high interest debt to the poor. The reliance on the narratives by the microfinance industry 
has enabled microfinance to become a large part of mainstream global capital and facilitate 
the financialisation of poverty, all under the guise of a development policy. 
 
The Research  
 
Central to my research is the assertion that microfinance is hegemonic as a development 
policy. This point is based on the continuing use of microfinance as a development policy, its 
credibility among policy makers, and the position it holds in the framing of the SDGs. The 
World Bank, the IMF, USAID, DfID and others continue to position microfinance as a critical 
development policy in the fight against poverty and exclusion (ACCION, 2008b; CGAP, 2012; 
WBG, 2017; IFC, 2019; GPFI, 2020; DfID, 2019) despite evidence against it. My past 
experiences working with microfinance showed me the realities of debt to the poor. Using 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, I began to view the narratives as tools for the industry to 
assign positive roles to debt and distract from those realities. The entrepreneurial narrative 
in the 1980s established microfinance as a positive tool for development. The 2014 Egyptian 
government’s strategic development plan capitalised on that narrative to try and convince 
the youth that their problems were being addressed. The IFIs and the Egyptian Government 
recreated and promoted the image of the poor entrepreneur and cited research that was 
undertaken over 30 years before (Yunus, 1999). The narrative of the entrepreneur has been 
disproven (Banerjee et al., 2015: 3), but in Egypt at a policy level, it is still promoted, and 
works to maintain the hegemony of microfinance. Since the entrepreneurial narrative was 
 204 
disproved, the IFIs globally have promoted a different narrative, that of financial inclusion. 
The aim not to support entrepreneurship but to provide sustainable financial services to the 
poor as a social good (CGAP, 2001; ACCION, 2008b; WBG, 2014; 2017; DfID, 2019; CGAP, 
2019b; GPFI, 2020). The financial inclusion narrative has been promoted by the industry to 
provide a continued rationale for microfinance as a development policy.  
 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is the framework I used to analyse the narratives of 
microfinance. Morton’s interpretation of Gramsci, “the articulation and justification of a 
particular set of interests as general interests” to exercise power and control (Morton, 
2007:113) was especially insightful in framing my research. I have demonstrated how the 
microfinance industry promotes their own interests as the interests of the poor borrowers, 
illustrating Morton’s definition. Gramsci’s other work has contributed to analysis and my 
understanding of the conditions which support hegemony. His conception of the economic 
base and superstructure has provided a deeper understanding of the hegemony of 
microfinance, providing insight into the continuation of microfinance where those narratives 
play no discernible role.  
 
The aim of this thesis was to better understand the role of narratives in the maintenance of 
the hegemony of microfinance in Egypt. Microfinance is high interest debt offered to the 
world’s poorest, with profits going to the world’s richest. However, when overlaid with a 
narrative, it is positioned as a tool for the entrepreneurial poor to help themselves out of 
poverty or for the excluded to gain inclusion. My research has shown that the narratives of 
microfinance make debt to the poor a logical choice, at least at a policy level. To understand 
the role of narratives in that process and to observe at what levels they were present, I 
interviewed participants from all levels of the microfinance industry. From the IFIs to the 
borrowers, I worked to obtain their perceptions of the narratives and their experiences of 




Over a period of two years, I gathered evidence from the microfinance industry in Egypt. I 
interviewed representatives from IFIs, CEOs from large MFIs, loan officers as well as 
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borrowers. I explored the hegemony of microfinance through the narratives the industry 
promotes. I used semi-structured interviews to provide a deep understanding of the influence 
the narratives had on participants and used that understanding to investigate my argument. 
I undertook my research to answer this core research question:  
 
• What role do narratives play in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance in Egypt?  
 
In Egypt, the narratives of microfinance run in parallel. The entrepreneurial narrative is the 
policy narrative yet the narrative of financial inclusion is shown to be part of the wider role of 
microfinance. The entrepreneurial narrative among the majority of the IFI representatives 
was itself hegemonic. The terms of the narrative were present in their collective senso 
comune. The evidence I gathered in my research further demonstrates that the IFIs, along 
with the government of Egypt, are supported by the entrepreneurial narrative as a tool at a 
policy level. The narrative works to affect the senso comune of the youth by promoting ideas 
that entrepreneurship is their path to employment. The NGO MFIs also promote the 
entrepreneurial narrative as by law they are mandated to. The CEOs stated that their MFIs 
had grown financially over the last 15 years not by using the narrative of entrepreneurship 
but by offering financial inclusion. The CEOs presented the narrative of financial inclusion as 
their chance to support the poor. The narrative was ingrained in their belief that microfinance 
is a social good for the poor.  
 
My argument was strengthened by the evidence from the commercial MFI CEO. Commercial 
MFIs had no need to promote a narrative to promote their loans and could advertise or offer 
consumer loans to the poor. One CEO demonstrated that the narrative of entrepreneurship 
had a significant value in their MFIs position within the industry. The commercial MFI 
promoted the narrative of entrepreneurship despite them stating the reality was not 
reflected by it. The CEO claimed that entrepreneurial microfinance could not achieve the role 
it set out to achieve yet he promoted it publicly because it created positive associations with 
debt. The evidence from interviews with tier one and two participants illustrates clearly that 




In my interviews with those on the front line of microfinance, the evidence demonstrated 
divergent reasons for engaging with microfinance. The terms of the narratives were not 
present in their collective senso comune and therefore played no discernible role in 
maintaining its hegemony. Both loan officers and borrowers demonstrated that the narratives 
were not present in their daily interactions with loans except as an administrative burden to 
those dealing with NGOs. The maintenance of the hegemony of microfinance on the ground 
was shown to be not through the altered senso comune of the loan officers and borrowers. 
Borrowers did not see themselves as entrepreneurs and loan officers did not present their 
role as one of creating employment amongst the poor. What was demonstrated was that the 
hegemony of microfinance on the ground was influenced by the impact of structural 
adjustment policies on the economic base. The neoliberal economic system that the poor of 
Egypt now lived in meant that, for borrowers, microfinance was a necessary tool to pay for 
basic goods and services. The SAP and CPF had financialised their existence and there are few 
alternatives to microfinance for the poor, forcing them to participate.  
 
The Narrative of the Entrepreneur  
 
At a policy level, I argue that the narrative of the entrepreneur is both a tool to maintain the 
hegemony of microfinance as well as being itself hegemonic. The narrative in Egypt is 
promoted by the IFI representatives as a solution to unemployment, especially for the youth. 
Evidence from my interviews with the IFIs demonstrated that the narrative was present in 
their collective senso comune. They each stated that microfinance, along with training, would 
impact both employment and poverty in Egypt. My research shows that the narrative is 
further promoted by the Government of Egypt and supported by universities, NGOs, and the 
media. I use Cox’s (1983) definition of the mechanisms of hegemony to observe the 
promotion of narratives through civil society as an action designed to reinforce hegemony. 
Whilst the narrative is hegemonic at the policy level, there is also evidence it is a tool. Details 
of the IFI interviews illustrated that rather than presenting a real solution, the narrative was 
part of an attempt to have the youth believe that entrepreneurship was an answer to 
unemployment. The IFI representatives understood the situation in Egypt and knew that 
promoting loans without jobs as an outcome would not have been agreed upon by the 
Egyptian government.  
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I argue that the IFIs along with the Government of Egypt rely on the narrative of 
entrepreneurship not only as a tool to maintain the hegemony of microfinance but to disguise 
the financialisation of poverty. In promoting the narrative, they work to convince the 
population that action is being taken to address unemployment and poverty. In reality, I 
demonstrated that the focus on entrepreneurship provides a cover for structural economic 
changes. Fearful of the power of the youth, the Egyptian Government needed a tool to 
convince them that a solution had been implemented. Whilst promoting microfinance as a 
solution, the IFIs and the government work to enact changes under the CPF that would 
negatively impact the Egyptian people. At a policy level, the entrepreneurial narrative works 
to distract attention while key public services are privatised, markets are liberalised, and civil 
service is reduced. Through the CPF and under the narrative of entrepreneurship, the 
microfinance market was liberalised and privatised, opening up the market for greater profits 
from lending to the poor.  
 
The CEOs of the NGO MFIs in Egypt further promoted the narrative of entrepreneurship, 
demonstrating more clearly that it is a tool to maintain hegemony rather than a tool for 
enterprise. They are forced by the law to lend only for enterprise and so they promote the 
narrative, yet the evidence they provided illustrated it was at odds with their lending 
activities. The CEOs explained that while they promoted the narrative, they did not believe it 
was effective in its aims. Their operations were at odds with the narrative, their clients 
demanded loans for school fees, medical bills and white goods, things that the CEOs claimed 
were socially important for their borrowers. One of the CEOs escorted me to visit a borrower 
who ran a successful business with a microfinance loan. This borrower was the embodiment 
of the narrative. The visit provided me with an understanding of the persuasiveness of the 
narrative. The story was reminiscent of those told by the industry over the past 30 years, I felt 
it was designed to show me as a researcher the effectiveness of microfinance. Whilst the NGO 
CEOs were forced to use the narrative of entrepreneurship, the real value was clearly 
demonstrated in the interview with the commercial MFI CEO. Despite stating his MFI’s motive 
was profit, he used the positive associations of the entrepreneurial narrative to overlay their 
lending activities and give a false moral cloak to the loans. The CEOs demonstrated that at an 
operational level the narrative of entrepreneurship was not a reflection of the reality of 
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microfinance. But at a policy level, in their MFI’s communications and research, the narrative 
played a key role in allowing their businesses to remain profitable and avoid negative 
associations.  
 
The evidence from loan officers as well as the borrowers confirmed my argument that the 
narrative on the ground is not present. The loan officers were aware of their legal obligations 
under the 2014 law but those obligations are shown to be little more than a form-filling 
exercise. The loan officers confirmed that despite the law change, NGO borrowers still borrow 
for consumption. They are now coerced into signing paperwork which claims they are 
entrepreneurs but the loans are for anything but an enterprise. My interviews with borrowers 
provided the same evidence. Borrowers were asked to sign forms stating their loan is for 
business use when they were looking to pay their children’s school fees or buy something 
new for the home. The few borrowers that had attempted entrepreneurship with a loan had 
failed and explained that the likelihood of their success was low based on the political 
economy in which they operate.  
 
The evidence gathered regarding the narrative of entrepreneurship illustrates its role at a 
policy level. The IFIs and MFIs, along with the Government of Egypt promote the narrative to 
affect perceptions of political actions and to conceal the financialisation of poverty. In 
practice, evidence from loan officers and borrowers demonstrate the narrative plays no role 
in the hegemony of microfinance nor is reflective of reality. Therefore, I argue that the 
narrative is both hegemonic and plays a key role in the maintenance of the hegemony of 
microfinance at a policy level but plays no role on the ground. The narratives of microfinance 
work only amongst populations far removed from the everyday use of microfinance. The 
narratives work to persuade those not directly affected to think that microfinance and 
entrepreneurship was a viable solution to unemployment for the poor. On the ground, 
evidence from the loan officers and borrowers shows that the narratives play no role in the 
hegemony of microfinance. Their responses illustrate that it is the neoliberal economic 
system, created by the SAP and CPF, that means microfinance has a continued role in the lives 
of the poor.   
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Financial Inclusion  
 
As I have argued, the narrative of entrepreneurship is both hegemonic and a tool to maintain 
the hegemony of microfinance. Conscious of the employment challenges facing Egypt, the 
narrative provides political value and acts as a distraction from the financialisation of poverty. 
The narrative of financial inclusion, which globally is the IFIs primary policy narrative, needed 
to be a secondary narrative in Egypt. As one IFI representative stated, a push for loans without 
jobs would not have worked to address the Egyptian government’s concerns. Consumer 
loans, under the narrative of financial inclusion, are what I argue is the financialisation of 
poverty. The provision of these loans has been offered to the private sector in Egypt by the 
2014 microfinance law. The IFIs have relied on the narratives to create the perception that 
entrepreneurship was the main use of microfinance in Egypt. However, my evidence revealed 
that over 90% of Egyptian microfinance is not for enterprise purposes and now was only 
accessible via commercial MFIs. The IFI representatives provided evidence that 
entrepreneurship was key in Egypt yet they quietly confirmed that financial inclusion was the 
largest microfinance sector. At a policy level in Egypt, the narrative of financial inclusion is 
hidden and currently only plays a limited role for the industry there.  
 
Financial inclusion at a policy level is missing from the discussions in Egypt, but the NGO CEOs 
gave evidence of the role that the narrative should play for their MFIs. The interviews revealed 
that the CEOs saw great value for their clients in the social loans, for paying school fees, 
accessing health care, and facilitating other types of consumption. Evidence from the NGO 
CEOs illustrated that the narrative of financial inclusion was present in their collective senso 
comune. The CEOs implied they used the entrepreneurial narrative to comply with the law 
but continued to offer consumption loans because they were of great social importance to 
their clients.  
 
The commercial MFI participant provided a different perspective on financial inclusion. They 
explained that their loans, designated financial inclusion by the IFIs, were not for any social 
good but for MFI profit. Evidence from that interview demonstrates that financial inclusion 
according to the commercial sector is a narrative, MFIs should not be considered a method 
of social inclusion but a provider of financial services. The evidence from the commercial MFI 
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CEO supports my argument that the narratives of microfinance are tools which help the 
industry to cover up the financialisation of poverty. Loans without a narrative would fail to 
position microfinance within the SDGs and therefore would fail to maintain its hegemony at 
a policy level. The commercial MFI CEO was aware of that and promoted a narrative, counter 
to the loans they offered, to ensure that their business was connected with the positive 
associations.  
 
As with the entrepreneurial narrative, the notion of financial inclusion did not reach the front 
line. Both loan officers and borrowers failed to recognise any of the positive social traits that 
the narrative assigns to debt. The loan officers facilitated the lending of money to borrowers 
with no reference to the social good of their act. They lent money so borrowers could expand 
consumption and pay for goods and services. The borrowers confirmed this, whilst some 
borrowed and attempted enterprise, the majority borrowed to pay for goods and basic 
services. The borrowers confirmed that they were taking loans not because they wanted to 
be included but because it was often the only means available to pay for the once free public 
services. On the ground, the narrative of financial inclusion was not present in the senso 
comune of the poor and was of no value to the microfinance industry. As previously stated, 
what maintained the hegemony of microfinance on the ground was the economic base that 
had been created for the poor by the SAP and CPF.  
 
The SAP and CPF have delivered a growing market for MFIs, MFIs have become full financial 
service providers for the poor. The narrative of financial inclusion has supported the industry 
in ensuring that financial service provision remained favourable and a key development 
policy. The realities shared by those on the front line of microfinance demonstrate that the 
narrative is nothing more than a cover, at a level higher up the chain, for the financialisation 
of the world the borrowers live in. The realities of life for the poorer parts of society are not 
reflected in the social good attributed to financial inclusion. Loans are taken by the poor to 
pay for basic services which they can no longer afford. Financial inclusion without the 
narrative is closer to payday lending than to the imperatives of development policies. 
Financial inclusion on a global scale is a policy narrative designed to mask the financialisation 
of poverty.  
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What Role do Narratives Play in Maintaining the Hegemony of Microfinance in Egypt?  
 
Microfinance is highly profitable, aligns with neoliberal development policy, and works to 
open markets while supporting the financialisation of poverty. On the basis of the evidence 
uncovered during my research, I argue that this statement is the reality of microfinance, 
minus its narratives. My research has demonstrated that the microfinance industry relies on 
narratives at a policy level to influence perceptions of debt to the poor. It is the narratives of 
microfinance that work to maintain its hegemony at a policy level, associating hope and 
inclusion with debt. The realities on the ground present a different reality, microfinance is 
often the only option for the poor whose lives have been financialised. They are a captive and 
expanding market which makes the business of microfinance profitable. Microfinance is not 
only profitable. It is also a powerful political tool for those involved from a governance 
perspective. NGO CEOs explained that they, and their board members, are afforded 
significant political influence by their access to their large client base. Industry insiders have 
considerable political capital and use it as a means by which individuals drive their own private 
business interests forward. My research has shown that the hegemony of microfinance is 
valuable to those involved for both profit and power.  
 
Microfinance, as illustrated in the literature review, has been shown to be anti-poor and anti-
development (Bateman, 2010b), yet is still a favoured development policy and central to the 
SDGs. Using Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to investigate the microfinance industry and the 
role of narratives has allowed me to better understand how the industry maintains and 
justifies its relevance. I argue that the narratives of microfinance are hegemonic at a policy 
level. The evidence I gathered from the IFIs and CEOs demonstrated that. The IFIs stated that 
entrepreneurship could solve the problems of unemployment in Egypt and the CEOs of NGOs 
believed that their loans were a social good. The narratives were present in their collective 
senso comune, microfinance was not just debt but a tool for enterprise and inclusion. Through 
Gramsci’s lens, I view the narratives as hegemonic as well as being tools to maintain that 
hegemony. The narratives are promoted by the mechanisms of hegemony, the IFIs, NGOs, 
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research, the media, and education. Their promotion allows them to gain support among the 
populations far removed from the everyday operation of microfinance. 
 
My research has also demonstrated that, on the ground, the narratives of microfinance are 
not what maintains its hegemony. The loan officers and borrowers demonstrated that the 
narratives were neither present nor representative of reality. The loan officers showed little 
understanding of the narratives their CEOs promoted other than the legal obligations they 
now had to comply with. The borrowers demonstrated little adherence to the narratives. 
Their loans fulfilled none of the aims attributed to debt. The loans offered the poor 
opportunities to expand their consumption or to pay for services that once were free. The 
reason microfinance is successful at an operational level can be attributed not to the 
narratives but the lack of alternatives for the poor who live in post-adjustment neoliberal 
societies. The economic base has been altered and it has changed the realities for the poor. 
The superstructure promotes narratives that work to shape senso comune and support 
changes to the base at a policy level but on the ground the economic base is the determinant 
of the actions of the poor.  
 
Narratives rhetorically soften the harsh realities of neoliberal development, making debt to 
the poor seem benign to those far removed. I argue that the narratives gain popular consent 
through the arguments made in favour of microfinance by a wide range of figures, including 
academics, the media and even celebrities, eventually the narrative becomes fact at a policy 
level (Hossain and Salimullah, 1984; Hossain, 1988; Soto, 1989; Yunus, 1989; Todd, 1996; Pitt 
and Khandker, 1998; Yunus, 1999; Alexander, 2001; Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001; Snodgrass and 
Sebstad, 2002; Pitt et al., 2003; Kaboski and Townsend, 2005; NYT, 2005; Pitt, Khandker and 
Cartwright, 2006; Kondo, 2007; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008; Bruhn and Inessa, 2009; Syed, 
2009; Roodman and Morduch, 2009; NPR, 2010; Roodman, 2012; Khandker, 2012; Hossain et 
al., 2013; McKenzie, 2015). The case of Egypt has shown that the popularity of the narrative 
of the poor entrepreneur championed by Yunus (1999), repeated by Bono (NYT, 2005) and 
now disproven by many  (Osmani, 1989; Quasem, 1991; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Morduch, 
1998; Rahman, 1999; Hulme and Arun, 2009; Karlan and Zinman, 2009; Bateman, 2010b; 
Duvendack et al., 2011; van Rooyen, Stewart and de Wet, 2012; Bateman and Chang, 2012; 
Sinclair, 2012; Garikipati, 2013; Bateman, 2014; Duvendack, Palmer-Jones and Vaessen, 2014; 
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Banerjee et al., 2015; Mader, 2015; Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman, 2015; Bateman and 
Maclean, 2017), is still hegemonic in development policy.  
 
At a policy level, it is the narratives of microfinance that maintain its hegemony. Its extensive 
inclusion in the SDGs is contingent on it fulfilling the tasks assigned by those narratives. 
Without the narratives, microfinance laid bare is payday lending to the poor. Gramsci’s theory 
has been instrumental in understanding microfinance in that way, separating the narrative 
from the reality. Narratives assign positive attributes to debt and the process of hegemony 
ensures that those narratives affect the senso comune of certain groups. In understanding the 
mechanisms of hegemony, I have been able to view the narratives as a tool which works to 
cover the financialisation of poverty in the name of development. The borrower’s stories 
demonstrate that on the ground, narratives play no role in the hegemony of microfinance. 




The idea for this research was developed while I was working in the finance industry, 
supporting IFIs and MFIs in funding their operations. Throughout that period, I went from 
being an advocate of microfinance to someone confused about why the intervention failed 
to achieve the goals it set. I wanted to understand how, despite all its failings, microfinance 
remained strongly positioned in the development agenda. Reading Gramsci’s theories led me 
to view microfinance in a conceptually different way, separating the narratives from the 
intervention. Microfinance is a tool to support neoliberalism and to financialise poverty while 
the narratives are tools to facilitate that process. The narratives have convinced the 
development sector that loans unequivocally help the poor. Five of the SDGs are contingent 
on the imagined impact of microfinance. My research has separated the narrative from the 
intervention and enabled me to argue that microfinance amounts to the financialisation of 
poverty, keeping the poor in a cycle of debt as they pay for the implementation of structural 
adjustment.   
 
The foundations of microfinance are based on the political economy within which it 
originated. I argue that it has always been a tool for structural adjustment more than it was a 
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tool for entrepreneurs or to foster inclusion. The position microfinance has in the lives of the 
poor is not because it has value in either of those areas but because it provides means to pay 
for education, healthcare, and other basic goods and services. The SAP and CPF in Egypt 
changed the economic base within which the poor live, as they have for many people across 
the world. It is the neoliberal system which creates the market for microfinance. The 
narratives only operate at a policy level to allow the financialisaton of poverty to occur under 
the guise of development. My research has opened discussion on the role of narratives in the 
hegemony of microfinance. It moves the debate away from the impact studies undertaken to 
prove or disprove microfinance and places focus on the politics that requires microfinance to 
exist.  
 
Directions of Future Research  
 
Microfinance research is still predominantly focused on intervention as a tool to achieve 
positive outcomes for the poor. My research has worked to move that debate on by arguing 
that those positive outcomes are largely imagined in the industry’s narratives and do not 
reflect the lived reality of borrowers’ lives. The evidence presented aligns my arguments with 
the financialisation of poverty school, critically viewing microfinance as a tool to integrate the 
poor into the global financial markets rather than being a tool for social improvement. My 
research has demonstrated that the microfinance industry relies on unsubstantiated 
narratives to maintain the view that intervention in the lives of the poor when the realities 
suggest otherwise. 
 
My contribution to the literature has been to explore the role of narratives within 
microfinance in order to better understand the industry’s continued dominance. It is these 
narratives of microfinance that assign positive roles to borrowing and continue to justify 
interventions that trap the poor in debt. Viewing the professed outcomes of microfinance – 
entrepreneurship, business growth, poverty alleviation, social and financial inclusion – as 
‘hegemonic narratives’ can change the way critical researchers understand the implications 
of microfinance on the poor. Conceptualising these narratives as tools with which the industry 
facilitates the ongoing dominance of microfinance in development provides an explanation 
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as to its ubiquity. This research recasts the way in which those critically engaged with 
microfinance can view interventions.    
 
My research offers insights for those looking to challenge the seemingly unstoppable progress 
towards the financialisation of poverty, allowing for a more considered understanding of the 
implications of microfinance. Given the pervasiveness of the microfinance model, my 
research will allow critical scholars, policymakers, and development sector professionals to 
challenge the narratives that sustain the sector. Understanding microfinance’s hegemony 
within development, and its narratives as tools, will enable counter narratives to develop. 
Viewing microfinance as debt and the industry’s narratives as tools that have created positive 
associations enables those looking to challenge microfinance to interrogate these narratives. 
If narratives are socially defined stories (Hinchman and Hinchman, 1997:16), their disconnect 
with reality will become the point by which the logic of microfinance can be challenged.  
 
As part of the financialisation of poverty school, I argue that more attention is required to 
investigate the narrative of financial inclusion. The narrative of entrepreneurship had a 
plausible economic underpinning. Hypothetically, if the poor were entrepreneurs, they could 
borrow money and start businesses. It could be positioned as a poverty alleviator or an 
employment generator. Whilst these ideas have been disproven empirically, it had a logical 
theoretical foundation. The narrative of financial inclusion is less clear cut and less well 
articulated and the impact, if any, would be more difficult to define than that of 
entrepreneurship. Yet, despite the weak underpinnings, the microfinance industry has 
integrated financial inclusion into the SDGs with the support of narratives. The intensive 
inclusion of personal debt with the attainment of the SGDs is an aspect of them that requires 
greater scrutiny and public awareness. Financial inclusion as discussed throughout this thesis 
was defined in the introduction as the social value attributed to loans which are currently the 
largest part of financial inclusion activities (Mader, 2017a: 3). Whilst the agenda does stretch 
much further, critics often describe the loans as just a rebranding of entrepreneurial 
microfinance (Bateman and Chang, 2012: 68). Financial inclusion as a narrative creates 
positive associations with financial services for the poor. Financial inclusion brings loans, bank 
accounts, savings, mobile money, financial literacy, and a range of other services provided by 
powerful public and private global actors into the lives of the poor. 
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The narrative of financial inclusion uses a rights-based language of justice to argue for the 
inclusion of the excluded. The World Bank, the IFC, USAID, DfID, ACCION, GCAP, and others 
promote full financial inclusion because “access to these services enables consumers to 
acquire productive assets, invest in health and education and make other purchases that 
enrich their lives” (DfID, 2019). GCAP, The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, is a 
consortium of 30 of the world’s largest development actors. Members include 15 national 
development agencies from the UK, Germany, France and others, companies like MasterCard 
and Visa, banks like Crédit Suisse and UN agencies like UNDP and the UNCDF, all promoting a 
well-funded rollout of financial inclusion (Mader, 2016; 2017a). GCAP argues that “One in 
three of the world’s adult population lacks the financial services they could use to dramatically 
improve their lives” (CGAP, 2019b). Financial inclusion is described by CGAP as key to 
“achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals of improved education, better 
health, food security, access to clean water and more” (CGAP, 2019b).  
 
CGAP and other financial inclusion supporters consider market-based services as a fait 
accompli. Improved education or better health care no longer public services but market 
goods paid for by microfinance. Their promotion of strong emotive narratives is reflective of 
the power put behind the entrepreneurial narrative in the early stages of the industry. The 
narrative claims that financial services could dramatically improve the lives of the poor yet 
fail to determine what that dramatic improvement might be. If the improvement they 
describe is the ability for the poor to pay for privatised services such as education, health, and 
water, then it would be necessary to determine why the poor might have to pay for those 
services in the first place. The World Bank (2018a) encourages borrowers to take loans to pay 
for basic commodities such as clean water and latrines, stating the poor should take debt to 
pay to improve their lives. The economic changes that require the privatisation of services are 
supported and promoted by many of those who are part of GCAP. Structural adjustment was 
and still is the catalyst for the proliferation of microfinance. The wider development industry 
is extending the reach of markets. What has changed between the microfinance of old and 
the latest push for financial inclusion is that the debt is provided by global investors. Global 
capital invests in financial inclusion microfinance which generates a significant financial return 
extracted from the poor. This is a change in sentiment from the stories once told by 
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Mohammed Yunus. Narrative analysis can be used by critical researchers to illuminate the 
extent to which microfinance is a corporate industry, literally banking on the poor for profit. 
 
Those interested in further challenging the narratives of microfinance could leverage my 
research to explore more deeply the way the national legislative frameworks impact the 
organisation of MFIs. In Egypt, narratives supported a change from NGO to private sector 
financial inclusion, associating ambitions of entrepreneurship with the expansion of debt. My 
research demonstrated that the commercial sector benefited from changes in the Egyptian 
legal framework. Those interested in exploring the financialisation of poverty through 
microfinance could continue this research to understand if this was an Egyptian anomaly or a 
global trend. A better understanding of the role of the narratives of microfinance globally will 
enable those critically engaged with microfinance to view it as financialisation rather than an 
expansion of a development intervention.  
 
I have demonstrated that the microfinance industry is supported by narratives which help to 
maintain global neoliberal hegemony. Those interested in challenging or at least better 
understanding the drive towards the financialisation of poverty can build on this research. I 
have argued that the global financial industry, including banks and payment providers, are 
controlling the financial inclusion agenda by assigning social value to loans for the poor that 
they themselves make a significant profit from. These claims should be tested. Obviously, my 
research was based on a single country case study. More research is needed in order to 
extrapolate and test my conclusions across a broader set of examples and cases. The use of 
my framework as a tool for future study can facilitate a far deeper understanding of the 
nature of microfinance if used in conjunction with additional empirical data. Research that 
understands microfinance in this way can cast light on the realities of people’s lived 
experiences and thereby challenge the mechanisms by which poverty is being financialised.  
 
Conclusion – Have we sold the poor the American Dream? 
 
The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates how the microfinance industry relies on 
narratives to maintain hegemony at a policy level. Whilst the narratives of microfinance work 
to convince those far removed from the front line that microfinance is a tool for development, 
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those narratives fail to resonate on the ground. On the ground, the realities of high interest 
loans to the poor are divergent from the narratives. The economic environment in which the 
poor live is the determinant of the hegemony of microfinance. The microfinance industry has 
promoted narratives to support structural adjustment programmes in Egypt, covering the 
financialisation of poverty with positive associations of entrepreneurship and inclusion. The 
narratives have allowed something that could be considered malign to be sold as something 
not only benign but of great value to those that access it. The evidence I have presented 
within this research has answered my research question and identified the role of narratives 
in maintaining the hegemony of microfinance.  
 
Using Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to view microfinance in relation to its narratives has 
allowed me to understand microfinance as the equivalent of payday lending, differing only in 
the sense that it is undertaken in the global south. Yet with the narratives overlaying the 
transaction and the borrowers being far removed from those the narratives speak to, that 
transaction can be sold globally as a social good, a step towards achieving the SDGs. The 
narratives are hegemonic at a policy level and their terms were present in the senso comune 
of the policy makers. On the ground, however, the narratives do not need to be hegemonic. 
Those that the narratives speak of only have limited options when making economic choices. 
The economic base has been altered to allow for neoliberal capitalism to determine how basic 
transactions occur and the financialisation of poverty ensures that microfinance is always 
‘needed’ by borrowers.  
 
The title of my thesis is ‘Have we Sold the Poor the American Dream?’. I conceived of that 
question when I first started researching microfinance. I asked myself whether the poor 
understood and lived the narratives of microfinance. What my research has told me is the 
opposite: that the poor have been forced into a market-based economy and have to borrow 
to pay for the most basic of services. I argue that to achieve that position, the microfinance 
industry has sold the poor’s American Dream to the policy makers who continue to advocate 
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Appendix 1 – Interview Schedule 
 
Code Number  Sex  Age  Location  Date of Interview  
IFI Representatives          
Subject 02  B C A 05/03/2016 
Subject 10  A C A 22/06/2016 
Subject 12  B B A 25/06/2016 
Subject 16  A B A 05/02/2017 
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Subject 18 B C A 06/03/2017 
CEOs          
Subject 01  B C C 02/03/2016 
Subject 11  B C A 25/06/2016 
Subject 15 B C A 10/09/2016 
Subject 17  B C A 05/03/2017 
Subject 19  B C A 04/04/2017 
Loan Officers and Field Staff          
Subject 03 A B A 12/03/2016 
Subject 04  B B B 10/05/2016 
Subject 05  A C A 10/05/2016 
Subject 08  B B C 20/06/2016 
Subject 09  B B A 20/06/2016 
Subject 33 B B A 05/01/2018 
Borrowers          
Subject 06  B D  A  12/05/2016 
Subject 07  A D  B 12/05/2016 
Subject 13 B A A 25/06/2016 
Subject 14  B C C 01/09/2016 
Subject 20  A  D  A 12/04/2017 
Subject 21 A D  A 12/04/2017 
Subject 22 A C A 13/05/2017 
Subject 23 A B D 15/05/2017 
Subject 24 B B C 21/05/2017 
Subject 25 A  C A 01/07/2017 
Subject 26 B D  A  04/07/2017 
Subject 27 A C B 09/07/2017 
Subject 28 B C B 01/10/2017 
Subject 29 B C B 04/10/2017 
Subject 30 A D  B 09/10/2017 
Subject 31 A B A 12/11/2017 
Subject 32 A A C 05/01/2018 
Subject 34 A B A 07/01/2018 
Subject 35 B C A 08/01/2018 
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Age Code  A B C D 
  15-25 26-39 40-59 60+ 
Location Code  A  B C D 
  Cairo  Giza  Alexandria  Delta  
Sex code  A B     
  Female  Male      
 
 
Appendix 2 - Draft Interview Guide for IFI Participants 
 
Themes  Guiding Themes  Opening Statements  Follow Up Statements  Notes  
Entrepreneurship  
Business Development  
•How do you view 
the role of 
microfinance here in 
Egypt?                               
•How have you 
worked with the 
Government to 
support the growth of 
microenterprises? 
•How do you perceive 
the impact of loans on 
microentrepreneurs?      
•How do you feel the 
loans help business 
growth of simple 
trading activities? 
•What do you see the 
role of (IFI) being here 
in Egypt? How do you 
measure that impact?                            
•Have you experienced 
times where the impact 
has not been seen in the 
wider communities as 
you expected?                       
•What are your 
experiences in working 
with Egyptian MFIs? 
Aim to work in 
the specific 







their role in the 
process and the 
perceptions of 
the impact the 
loans have on 




Economic Growth  
Poverty Alleviation  
Jobs and Income  
•Is Microfinance able 
to address the deeper 
issues associated with 
poverty in Egypt?                             




and unemployment?  
•Do you feel that 
entrepreneurs are able 
to escape poverty?                    
• In your experience, 
have you seen examples 
of the poor becoming 
successful 
entrepreneurs?                     
• How sustainable do 
you feel that reduction 
Focus on the 





Social Improvement  
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Women's Empowerment  
in poverty is? For the 
Individual? For the 
Wider Community?                           
• How does running a 
small business address 
the structural issues of 
poverty? • Does being 
in debt challenge the 
notion of reducing 
poverty?  Health and Education  
Food and Security  
Financial Inclusion  
Social Inclusion  
•Why is Financial 
Inclusion not part of 
(IFI)'s work in Egypt?                                     
• Given (IFI) work 
with financial 
inclusion elsewhere, 
what role to do you 
see financial inclusion 
microfinance having 
here? 
•How do you consider 
finance a tool for social 
inclusion?                   
• What is the role of 
(IFI) in providing these 
services?     • What are 
your experiences with 
financial inclusion 
elsewhere?                           
• How was it able to 
fulfil its role as a social 
good for the poor?                                     
• Can you explain how 
you determine the 
difference between 
consumption as a social 
good and consumption 
due to lack of 
alternative?  
Explore why the 
IFIs do not talk 
about financial 
inclusion in 
Egypt. Seek to 
understand how 
the role of debt 
becomes a social 
good in their 
perspective.  Investing in the Future  
Health and Education  
Managing Financial Affairs  
A Requirement of Life  
Consumption  
Basic Services  




inclusion?         • How 
do you explain debt 
led consumption part 
of everyday life?  
•How important is it to 
distinguish between the 
working poor and those 
in poverty when it 
comes to financial 
inclusion? • How do you 
see borrowing for 
consumption as an 






is accepted as 
part of financial 
inclusion and 
how they 
perceive that to 
be part of the 
SDGs.  
Improved Services  
Household Goods  
Food and Security  
Luxury Items  
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